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L JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The Supreme Court referred jurisdiction to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (4). 
II. ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Did Judge Harding err in granting PacifiCorp's motion for summary 
judgment? The courts review the rulings on motions for summary judgment for 
correctness. Bond v. SDNCO, 2002 UT 83, If 10, 54 P.3d 1131 (Utah 2002); 
Harline v. Baker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996); Schurtz v. BMW North America, 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). Fox Ridge preserved this issue with the 
timely filing of its Notice of Appeal. Tr. 1003. 
B. Did Judge Harding err in denying Fox Ridge's motion for summary 
judgment? As indicated above, rulings on motions for summary judgment are 
reviewed for correctness. Fox Ridge preserved this issue with the timely filing of 
its Notice of Appeal. Tr. 1003. 
C. Did Judge Harding err in making the following evidentiary rulings: 
(1) refusing to admit or consider parol evidence; and (2) granting PacifiCorp's 
motions to strike? The determination of the admissibility of evidence, including 
the admissibility of parol evidence, is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. Spears v. Warrf 2002 UT 24, \ 18, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002); 
Wadsworth Contr. v. City of St George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995). Fox 
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1 
Ridge preserved these issues by timely filing its Notice of Appeal, Tr. 1003, by its 
proffers of evidence, Tr.187-189, 191-195, 592-594, 602-603, 624-626, 889-891, 
949-951, 953-955, and by its memorandum in opposition to PacifiCorp's first 
motion to strike. Tr. 967. PacifiCorp filed its second motion to strike on March 7, 
2001, the day before the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, leaving 
Fox Ridge no opportunity to respond in writing. Tr. 946-948. It did so without 
filing a motion that the motion be heard in shortened time. Nonetheless, without 
notice to Fox Ridge, Judge Harding heard the motion the following day and 
granted it in his written ruling. Tr. 977, 981-988. 
D. Did Judge Harding err in denying Fox Ridge's conditional Rule 
56(f) motion for continuance? The grant of this motion would have precluded 
summary judgment, and therefore should be reviewed for correctness. Fox Ridge 
preserved this issue by timely filing its Notice of Appeal. Tr. 1003. 
III. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The interpretation of the following rules is determinative of this appeal: 
A. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
B. Rules 401,402, 408, 803 and 804, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
These rales are set forth in their entirety as Tab 13 of the Addendum to this 
brief. There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. PacifiCorp filed this action on January 16, 2001, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that it possesses the right under a Transmission 
Line Easement over Fox Ridge's real property to remove existing two pole and 
three pole structures and install in their place much larger steel towers. Tr. 19. On 
February 5, 2001, Fox Ridge filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment 
that PacifiCorp does not possess that right, and also seeking injunctive relief. Tr. 
62-112. (PacifiCorp's and Fox Ridge's claims regarding interpretation of the 
transmission line easement are collectively referred to as the "Easement Claims" 
or separately as PacifiCorp's "Easement Claim" and Fox Ridge's "Easement 
Claim," respectively.) 
Fox Ridge's counterclaim also made claims that PacifiCorp's plan to 
construct, own and operate new power transmission lines over Fox Ridge's 
property violated the Lehi City Redevelopment Agency's (the "RDA") Alpine 
Highway Redevelopment Plan (the "Redevelopment Plan") and the Utah 
Neighborhood Redevelopment Act; that the RDA adopted the Redevelopment 
Plan without adequate notice and hearing in violation of Fox Ridge's due process 
rights; that PacifiCorp's proposed ownership of a new transmission line and other 
facilities across Fox Ridge's property would constitute an unconstitutional use of 
public funds in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article XI, § 5, Article XIV, § 
3, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-2 and 17-50-302 and -303; that PacifiCorp's 
construction of steel towers and a new transmission line would constitute an 
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unlawful condemnation of Fox Ridge's property; and that PacifiCorp had a duty 
under a Franchise Agreement with Lehi City to provide electrical power to Fox 
Ridge (the "RDA Claims"). Fox Ridge sought declaratory and injunctive relief in 
connection with these claims. Tr. 62-112. 
B. Course of Proceedings. On January 29, 2002, before Fox Ridge 
even had the opportunity to answer PacifiCorp's complaint, PacifiCorp filed a 
motion for summary judgment. Tr. 25-26. On January 31, 2002, Judge Raymond 
M. Harding, Jr., held a telephone scheduling conference, and, at PacifiCorp's 
request1, established an accelerated briefing and hearing schedule. Tr. 676-677. 
Judge Harding's Scheduling Order provided, among other things: (1) that Fox 
Ridge must file its answer and any counterclaims by February 5, 2001; (2) that 
Fox Ridge must file its response to the pending summary judgment motion and 
file any summary judgment of its own no later than February 15, 2001; and (3) 
that the Court would hear oral argument on "the parties' respective motions for 
summary judgment" on March 8, 2001. Tr. 676-677. 
As ordered, Fox Ridge filed its answer and counterclaim on February 5, 
2001, Tr.112; filed a response to PacifiCorp's motion for summary judgment on 
the Easement Claims and a cross motion for summary judgment on the Easement 
Claims on February 15, 2001, Tr. 144, 661; and also filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the RDA Claims on February 15, 2001. Tr.136, 591. 
PacifiCorp filed a motion for speedy hearing, together with its motion for summary judgment. Tr. 59. 
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The parties subsequently filed a series of motions on evidence and 
procedure. On February 15, 2001, Fox Ridge filed a conditional motion for 
continuance of PacifiCorp's motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(f). Tr. 
152. Even though the Court's Scheduling Order provided that the parties' 
respective summary judgment motions would be heard on March 8, 2002, 
PacifiCorp filed a motion on February 21, 2001, asking the Court to bifurcate the 
issues to be heard at the March 8 hearing, i.e.9 to proceed as scheduled on the 
parties' motions for summary judgment on the Easement Claims and to stay the 
briefing schedule and hearing on Fox Ridge's motion for summary judgment on its 
RDA Claims. Tr. 664. On February 27, 2001, PacifiCorp filed a motion to strike 
certain evidence Fox Ridge offered in support of its motion for summary judgment 
on the Easement Claims and in opposition to PacifiCorp's motion for summary 
judgment. Tr. 757, 786. On March 6, 2001, PacifiCorp filed its own conditional 
motion for continuance of Fox Ridge's motion for summary judgment on the 
Easement Claims under Rule 56(f). Tr. 920. Finally, on March 7, 2001 - the day 
before the scheduled hearing - PacifiCorp filed a motion to strike the Affidavit of 
S. Kenly Clark that Fox Ridge filed on March 1, 2001, together with its reply 
memorandum in support of its cross motion for summary judgment on its 
Easement Claims. Tr. 948. 
Due to the expedited schedule, during the January 31 scheduling conference 
PacifiCorp agreed to produce documents per informal written request by Fox 
Ridge on an expedited basis no later than February 9. Tr. 167, 171. On February 
5 
9, PacifiCorp produced a number of additional documents, but never folly 
complied with Fox Ridge's requests. Tr. 160, 796. Neither party took any 
depositions. 
Without ruling on whether it would grant PacifiCorp's motion to bifurcate 
(and thereby deny Fox Ridge a hearing on its motion for summary judgment on 
the RDA Claims), or without giving notice that it would hear PacifiCorp's motions 
to strike, Judge Harding proceeded with the scheduled hearing on March 8, 20012. 
At the outset of the hearing, Judge Harding announced he would not hear Fox 
Ridge's motion for summary judgment on the RDA Claims because Fox Ridge 
had not served the Lehi City Redevelopment Agency, and in so doing effectively 
granted PacifiCorp's motion to bifurcate. He then heard argument on all 
remaining motions, including PacifiCorp's motions to strike that were neither 
noticed nor folly briefed, and took the matter under advisement. Tr. 977. He 
issued his written ruling on March 12, 2001. Tr. 988 (Tab 2 of Addendum). 
Disposition Below. Even though the parties urged opposite interpretations 
of the subject easement, Judge Harding concluded that "[b]oth parties agree that 
the easement language is clear and unambiguous, and the Court so holds." Tr. 
987 (Tab 2 of Addendum). Having so held, Judge Harding found the matter ripe 
for summary judgment and ruled as follows: 
2
 The Court's Notice of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, Tr. 61, was the only notice given of 
any motion to be heard on March 8,2001. 
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1. Granted PacifiCorp's motion for summary judgment on its Easement 
Claim. 
2. Denied Fox Ridge's motion for summary judgment on its Easement 
Claim. 
3. Granted PacifiCorp's motions to strike. 
4. Denied PacifiCorp's motion to bifurcate as moot. 
5. Denied Fox Ridge's Rule 56(f) motion as moot. 
6. Announced that Fox Ridge's motion for summary judgment requires 
additional parties and was not yet properly before the Court. 
Tr. 981 (Tab 2 of Addendum). 
On April 15, 2002, Judge Anthony Schofield entered an Order to Show 
Cause under Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 4-103 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, requiring the parties to appear and show 
cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Tr. 997. The 
parties appeared as ordered and Judge Schofield continued the matter until August 
23, 2002. Tr. 998. Without further notice, Judge Schofield entered an Order of 
Dismissal without prejudice of all remaining claims on September 24, 2002. Tr. 
1000. 
Fox Ridge timely filed its Notice of Appeal on October 23,2002. Tr. 1003. 
Statement of Facts. Fox Ridge is the owner and developer of 
approximately 2600 acres of real property in northern Utah County known as the 
Traverse Mountain Master Planned Community ("Traverse Mountain"). Tr. 656. 
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Once completed, Traverse Mountain will include 3500 homes, office space, retail 
shops, restaurants, theatres, parks, schools, churches, hospitals, police and fire 
departments, nature trails and a 1,200 acre nature preserve. Tr. 655. 
On December 21, 1956, Sylvan W. Clark and Zella R. Clark, Fox Ridge's 
predecessors in interest, granted Utah Power & Light ("UP&L"), PacifiCorp's 
predecessor in interest, the subject easement and right of way (the "Clark 
Easement") across the Traverse Mountain property. Tr. 622 (Tab 6, Exhibit A of 
Addendum), 657. The Clark Easement is set out on UP&L's pre-printed form 
entitled Transmission Line Easement, and grants to UP&L: 
a perpetual easement and right of way for the erection and continued 
maintenance, repair, alteration, inspection, relocation and replacement of 
the electric transmission, distribution, telephone and telegraph circuits of 
the Grantee, one three pole and nine two pole towers structures and four 
guy anchors with the necessary guys, stubs, cross arms, braces and other 
attachments affixed thereto, for the support of said circuits, on, under, over 
through, and across [the relevant property]. (Emphasis added.) 
As shown by the enlarged excerpt of the crucial words contained in the Clark 
Easement, the words in italics ("one three pole and nine") 
were typed into blanks on the form. The . . 
srrtacturM 
word "towers" was x-d out. The word ntamJXS*^&JaLsiM~x** pofe t«a» wuLJ 
I Cropped excerpt from Qaifc Easement showing the blank on the I 
in b o l d ("Structures") w a s inse r t ed a b o v e easement fona filled in and tibe word "towers" x'd out with the 
J typewriter. I 
the x-d out word. Tr. 622 (Tab 6, ' ' 
Exhibit A of Addendum), 657. The Clarks intended that striking the word 
"towers" would exclude large steel towers and limit UP&L (and successors) to 
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erecting wooden poles of the size UP&L actually installed. Tr. 890 (Tab 7 of 
Addendum). 
In 1957, UP&L constructed a transmission line to connect its substation on 
90th South in Salt Lake County to the Hale substation at the mouth of Provo 
Canyon (the "90th South-Hale Line"), and, as provided in the Clark Easement, 
erected one three pole and nine two pole structures over the Traverse Mountain 
property. Tr. 656-657. 
In 1956 and 1957, contemporaneous with the execution of the Clark 
Easement, UP&L obtained easements from property owners all along the 90th 
South-Hale Line on the same pre-printed form as the Clark Easement that 
provided for the erection of a specific number of two pole and three pole 
structures. Tr. 648-650. Examples include: 
• Johnson Easement: "no structures" and "no guy anchors" (Tab 6, Exhibit B 
of Addendum) 
• Southworth Easement: "one 3-pole structure" and "6 guy anchors" (Tab 6, 
Exhibit C of Addendum) 
• Beck Easement: "one 3-pole structure, 14 two pole structures" and "4 guy 
anchors" (Tab 6, Exhibit D of Addendum) 
• Broadbent Easement: "two two pole structures" and "no guy anchors" (Tab 
6, Exhibit E of Addendum) 
• Burgess Easement: "no two pole towers" and "no guy anchors" (Tab 6, 
Exhibit F of Addendum) 
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• Hansen Lime Easement: "one three pole structure, 2 two-pole 
structures"and "6 guy anchors" (Tab 6, Exhibit G of Addendum) 
In each easement, except the Burgess Easement, the word "towers" is x'd out. Tr. 
609 (Tab 6, Exhibit G of Addendum), 611 (Tab 6, Exhibit F), 613 (Tab 6, Exhibit 
E), 615 (Tab 6, Exhibit D), 617 (Tab 6, Exhibit C) and 619 (Tab 6, Exhibit B). 
The number and type of pole structures described in each of these easements 
corresponded to the type and number of pole structures UP&L intended to install. 
Tr. 718-719. 
UP&L subsequently obtained other electrical transmission line easements 
that, although similar in most respects to the Clark Easement, contained 
significantly broader language. For example, on October 10, 1978, Security Title 
Company and others conveyed a power line easement to UP&L permitting the 
"erection ... of electric transmission and distribution circuits ..., with the 
necessary poles, towers, guys, stubs, crossarms, braces and other attachments 
affixed thereto ..." Tr. 606 (Tab 6, Exhibit H of Addendum), 648 (emphasis 
added). On or about June 29, 1989, Michael M. Carlson conveyed an easement to 
UP&L granting "a perpetual easement and right of way for the erection, operation, 
maintenance, repair, alteration, enlargement, inspection, relocation and 
replacement of electric transmission and distribution lines ..." Tr. 603 (Tab 6, 
Exhibit I of Addendum), 648. 
PacifiCorp also has rewritten at least one of the original easements along 
the 90th South-Hale Line to broaden its language and expand the type of 
10 
permissible structures. On May 29, 1996, PacifiCorp obtained from Micron, 
successor to the real property covered by the original Beck Easement described 
above, a modified easement granting: 
a perpetual easement and right of way for the erection, operation, 
maintenance, repair, alteration, enlargement, inspection, relocation 
and replacement of electric transmission and distribution lines, 
communications circuits, fiber optic cables and associated facilities, 
and four - three pole structures, six - two pole structures, one -four 
pole switch structure and fourteen guy anchors, with the necessary 
stubs, crossarms, braces and other attachments affixed thereto, for 
the support of said lines and circuits ... 
Tr. 600 (emphasis added) (Tab 6, Exhibit J of Addendum). Notably, all of the 
above evidence was obtained without the benefit of full discovery prior to issuance 
of Judge Harding's summary judgment ruling; other additional relevant evidence 
most assuredly exists that Fox Ridge was not able to distill (see section VI.D, 
infra). 
In about June of 2000 - 43 years after UP&L erected the original two pole 
and three pole structures on Fox Ridge's property - representatives of PacifiCorp, 
including PacifiCorp's lawyer, Jeff Richards, met with Stephen Christensen, Fox 
Ridge's Operations Manager, and requested that Fox Ridge sign a new easement 
that would relocate a portion of the transmission lines across Traverse Mountain 
and replace the original Clark Easement over the balance of the easement corridor 
(the "Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement"). Tr. 646, 950 (Tab 9 of Addendum). 
The Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement identified Utah Valley Land Company as 
"Grantor" (as PacifiCorp apparently was unaware Fox Ridge had purchased the 
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property), Tr. 594 (Tab 6, Exhibit K of Addendum), and contained significantly 
broader language than the Clark Easement, stating: 
[Grantor] hereby grants to PacifiCorp, ... ("Grantee"), an easement 
for a right of way 50 feet in width, more or less for the construction, 
reconstruction, operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, 
enlargement, and removal of electric power transmission, 
distribution and communication lines and all necessary and 
desirable accessories and appurtenances thereto, including without 
limitation: supporting towers, poles, props, guys and anchors .... 
(Emphasis added). 
Tr. 594 (Tab 6, Exhibit K of Addendum), 646. 
During the meeting, PacifiCorp's representatives advised Mr. Christensen 
that PacifiCorp intended to remove the 
existing two pole and three pole structures 
and install in their place the much larger 
single pole steel towers that are the subject 
of this litigation, and to add an additional 
transmission line. Tr. 950 (Tab 9 of 
Addendum). Fox Ridge ultimately refused 
to sign the 2000 Fox Ridge Easement, and 
informed PacifiCorp that the proposed construction of new steel towers and an 
additional transmission line exceeded the express scope of the Clark Easement. 
Tr. 544-546 (Tab 5 of Addendum), 652. 
The original two and three pole structures averaged 52 feet in height and 16 
12 
inches in diameter. Tr. 625 (Tab 6 of Addendum), 653. In contrast, the steel 
towers average 89 feet in height, Tr. 703, and are larger in diameter than the two 
and three pole structures, with at least one such tower measuring approximately 6 
feet in diameter. Tr. 625 (Tab 6 of Addendum), 653. 
Due to their increased height and girth, the new towers increase the burden 
on the Traverse Mountain property in at least the following respects: 
1. They require setbacks of 400 to 600 feet on either side of the 
transmission line, well beyond the 50-foot corridor provided for in the Clark 
Easement. Tr. 187-189 (Tab 3 of Addendum), 192-195 (Tab 4 of Addendum), 
652. 
2. They will cause the loss or devaluation of 500 to 800 residential lots. 
Tr. 192-195 (Tab 4 of Addendum), 651. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Under Utah law, a contract is ambiguous if it is capable of more than 
one reasonable interpretation. R & R Enters, v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc^ 936 
P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997) (ambiguity exists if contract language is "reasonably 
capable of being understood in more than one sense"); Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1995). It follows that if Fox Ridge's 
interpretation of the Clark Easement is reasonable, then Judge Harding erred in 
granting PacifiCorp's motion for summary judgment. 
The most reasonable interpretation of the Clark Easement is that the parties 
intended the words "two pole and three pole structures" to refer to the particular 
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type of structures that PacifiCorp actually erected on the Traverse Mountain 
property; and that the words "alteration," "relocation/' and "replacement" give 
PacifiCorp the right to alter the original two and three pole structures, to relocate 
them, and to replace them with similar structures, but not to remove the original 
structures and install steel towers, which are much larger and therefore more 
intrusive, in their place. 
One indication that the foregoing interpretation is reasonable is that the 
parties struck the word "towers" and replaced it with the word "structures," 
manifesting their intention that the easement exclude tall steel towers and permit 
only two and three pole structures of the type actually erected. A further 
indication of the reasonableness of this interpretation is that the 50-foot right of 
way is insufficient for PacifiCorp's steel towers. For safety and other reasons, 
setbacks of at least 100 feet are necessary on both sides of the towers. 
In short, Fox Ridge's interpretation that the parties who created the Clark 
Easement intended the words "two pole and three pole structures" to refer to the 
type of structures actually erected, and did not intend the words "alteration," 
"relocation," and "replacement" to allow PacifiCorp to substitute the more 
intrusive steel towers for the original structures, is reasonable. Accordingly, the 
Court should reverse Judge Harding's order granting summary judgment in favor 
of PacifiCorp. 
B. Judge Harding should have granted Fox Ridge's motion for 
summary judgment because PacifiCorp's interpretation of the language of the 
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Clark Easement is not reasonable. PacifiCorp's position is that the easement 
cannot be read to impose any limitation on the type of permissible structure. If 
that were so, the easement would not have specified two pole and three pole 
structures but would have simply granted UP&L the right to erect ten structures of 
any type as needed to support the electrical transmission lines. 
Alternatively, if both Fox Ridge's and PacifiCorp's interpretations are 
reasonable and the easement is therefore ambiguous, Judge Harding should have 
granted summary judgment in favor of Fox Ridge because the undisputed extrinsic 
evidence resolves the ambiguity in Fox Ridge's favor. As shown below, the 
extrinsic evidence shows that the parties intended to limit permitted structures to 
the type actually erected. That evidence includes the following: 
1. Original transmission line easements along the 90th-South Hale Line 
granting UP&L the right to erect a specific number of two pole and three pole 
structures. These easements, consistent with the Clark Easement, indicate an 
intent that the UP&L be limited to a certain number and type of structures. 
2. Subsequent UP&L and PacifiCorp transmission line easements 
containing broader language than that included in the Clark Easement, in 
particular providing for "enlargement" of permitted structures, and allowing 
generally for "towers" or other structures rather than specifying two pole and three 
pole structures. 
3. A modification of the Beck Easement - one of the original 90th 
South-Hale Line easements - to allow "enlargement" of supporting structures, and 
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also to add one "four pole structure" to the type of structures permitted in the 
easement corridor. This indicates that UP&L's successor, PacifiCorp, understood 
the original 90th South-Hale Line easements did not permit "enlargement" of 
permitted structures, and that changing the type of structures to be erected in the 
easement required amendment of the easement language. 
4. PacifiCorp's proposed substitute for the original Clark Easement that 
added the word "enlargement" and replaced the words "two pole and three pole 
structures" with the words "all necessary and desirable accessories and 
appurtenances thereto, including without limitation: supporting towers, poles, 
props, guys and anchors ..." This again demonstrates that PacifiCorp knew how 
to draft broad language of grant and knew, too, that the narrower words "two pole 
and three pole structures" contained in the Clark Easement limited the type of 
structures that could be erected in a way that prevented erection of steel towers. 
5. The Affidavit of S. Kenly Carlson, the son of the grantors, stating 
that his parents struck the word towers to keep UP&L from putting anything larger 
than the original wooden poles on the subject property. 
6. The Affidavits of James Christensen and Rustin Tolbert stating that 
the proposed steel towers would significantly increase the burden on the servient 
estate because, among other things, the towers would require much greater 
setbacks than the original two and three pole structures - setbacks significantly 
exceeding the 50 foot right of way provided for in the Clark Easement - and 
would eliminate or devalue 500 to 800 lots. 
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C. Judge Harding erred in granting PacifiCorp's motions to strike the 
Carlson Easement, the Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement, portions of the 
Affidavits of James Christensen and Rustin Tolbert, and the Affidavit of S. Kenly 
Carlson because: 
1. The Carlson Easement, although not pertaining to the 90 South-
Hale Line easement corridor, provides for "enlargement" of permitted structures 
and thereby demonstrates the type of language PacifiCorp itself considered 
necessary to permit the enlargement of such structures. 
2. The Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement was not an offer of 
compromise, as Judge Harding ruled. Rather, PacifiCorp offered that easement as 
part of a proposed business transaction before there was any dispute between the 
parties. 
3. Contrary to Judge Harding's ruling, the Christensen and Tolbert 
Affidavits were not speculative but based on the personal knowledge of the 
affiants as to the setbacks required for large power transmission towers and the 
impact of the towers on the number of lots that could be developed on the 
Traverse Mountain property. 
4. The Kenley Clark Affidavit, although hearsay, presents direct 
evidence of intent not available elsewhere. It contains sufficient circumstantial 
indications of reliability in that Mr. Clark is a disinterested witness and has 
specific memory of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Clark 
Easement because he ran the family cattle business on the subject property at the 
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time the easement was executed and was concerned about its impact on that 
business. 
D. At a minimum, Judge Harding erred in denying Fox Ridge's Rule 
56(f) motion. Given the compressed schedule and PacifiCorp's failure to timely 
produce documents as requested, he should have continued the hearing on 
PacifiCorp's motion to allow discovery of evidence on meaning of the words "two 
pole and three pole structures" and "towers." He also should have permitted 
discovery on the issue of burden, particularly as to the type of setbacks reasonably 
required for steel towers nearly 100 feet in tall. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. Judge Harding Erred in Granting Paeificorp's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
1. Relevant Legal Standards. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to enter 
summary judgment only if the court finds "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
The moving party bears the burden of proof that there is no genuine issue of as to 
any material fact. Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997). 
For purposes of a summary judgment motion, all "facts and reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom [must be viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Utah 1995). "A 
trial court may properly grant a motion for summary judgment ... only when 
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reasonable minds could not differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence 
presented." Olympus Hills Shopping Center v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, 
Inc., 889 P.2d 445,450 (Utah App. 1995). 
In the instant case, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. 
Each party claimed the Clark Easement clearly and unambiguously supported its 
interpretation. Judge Harding erroneously concluded that, because both parties 
contended the easement was unambiguous, the matter was ripe for summary 
judgment and extrinsic evidence irrelevant. However, "the filing of cross-motions 
for summary judgment does not necessarily mean that material issues of fact do 
not exist." Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Division of State Lands and 
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). "Rather, cross-motions may be viewed 
as involving a contention by each movant that no genuine issue of facts exists 
under the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no dispute remains under 
the theory advanced by its adversary." Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 
P.2d 821, 825 (Utah App. 1989). 
When interpreting a contract, the basic rule is that the intent of the parties 
must be ascertained from the instrument itself. Plateau Mining, 802 P.2d at 725. 
Parol evidence may be admitted to explain the parties' intent if a contract is 
ambiguous. Id; Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 
1995). "When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant 
evidence must be considered. ... A judge should ... consider any credible evidence 
offered to show the parties' intention." Id. (emphasis added). "[I]f a legal 
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conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual 
issue as to what the parties intended/' summary judgment may not be granted. 
Plateau Mining, 802 P.2d at 725. 
In interpreting an easement, "[t]he accepted rule is that the language of the 
grant is the measure and extent of the right created; and that the easement should 
be so construed as to burden the servient estate only to the degree necessary to 
satisfy the purpose described in the grant." Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590, 
591 (Utah 1963). 
2. Fox Ridge's Interpretation that the Parties Intended the Words "Two 
Pole and Three Pole Structures" to Refer to the Type of Structures 
UP&L Actually Erected is Reasonable. 
As shown above, a contract that is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation is ambiguous as a matter of law. Ward v. Intermountain Farmers 
Ass'n, 907 P.2d at 269. It follows that if Fox Ridge's inteipretation is reasonable, 
then Judge Harding erred in granting summary judgment in favor of PacifiCorp. 
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment based on alleged unambiguous 
language because the easement language, especially the term "maintenance," did 
not unambiguously reflect the intent of the parties). 
The most reasonable interpretation of the easement is that the parties 
intended that UP&L would have the right to erect two and three pole structures of 
the type it actually built. Indeed, all along the 90th South-Hale Line, from Lehi 
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to Highland to Provo, stands a pattern of 
assembled, framed wooden structures, 
consisting of two or three wooden poles 
with wooden cross members. The picture 
at right shows such structures. Under the 
doctrine of practical construction of a 
contract, the fact that UP&L actually 
erected wooden two and three pole structures on the Traverse Mountain property 
demonstrates UP&L's understanding that these are the type of structures the Clark 
Easement permitted. Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 684 
P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1984) ("[A] practical construction placed by the parties upon 
the instrument is the best evidence of their intention." (quoting Rosen v. E.C. 
Losch Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 377, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965)); Zeese v. Estate of Max 
Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975) ("Under the doctrine of practical construction, 
when a contract is ambiguous and the parties place their own construction on their 
agreement and so perform, the court may consider this as persuasive evidence of 
what their true intention was. The parties, by their action and performance, have 
demonstrated what was their meaning and intent.") 
PacifiCorp concedes that in 1956 and 1957, contemporaneous with the 
execution of the Clark Easement, UP&L obtained easements from property 
owners for a power line between its substation at 90th South and its Hale substation 
at the mouth of Provo Canyon. As PacifiCorp explains: 
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These easements were form documents, each containing the same 
language, with blanks to be filled in only for the number of support 
structures that UP&L then intended to erect on each particular parcel 
of property. Some parcels were small, and required an easement 
solely for the power lines themselves to cross over the air space of 
the surface of the property; no support structures were to be built on 
these properties. Other parcels were larger, and required an 
easement not only for the airspace for the lines themselves, but also 
required the erection of a number of support structures. In these 
cases, the parties filled in the number of structures then intended to 
be installed. 
Tr. 718-719. Recorded easements all along the 90th South-Hale Line, to the extent 
they allow supporting structures at all, use the words "two pole structures" and 
"three pole structures." As does the Clark Easement, these easements also specify 
the number of guy wires that may be installed to support the structures. Tr. 609 
(Tab 6, Exhibit G of Addendum), 611 (Tab 6, Exhibit F of Addendum), 613 (Tab 
6, Exhibit E of Addendum), 615 (Tab 6, Exhibit D of Addendum), 617 (Tab 6, 
Exhibit C of Addendum) and 619 (Tab 6, Exhibit B of Addendum). PacifiCorp 
omits to mention that these easements specified the particular type, as well as the 
number, of structures to be installed on the various properties. Such specificity is 
inconsistent with any interpretation other than that the parties intended to limit the 
type, as well as the number, of structures that UP&L could erect on each of the 
subject properties. 
As is evident from the plain language of the Clark Easement, the parties 
intended (1) that UP&L would have a perpetual easement and right of way for 
electric transmission lines or "circuits" and (2) that the burden of the easement be 
minimized by limiting UP&L to a particular number and type of support 
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structures. In granting PacifiCorp's summary judgment motion, Judge Harding 
gave effect to the former of these intentions but nullified the latter. In contrast, 
Fox Ridge's interpretation gives full effect to all of the Clark Easement's terms 
and thus full effect to the parties' intentions. Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 987 P.2d 
48, 52 (Utah 1999) ("[A] court must attempt to construe the contract so as to 
'harmonize and give effect to all of [its] provisions.'" (quoting Niels on v. O'Reilly, 
848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1993)). In short, Fox Ridge reasonably interprets the 
words "two and three pole structures" to limit the type of permissible structures. 
Accordingly, Judge Harding's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
PacifiCorp must be reversed. 
3. The Parties' Striking of the Word "Towers" Provides Further 
Indication that Fox Ridge's Interpretation is Reasonable. 
As stated above, the Clark Easement is set forth on UP&L's pre-printed 
form. The parties struck the printed word "towers" and replaced it with the word 
"structures." In interpreting a contract, the fact finder may consider such 
alterations to a printed form. Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., 417 P.2d 643, 645-46 
(Utah 1966) (finding "most important" factor in interpretation of assignment 
contract the fact of alterations made to a printed form). 
PacifiCorp contends, and Judge Harding agreed, that the word "structures" 
is broader than, and inclusive of, the word "towers," and that the parties actually 
expanded the easement by replacing the word "towers" with the word "structures." 
Tr. 718. But this argument mischaracterizes the real issue, which is whether at the 
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time of executing the Clark Easement the parties understood and intended the 
words "two pole and three pole structures" to refer to the particular type of 
structures that were different from "towers." In other words, the issue is whether 
the parties understood the words "two and three pole structures" and "towers" to 
be terms of art describing a particular (and different) type of support structures. 
The answer, of course, is yes. Plainly the limiting words "two pole and three pole" 
indicate a particular type of structure. If the parties intended the word "structures" 
to be used in its broadest sense it would have stood alone without the modifying 
words "two pole and three pole." 
Judge Harding denied Fox Ridge the opportunity to take evidence on this 
issue, but Fox Ridge believes discovery would show that in the 1950s UP&L and 
other power companies used the combination of words "two pole", "three pole", 
and "structures" to refer to the type of wooden pole structures it actually erected 
along the 90th South-Hale Line, and the word "towers" (which was x'd out of the 
Clark Easement) to refer to larger steel towers. Certainly there is, at a minimum, 
sufficient indication that this is so and therefore it was error for Judge Harding to 
grant summary judgment for PacifiCorp. 
4. The Words "Alteration," "Relocation," and "Replacement" only Give 
PacifiCorp the Right to Alter the Existing Structures, to Relocate Them, 
and to Replace Them with Similar Structures. 
PacifiCorp argues, and Judge Harding agreed, that the words "alteration," 
"relocation," and "replacement" permit the removal of the two and three pole 
structures and erection of steel towers in their place. But the most reasonable 
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interpretation of these words is that they permit nothing more than the alteration of 
the original two and three pole structures, the relocation of those original 
structures, and the replacement of those original structures with similar structures. 
The dictionary defines the word "alteration" as "... the state of being 
altered: The alteration improved the dress." The Random House Dictionary of 
the English Language, at 43 (Unabridged Ed., 1967). Synonyms of alteration are 
"modification" and "adjustment." To make an "alteration" of a will means to 
modify some language, not create a new will. To alter a dress or a suit means to 
take it in, or let it out, not manufacture a new and different dress or suit. To make 
an alteration of a thing means to modify a thing, not replace it with something new 
and different. Thus "alteration" of "two and three pole structures" means to 
modify those very structures, not replace them with something entirely different 
such as, for example, PacifiCorp's much larger steel towers. 
The word "replacement" means, in common usage, "to provide a substitute 
or equivalent in the place of: "to replace a broken vase or dish." The Random 
House Dictionary of the English Language, at 1216 (Unabridged Ed., 1967). Thus 
a "repair or replace warranty" gives a purchaser the right to demand replacement 
of a defective article with an article with the same or a substantially similar article. 
It does not give the purchaser the right to demand a different article that performs 
a similar function. If, for example, a careless hunter were to shoot out an insulator 
on one of PacifiCorp's poles, the Clark Easement would allow PacifiCorp to 
replace it. Similarly, if a pole were to rot or to be blown down in a windstorm, 
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PacifiCorp would have the right to replace the defective pole with a similar pole. 
But replace, in its common meaning, cannot be read to mean that PacifiCorp 
would have the right to remove the existing two and three pole structures and erect 
something different in their place. 
Finally, the word "relocate" means PacifiCorp has the right to change the 
location of the permitted two and three pole structures. That word cannot be read 
to grant the right to substitute steel towers for two and three pole structures. 
In short, contrary to PacifiCorp's argument and Judge Harding's ruling, the 
plain meanings of the words "alteration," "replacement" and "relocation" do not 
permit substitution of steel towers for two and three pole structures. Those words 
only permit the alteration of the existing two and three pole structures, the 
replacement of two and three pole structures with similar structures, and the 
relocation of the existing (or replacement) two and three pole structures. They do 
not grant PacifiCorp to erect something significantly larger and more intrusive. 
5. The Most Reasonable Interpretation of the Clark Easement is that 
PacifiCorp's Towers Exceed the Scope and Extent of the Easement 
Grant, and Impose a Substantial Additional Burden on the Servient 
Estate. 
Utah law regarding the scope and extent of easements is well-established: 
The accepted rule is that the language of the grant is the measure of 
the extent of the right created; and that the easement conveyed 
should be so construed as to burden the servient estate only to the 
degree necessary to satisfy the purpose described in the grant. 
Weggeland v. Ujufusa, 384 P.2d at 591. "A right of way founded on a deed or 
grant is limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument." Labrum v. 
26 
Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah 1985). It is impermissible for a court to 
expand the terms of the easement beyond those set out in the grant. Id. 
As stated above, the Clark Easement language evidences the parties' intent 
that UP&L have a perpetual easement and right of way for transmission lines. The 
easement language also evidences that the parties intended to limit the burden on 
the servient estate by specifying the precise number and type of permitted support 
structures. 
A further indication that the parties intended to limit the burden to the 
servient estate is that the Clark Easement provides for only a 50-foot right-of-way 
for the pole structures and transmission lines. As PacifiCorp admits, its new 
towers range from 79 to 98 feet and average approximately 89 feet in height. Tr. 
729. The effect of this increase in height is to significantly widen the corridor 
required for the towers beyond that provided for in the original easement grant. 
Fox Ridge offered unrebutted evidence that the increased height of the 
towers requires a corridor wider than 50 feet. For example, Fox Ridge offered the 
Affidavit of Rustin J. Tolbert of D.R. Horton, one of the nation's largest 
homebuilders and one of the developers selected by Fox Ridge to develop the 
property in question, in which Mr. Tolbert stated that, due to the increased height 
of the towers and a new 150 megawatt circuit, D.R. Horton would require setbacks 
of at least 400 feet (and up to 600 feet) on either side of the towers.3 Fox Ridge 
3
 As Fox Ridge argues below, Judge Harding erroneously granted PacifiCorp's motion to strike the 
Affidavit of Rustin J. Tolbert that presented evidence of the need for such setbacks. 
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Reply at 13. FHA requires a minimum setback at least equal to the height of 
power transmission towers (which it refers to as the "fall distance") on dwellings 
covered by FHA mortgages. HUD Handbook, 4150.2 (as provided by FHA) (Tab 
11 of Addendum). Prince William County, Virginia, requires a setback of two feet 
from a dwelling for every foot in height of a tower supporting power transmission 
lines. Internet at www.co.prince-william.va.us/coatty/code/32-240.htm (Tab 12 of 
Addendum). Red Oak, Texas, requires that residential dwellings must be set back 
an additional foot for every foot by which a neighboring transmission line or tower 
exceeds 15 feet. Bolton and Sick, "Power Lines and Property Values: The Good, 
the Bad and the Ugly," The Urban Lawyer, The National Quarterly on State and 
Local Government Law, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Spring 1999) (Tab 10 of Addendum). All 
of these authorities point to the same conclusion - 50 feet is an insufficient 
corridor for towers nearly 100 feet tall. Under the minimum Red Oak standard, a 
corridor of approximately 160 feet is necessary, and under the more conservative 
D.R. Horton view an 800-foot corridor is required. 
The reason for setbacks is obvious. 
Winds can blow towers down, and power lines 
can fall. Courts have held that fear of cancer 
alone (cancerphobia) - no matter how 
unreasonable - is a sufficient basis for an award 
of damages caused by a power line easement. 
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Criscuola v. Power Authority of the State of New York, 602 N.Y. Supp. 2d. 588 
(N.Y. 1993); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1987). 
As matter of safety, there must be a wide corridor on either side of power 
transmission lines and towers. The taller the towers, the greater the setback 
required. By any standard, even a common sense standard, a 50-foot wide right of 
way is an insufficient corridor for nearly 100-feet tall towers carrying a double 
circuit for 150 megawatts of electricity. 
PacifiCorp has argued that Fox Ridge is attempting to diminish 
PacifiCorp's rights through its own changed use of the property. Tr. 713. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. The Clark Easement plainly restricts PacifiCorp to 
a certain number and type of structures to be contained within a 50-foot right of 
way. The burden of the easement may not extend beyond that contemplated under 
the original grant. By increasing the height of the towers, it is PacifiCorp that is 
restricting Fox Ridge's use of its land outside the easement corridor. It is not 
PacifiCorp, but Fox Ridge, that owns the servient estate in fee simple. To the 
extent PacifiCorp's changed use denies Fox Ridge the benefit of its real property 
outside the easement corridor, it is PacifiCorp that has exceeded its rights and 
expanded the burden of the easement. See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements § 81 (1996) 
(aThe owner of an easement is said to have all rights incident or necessary to its 
proper enjoyment, but nothing more . ... If the easement owner exceeds his rights 
. . . he becomes a trespasser. . . .") (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent the 
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heightened towers require a wider corridor than that provided for in the Clark 
Easement grant, PacifiCorp impermissibly adds to the burden of the easement. 
As stated above, PacifiCorp in effect argued, and Judge Harding 
erroneously ruled, that UP&L's permanent right of way for transmission lines 
nullifies the equally clear language intended to limit the burden those lines would 
impose. It is not reasonable to conclude that the same parties who went to such 
care to describe the number and type of permitted structures, and to specify a 
maximum corridor width, intended no limitation on the height or girth of the 
structures that might be installed. The most reasonable interpretation is that the 
parties intended to limit permitted structures to two and three pole structures of the 
type UP&L installed. 
6. Because Fox Ridge's Interpretation is Reasonable, Judge Harding's 
Summary Judgment Order Must Be Reversed. 
Judge Harding relied on cases from other jurisdictions in which courts ruled 
for various reasons that certain power transmission easements permitted the 
replacement of wooden H-frame structures with larger structures. Florida Power 
Corp. v. Silver Lake Homeowners Assoc., 727 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. App. 1999); 
Central Power and Light Co. v. Holloway, 431 S.W. 2d 436, 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1968); Talty v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 347 N.E.2d 74 (111. App. 1976). Not 
one of those decisions is controlling here, and not one of them interprets the 
language at issue here. Those decisions are either inapposite because the language 
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of grant at issue in those cases is broader than that of the Clark Easement, or they 
are simply wrong. 
As stated in another case cited by Judge Harding, "the general rule [is that] 
'when precise language is employed to create an easement, such terminology 
governs the extent of usage.'" Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1542 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, this Court is bound to decide this case based solely on the 
language of the Clark Easement. Fox Ridge reasonably interprets that language to 
limit the number and type of permitted support structures. Because Fox Ridge's 
interpretation is reasonable, Judge Harding's summary judgment order is incorrect 
and must be reversed. 
B. Judge Harding Erred in Denying Fox Ridge's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
1. Because PacifiCorp's Interpretation is Unreasonable and Because 
Extrinsic Evidence Supports Fox Ridge's Reasonable Interpretation, 
Judge Harding's Order Denying Summary Judgment in Favor of Fox 
Ridge Should be Reversed. 
As discussed above, a contract that is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation is ambiguous. It follows that if Fox Ridge's interpretation of the 
Clark Easement is reasonable, and PacifiCorp's is not, then the easement is 
unambiguous and summary judgment must be granted in favor of Fox Ridge. On 
the other hand, if both parties' interpretations are reasonable, and the Clark 
Easement is therefore ambiguous, the Court may consider extrinsic evidence to 
resolve the ambiguity. Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass % 907 P.2d at 269. 
Based on both the unreasonableness of PacifiCorp's interpretation, and Fox 
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Ridge's undisputed extrinsic evidence, Judge Harding's order denying Fox 
Ridge's cross motion for summary judgment should be reversed. 
With but one immaterial exception, PacifiCorp failed to offer any affidavits 
or other evidence controverting Fox Ridge's statement of undisputed facts in 
support of its summary judgment motion. PacifiCorp either admitted Fox Ridge's 
facts to be true, argued that they are immaterial, or stated without evidentiary 
support that it disputes those facts. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides in relevant part that: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Thus Rule 56(e) requires that, to the extent Fox Ridge's evidence is material and 
otherwise admissible, it must be taken as true. PacifiCorp's unsupported 
allegations and denials cannot create an issue for trial. 
Hence, if the Court finds the Clark Easement to be ambiguous, because 
PacifiCorp did not offer any evidence to refute Fox Ridge's extrinsic evidence, it 
may rely only on Fox Ridge's evidence in resolving the ambiguity and must enter 
summary judgment for Fox Ridge based on that evidence.4 Similarly, because 
PacifiCorp did not offer any evidence to rebut Fox Ridge's evidence of burden on 
4
 The Court may also consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether ambiguity exists. "When 
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. ... A judge should 
... consider any credible evidence offered to show the parties' intention." Ward v. Intermountain Farmers 
Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added). 
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the servient estate, the Court may rely on that evidence to determine whether 
PacifiCorp's evidence created a burden exceeding that permitted under the 
easement grant. 
2. PacifiCorp's Interpretation of the Clark Easement is Unreasonable. 
PacifiCorp contends that the Clark Easement "cannot by any stretch be 
construed to limit the parties in terms of the specific type of support structure that 
could be erected there." Tr. 718. In order to accept PacifiCorp's interpretation, 
the Court would have to find that the words "one three pole and nine two pole 
structures" allow PacifiCorp to erect "ten structures" of any size or material. But 
UP&L, which drafted the easement, chose not to use broad or general language 
that clearly would have supported this interpretation, which it could easily have 
done. Rather than do so, UP&L specified a particular type of structure - two pole 
and three pole structures - and even designated the number of guy anchors 
permitted within the easement corridor. That specific language is inconsistent 
with PacifiCorp's expansive interpretation, which attempts to ignore or "read out" 
the easement language stating the particular type of structures that would be 
allowed. PacifiCorp's unreasonably broad interpretation conflicts with the 
fundamental principle that each contract provision is to be considered in relation to 
all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. 
Plateau Mining, 802 P.2d at 725. 
PacifiCorp's broad interpretations of the words "alteration," "relocation," 
and "replacement" are likewise unreasonable. Under PacifiCorp's interpretation 
33 
of the word "alteration," men's suit vendor Mr. Mac's free lifetime alterations 
policy would have driven him to bankruptcy; he would have been required to 
provide new suits to customers who found their old suits no longer fit. Similarly, 
under the PacifiCorp view, a "replacement" warranty on a Toyota Corolla would 
entitle the owner of a defective Corolla to a new Land Cruiser. And "relocation" 
of an object would mean replacement of the object with a new and different 
object. Those interpretations are clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the 
words in question, and are therefore unreasonable. 
Because PacifiCorp's interpretation of the Clark Easement language is 
unreasonable, Judge Harding's order denying Fox Ridge's cross motion for 
summary judgment should be reversed. 
3. PacifiCorp's Conduct Establishes that the Clark Easement Does Not 
Permit the Erection of Steel Towers. 
If the Court were to find PacifiCorp's broad interpretation of the easement 
to be reasonable (which it should not) it may, as shown above, consider extrinsic 
evidence to resolve the ambiguity. In resolving ambiguous contract language, the 
Court may consider conduct of the parties, including subsequent acts, indicating 
the meaning the parties themselves gave the contract language. See Upland 
Indus., 684 P.2d at 642 ("[A] practical construction placed by the parties upon the 
instrument is the best evidence of their intention." (quoting Rosen, AA Cal. Rptr. at 
381); Zeese, 534 P.2d at 90 ("Under the doctrine of practical construction, when a 
contract is ambiguous and the parties place their own construction on their 
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agreement and so perform, the court may consider this as persuasive evidence of 
what their true intention was. The parties, by their action and performance, have 
demonstrated what was their meaning and intent.") 
Both contemporaneous with, and subsequent to, the execution of the Clark 
Easement, PacifiCorp (and its predecessor UP&L) engaged in a variety of conduct 
indicating their understanding that the Clark Easement allows only two and three 
pole structures of the type actually erected and excludes steel towers. This 
conduct includes the following: 
a. Following the execution of the Clark Easement, UP&L erected one 
wooden three pole and nine wooden two pole structures on the subject property, 
the very structures that stood until PacifiCorp filed the instant lawsuit. The fact 
that UP&L built the type of structures described in the easement is the best 
evidence of what the parties intended by the language of the easement. Tr. 656-
657. 
b. At about the time the Clark Easement was executed, other 
landowners along the 90th South-Hale Line also executed easements specifying 
"two pole and three pole structures." Tr. 609 (Tab 6, Exhibit G of Addendum), 
611 (Tab 6, Exhibit F of Addendum), 613 (Tab 6, Exhibit E of Addendum), 615 
(Tab 6, Exhibit D of Addendum), 617 (Tab 6, Exhibit C of Addendum) and 619 
(Tab 6, Exhibit B of Addendum). UP&L erected the same type of structures 
pursuant to those easements as it did under the Clark Easement, further indicating 
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that the words two pole and three pole structures indicated a particular type of 
structure. Tr. 718-719. 
c. PacifiCorp subsequently obtained transmission line easements 
containing broader and more expansive language regarding the type of permitted 
structures than did the Clark Easement. For example, on June 29, 1989, Michael 
M. Carlson executed an easement conveying to UP&L the following: 
A perpetual easement and right of way for the erection, operation, 
maintenance, repair, alternation, enlargement, inspection, relocation and 
replacement of electric transmission and distribution lines, communications 
circuits, fiber optic cables and associated facilities, one steel pole and one 
guy anchor, with the necessary guys, stubs, crossarms, braces and other 
attachments affixed thereto, for the support of said lines and circuits. 
Tr. 603, 648. Although this easement was not on the 90th South-Hale Line, it 
provides evidence that UP&L understood that the grant language needed to 
include the word "enlargement" for it to have the right to enlarge supporting 
structures. 
Similarly, on May 29, 1996, Micron executed an easement modifying an 
earlier transmission line easement across its property on the 90th South-Hale Line 
immediately east of Fox Ridge's property (the "Modified Beck Easement"). This 
modified easement continues to specify two pole and three pole structures, but 
adds language providing for "enlargement" of supporting structures and "one four 
pole switch structure," specifically granting to PacifiCorp: 
a perpetual easement and right of way for the erection, operation, 
maintenance, repair, alteration, enlargement, inspection, relocation 
and replacement of electric transmission and distribution lines, 
communications, circuits, fiber optic cables and associated facilities, 
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and four - three pole structures, six - two pole structures, one four 
pole switch structure and fourteen guy anchors, with the necessary 
stubs, crossarms, braces, and other attachments affixed thereto, for 
the support of said lines and circuits ... 
Tr. 600 (Tab 6, Exhibit J of Addendum). This Modified Beck Easement is 
evidence that PacifiCorp both understood that language specifying particular a 
type of structures actually limited the type of structures it had the right to build, 
and that the word "enlargement" is needed for it to have the right to enlarge 
existing structures. 
d. In about June of 2000, PacifiCorp proposed that Fox Ridge sign an 
easement providing: 
[Grantor] hereby grants to PacifiCorp, ... ("Grantee"), an easement 
for a right of way 50 feet in width, more or less for the construction, 
reconstruction, operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, 
enlargement, and removal of electric power transmission, 
distribution and communication lines and all necessary and 
desirable accessories and appurtenances thereto, including without 
limitation: supporting towersy poles, props, guys and anchors .... 
(Emphasis added). 
Tr. 646. Here again PacifiCorp included language providing for "enlargement" of 
supporting structures. PacifiCorp also included broad language regarding the type 
of permitted supporting structures ("all necessary and desirable accessories and 
appurtenances thereto, including without limitation ... supporting towers ..."), 
indicating it viewed the narrow language of the Clark Easement as inadequate to 
permit erection of towers in place of two and three pole structures. 
In sum, the Clark Easement and other contemporary easements limited the 
type of structures permitted on the 90th South-Hale Line. Later, more expansive 
37 
easements permitted "enlargement" and, at least in the case of the 2000 Fox Ridge 
Easement, included general language regarding the type of structures permitted in 
the easement corridor. The contrast between the earlier specific language and later 
more general language shows that the parties intended the Clark Easement to 
allow only the two and three pole structures specified to exclude large towers. 
4. The Affidavit of S. Kenly Clark Shows that the Parties Intended to 
Limit the Type of Structures that Could Be Erected in the Easement 
Corridor and to Exclude Steel Towers. 
The best evidence of the Clarks' intentions in striking the word "towers" 
would be the testimony of the Clarks themselves, but they are both deceased. 
Shortly before the hearing on the parties' summary judgment motions, however, 
Fox Ridge located the Clarks' son, S. Kenly Clark, whose testimony is the next 
best thing. Mr. Clark was 21 at the time his parents signed the easement, and paid 
close attention to their negotiations with UP&L because the power line affected 
the cattle business he ran on the property. He discussed the easement with his 
parents many times. He recalls that his parents struck the word "towers" from the 
easement form because they did not want anything larger or taller than the original 
wooden poles on the property. He recalls his father telling him anything larger 
than the wooden poles would wreck the view and hurt the value of the property. 
Tr. 890-891 (Tab 7 of Addendum). 
5. Both the Easement Language and Extrinsic Evidence Require Summary 
Judgment in Favor of Fox Ridge. 
As shown above, PacifiCorp's interpretation of the Clark Easement is 
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unreasonable. Moreover, even if it were reasonable and the easement were 
therefore ambiguous, extrinsic evidence - including UP&L's and PacifiCorp's 
contemporaneous and subsequent conduct, and the affidavit of S. Kenly Clark, the 
grantors' surviving son - supports the conclusion that the parties intended the 
Clark Easement to limit the type of structures that could be erected on the Traverse 
Mountain property to the two and three pole structures actually erected. Fox 
Ridge's burden evidence presented in section VI.A.5 above requires the same 
conclusion.5 Both the unreasonableness of PacifiCorp's interpretation and 
extrinsic evidence require reversal of Judge Harding's order denying summary 
judgment in favor of Fox Ridge. 
C. Judge Harding Erred in Granting Pacificorp's Motions to Strike. 
1. Judge Harding Should Have Admitted the 2000 Fox Ridge 
Easement. 
Judge Harding excluded the Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement based on 
Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides in relevant part: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, 
or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable 
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim 
which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible 
to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. 
Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations 
is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion 
of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is 
presented in the course of compromise negotiations. 
Of course, Judge Harding excluded much of the extrinsic evidence Fox Ridge offered, and it may be 
considered only if admissible. As shown below, Judge Harding erred in excluding this evidence. 
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PacifiCorp has the burden of proving that the Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement 
should be excluded under this rule. See Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1232 
(Utah App. 1991), cert denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Judge Harding erred in 
finding PacifiCorp met this burden. 
Rule 408 applies only if the evidence in question is part of a "compromise 
negotiation." Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1232. A document may not be considered 
part of a compromise negotiation unless there is an actual dispute and an attempt 
to resolve that dispute. Walsh v. First Union Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 929, 931 
(W.D.N.Y. 1997); Kraemer v. Franklin and Marshall College, 909 F. Supp. 267, 
268(E.D.Pa. 1995). 
PacifiCorp moved to strike the Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement based 
solely on the conclusory Affidavit of R. Jeff Richards, which states in relevant part 
the following: 
In June 2000, in an attempt to settle this matter short of 
litigation, PacifiCorp entered into negotiations with Fox Ridge. As 
part of the negotiation, PacifiCorp attempted to resolve this matter 
by simply negotiating a new and differently-worded easement over 
Fox Ridge's property. In connection with these negotiations, 
PacifiCorp asked Fox Ridge whether it would be willing to sign the 
so-called "Unsigned Fox Ridge Easement," which is attached to Fox 
Ridge's memorandum in support of its cross-motion as Exhibit K. 
Tr. 789. Judge Harding accepted this conclusory affidavit at face value in ruling 
in PacifiCorp's favor. In so doing, he completely ignored the contradictory 
Affidavit of Stephen L. Christensen, which sheds considerably more light on the 
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circumstances under which PacifiCorp presented the Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge 
Easement. Tr. 949-51 (Tab 9 of Addendum). 
Mr. Christensen states that in approximately June 2000, a representative of 
PacifiCorp called and asked to meet at his office. Mr. Christensen subsequently 
met with representatives of PacifiCorp, including PacifiCorp's attorney, Jeff 
Richards. At the meeting PacifiCorp's representatives explained to Mr. 
Christensen that they wanted to relocate a portion of the power line over Fox 
Ridge's property and construct a new line in place of the existing wooden poles, 
handing him computer-enhanced photographs they said showed the difference 
between the new steel towers and the existing wooden poles. They then handed 
him a three-page document consisting of the Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement 
and a map of the power line easement. Mr. Christensen told PacifiCorp's 
representatives he had to go back to his office and think about it. Tr. 949-51 (Tab 
9 of Addendum). 
The Richards Affidavit is insufficient to meet PacifiCorp's burden of 
establishing the parties had entered into compromise negotiations, particularly in 
light of the Christensen Affidavit. As the Christensen Affidavit shows, and the 
Richard Affidavit fails to disclose, PacifiCorp offered the Unsigned 2000 Fox 
Ridge Easement during a meeting in which PacifiCorp for the first time explained 
its intent to replace the existing wooden pole structures with steel towers and 
asked that Fox Ridge sign the proposed new easement. PacifiCorp offered the 
Unsigned 2000 Easement as part of a proposed business transaction when there 
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was no dispute between the parties. It was only when Fox Ridge said no to 
PacifiCorp's proposal that a dispute arose. Rather than being part of compromise 
negotiations, PacifiCorp's offer of the Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement was 
part of the conduct that created the dispute that precipitated the instant litigation. 
If the Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement is not admissible, then the evidence of 
dispute required for a declaratory judgment action does not exist. 
It is as if PacifiCorp, after years of driving over an old road past a house, 
showed up one day, announced to the homeowner it now needed to drive over the 
homeowner's lawn, and demanded that the homeowner sign a document giving 
PacifiCorp the right to do so. This is a demand that creates a dispute, not an offer 
of compromise to resolve it. 
Moreover, the 2000 Fox Ridge Easement language itself belies Mr. 
Richards' affidavit testimony that the parties had entered into a negotiation. That 
language names Utah Valley Land Company as grantor, not Fox Ridge. Tr. 594 
(Tab 6, Exhibit K of Addendum). Had there been any prior discussion or 
negotiation, PacifiCorp would have known that Utah Valley Land Company had 
conveyed the property to Fox Ridge. Again, PacifiCorp's proposed Unsigned 
2000 Fox Ridge Easement is not the product of any attempt to compromise or 
settle a disputed claim. PacifiCorp proposed it during an introductory meeting 
between businessmen to explore the possibility of "striking a deal," not to settle 
any dispute, and therefore Rule 408 has no application. See Walsh, 982 F. Supp. 
at 931 (refusing to exclude letters because, at the time they were sent, "neither a 
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dispute, nor a clear difference of opinion, existed"; and because the discussions 
were really "business communications" not within the scope of Rule 408). 
Hence, because the Unsigned 2000 Fox Ridge Easement was not part of an 
offer of compromise falling under Rule 408, Judge Harding erred in refusing to 
admit it. 
2. Judge Harding Should Have Admitted Evidence of the Additional 
Burden PacfiCorp's Towers Impose on the Servient Estate. 
Judge Harding excluded as speculative both Rustin Tolbert's affidavit 
testimony of setbacks that reputable homebuilders require from power lines, and 
James Christensen's affidavit testimony of the negative impact the steel towers 
would have on the Traverse Mountain development. This testimony is hardly 
speculative. Mr. Tolbert states in his affidavit that his employer is D.R. Horton, 
one of the largest homebuilders in the United States. He is not speculating about 
the setbacks from steel towers that D.R. Horton requires; he knows that for a fact 
from his experience at D.R. Horton. Tr. 188 (Tab 3 of Addendum). 
Similarly, James Christensen is a partner in Fox Ridge, the developer of the 
Traverse Mountain property. He does not speculate when he says PacifiCorp's 
towers will cause certain building lots to be lost; he knows this because the 
additional setback from PacifiCorp's steel towers and power lines would require 
Fox Ridge to eliminate lots planned for in the original design of the subdivision. 
Tr. 191-95 (Tab 4 of Addendum), 953-55 (Tab 8 of Addendum). 
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3. Judge Harding Should Have Admitted the Carlson Easement. 
Judge Harding excluded the Carlson Easement as irrelevant because it was 
granted thirty years after the easement in question and on unrelated land. 
Subsequent acts of the parties are admissible to resolve or even show ambiguity. 
See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d at 268; Upland Indus., 684 
P.2d at 642; Zeese, 534 P.2d at 90. The language of grant of the Carlson Easement 
is similar to that of the Clark Easement, except for the addition of the word 
"enlargement." The inclusion of that word is suggestive of what UP&L 
considered necessary in order to have the right to enlarge the size of supporting 
structures. For that reason, it is relevant to the interpretation of the Clark 
Easement under Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
4. Judge Harding Should Have Admitted the Affidavit of S. Kenly 
Clark. 
Judge Harding excluded the affidavit of S. Kenly Clark as a clear violation 
of the hearsay rule. Mr. Clark's affidavit makes hearsay statements concerning his 
parents' intentions regarding the overstrike of the word "towers" relative to the 
type of structures permitted in the easement corridor. 
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) allow the admission of hearsay not falling into 
a specific exception to the hearsay rule, whether or not the declarant is 
unavailable, where there are "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" and the 
court determines that "(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any 
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other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be 
served by admission of the statement into evidence." 
Mr. Clark's affidavit testimony is evidence of a material fact, namely, his 
parents' intentions relative to easement language describing the structures 
permitted in the easement corridor. Since both of Mr. Clark's parents are 
deceased and no UP&L witnesses could be located, Mr. Clark's hearsay testimony 
is the best available evidence of the parties' intentions. Given the passage of time 
and the resulting unavailability of witnesses, the interests of justice are best served 
by the admission of testimony from the one person who could be located having a 
memory of the subj ect transaction. 
Despite the passage of time, there are two strong circumstantial indications 
that Mr. Clark's testimony is reliable. First, Mr. Clark has no interest in the 
subject property and thus no personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit. As a 
disinterested person, he has no motive to do anything but tell the truth. Second, 
Mr. Clark took an interest in the transaction because at the time his parents signed 
the easement he ran the family cattle business on the subject property. For that 
reason, as he states in his affidavit, he had an interest in the easement, discussed it 
with his father, and retains a memory of those discussions. Tr. 890 (Tab 7 of 
Addendum). With those two indications of reliability, together with the 
importance of Mr. Clark's testimony and the unavailability of any other evidence 
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going to the same issue, the interests of justice would best be served by the 
admission of Mr. Clark's affidavit. 
As with almost all evidence, the proper approach to Mr. Clark's testimony 
is to admit it, and allow the trier of fact to determine the weight it should be given. 
After cross examination by opposing counsel, it should be evident to the trier of 
fact whether Mr. Clark's memory is sound or not. 
D. Judge Harding Erred in Denying Fox Ridge's Provisional Rule 56(f) 
Motion for Continuance. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion 
that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential 
to justify his opposition, the Court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be bad or may 
make such other order as is just. 
Because of the compressed schedule and lack of any opportunity for meaningful 
discovery, Fox Ridge filed a provisional Rule 56(f) motion of continuance. Tr. 
152. 
This case proceeded from complaint to summary judgment in less than 60 
days. Fox Ridge received only limited document discovery, and had no 
opportunity to take depositions. Judge Harding forced Fox Ridge to proceed on 
an expedited schedule but did not allow Fox Ridge the time or opportunity to 
respond to certain of PacifiCorp's motions. He also did not allow Fox Ridge the 
courtesy of ruling in advance on PacifiCorp's motion to bifurcate, and thereby 
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denied Fox Ridge any opportunity to be heard on its motion for summary 
judgment on its RDA Claims. 
In denying Fox Ridge's Rule 56(f) motion, Judge Harding denied Fox 
Ridge any opportunity to develop evidence that could have demonstrated the 
correctness of its position. Indeed, all of the extrinsic evidence discussed in this 
brief was obtained without the benefit of any meaningful formal discovery; 
additional relevant evidence most assuredly exists the benefit of which Fox 
Ridge was denied as a result of Judge Harding's premature ruling. There could 
well be files or diagrams providing specifications for two and three pole 
structures; there may be manuals describing towers; there may be witnesses who 
can explain why the word "towers" was stricken in the Clark Easement and in 
other contemporaneous easements along the 90th South-Hale Line. Simple 
fairness would have allowed Fox Ridge time to develop such evidence. In his 
haste to permit PacifiCorp to meet its construction schedule, however, Judge 
Harding denied Fox Ridge fairness, due process, and in fact prejudged the case. 
The least Judge Harding should have done was to grant a Rule 56(f) continuance 
for a sufficient period of time to permit Fox Ridge to gather evidence. His 
failure to do so was error. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Fox Ridge respectfully requests that the 
Court: 
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1. Reverse Judge Harding's grant of PacifiCorp's motion for summary 
judgment on its Easement Claim; 
2. Reverse Judge Harding's denial of Fox Ridge's motion for summary 
judgment on its Easement Claim; 
3. Reverse Judge Harding's grant of PacifiCorp's motions to strike; and 
4. To the extent not mooted by its rulings on the foregoing, grant Fox 
Ridge's Rule 56(f) motion for continuance. 
DATED: March 7, 2003. 
PARR W ^ D O U P S BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Paul C^t)recksel 
Stephen J. Hill, Of Counsel 
James L. Ahlstrom 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter comes before the Court on cross motions for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs 
Motions to Strike, Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, and cross Rule 56(f) motions. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the parties' memoranda, heard oral arguments, and being My 
advised in the premises issues the following: 
RULING 
This matter stems from an attempt by Plaintiff (PacifiCorp) to replace existing multiple 
pole power structures with single steel poles of greater height. Defendant (Fox Ridge) is the 
current owner of the servient estate. Plaintiffs predecessor in interest (Utah Power & Light) 
obtained the easement for power lines in 1956, which it used to construct a line in 1957. The 
original language of conveyance is as follows: 
Grantors . . . hereby convey . . . a perpetual easement and right of way for the 
erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, inspection, relocation and 
replacement of the electric transmission, distribution, telephone and telegraph 
circuits of the Grantee, and one three pole and nine two pole towers structures 
and 4 guy anchors with the necessary guys, stubs, cross arms, braces and other 
attachments affixed thereto, for the support of said circuits, on, under, over, 
through, and across a tract of land fifty (50) feet in width. . . and being twenty-
five (25) feet on each side of the following described center line: [legal description 
of the easement boundaries omitted]. 
The conveyance is part of a pre-prepared form entitled Transmission Line Easement. Words in 
italics were typed into blanks. One word in the form was x-ed out—represented here by 
overstrike. One word (here shown in bold) was inserted above the x-ed out word. 
Parties' Summary Judgment Motions are properly granted only if the Court finds that 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law," pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56. "When evaluating a motion for 
summary judgment, 'a court must consider all of the facts and evidence presented, and every 
reasonable inference arising therefrom, in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion."' Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting Katzenberger v. State, 735 P.2d 405, 408 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
Defendant makes two motions for summary judgment. The first is based on the 
Redevelopment Plan and is not properly before the Court as it contains claims that may only be 
brought against entities not joined to this action. See U.C.A. § 17A-2-1211(3) - (4) (providing a 
remedy for violations of a redevelopment plan against the redevelopment agency). Defendant's 
second summary judgment motion regards scope. 
Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment: Scope 
Both parties agree that the easement language is clear and unambiguous, and the Court so 
holds. See Memorandum in Support of Fox Ridge's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 16 
("For over 40 years, UP&L strictly abided by the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Clark 
Easement.") Because there is no ambiguity, the matter is ripe for summary judgment: 
The interpretation of an unambiguous deed is a question of law. 
Johnson v.Higlev. 989 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah App. 1999). 
Ruling Page 2 
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the granting language of the 
easement prohibits PacifiCorp's proposed actions. The granting language provides no limits as to 
steel or height. There are no specific bars to the type of pole PlaintiflF wishes to use. Because the 
grant is for a perpetual easement, it presumes some advances in technology (see discussion 
below). Defendant is not entitled to a declaratory judgment as a matter of law. Summary 
Judgment is denied. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment based on the plain language of the grant of the 
easement. Plaintiff points out that this is a "perpetual easement" allowing for "alteration," 
"relocation," and "replacement." Plaintiff correctly notes that the easement gives no height 
restriction and does not limit poles to wood. Plaintiff argues that it could replace the existing 
two-pole wood poles with taller two-pole steel poles and still be within the express language of 
the easement. Defendant argues that the construction of single steel poles would violate the 
grant, which specifically provides for "one three pole and nine two pole structures." 
Plaintiff cites a series of cases where the grant provided for tradition H-style poles and the 
courts allowed them to be replaced by taller, single steel poles. In a case with similar facts, 
Florida Power was granted an "easement forever to construct, operate and maintain an H-frame 
line." Florida Power Corp. v. Silver Lake Homeowners Assoc. 727 So.2d 1149 (Fla. App. 
1999). The court held, 
case law from other jurisdictions indicates that the holder of an electric 
transmission line easement may avail itself of modern inventions and improvements 
so long as such action is within the scope of the easement. 
In the instant case, FPC reconstructed its power line by replacing the 
antiquated wooden H-frame structures with modern steel monopole structures. 
The steel monopole structure is necessarily taller than the wooden H-frame 
structure as the voltage carried by the power line has been increased. 
Notwithstanding the steel monopole's taller height, it occupies the exact path of 
the prior wooden H-frame poles and is completely contained within the same 
prescribed easement area. We find the reconstruction by FPC to be within the 
scope of its 1948 easement. Accordingly, the summary judgment is reversed. 
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Id (citations omitted). See also, Lower Colorado River Authority v. Ashbv. 530 S.W.2d 628 
(Tex. App. 1975). 
Considering the issue of height in Central Power and Light Co. v. Hollowav. the court 
found the general terms of the easement allowed for an increase of height: 
We hold that the terms "reconstruction" and "relocate" as used in this instrument 
are at least broad enough to include the right to increase the height of the poles 
and wire upon the reconstruction of the electric transmission line. 
431 S.W. 2d 436, 440 (Tex. App. 1968). See also, Taltv v. Commonwealth Edison Co.. 346 
N.E.2d 74 (111. App. 1976) (holding that because the easement was perpetual, the holder of the 
easement could take advantage of scientific advancement to install taller, more powerful power 
lines). 
Utah law appears to follow the same reasoning. Valcarce, a case regarding a prescriptive 
rather thai I express easement, provided foi soi i ie improvements even w hen the holder of the 
easement arguably exceeded the traditional use giving rise to the easement. 
The general rule is that the extent of a prescriptive easement is measured 
and limited by its historic use during the prescriptive period, "The right cannot 
be enlarged to place a greater burden or servitude on the property.11 We note, 
however, that the common law of Utah requires a different approach to the use of 
easements than that of England or of our "sister states." In Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Co. v. Mqyle, 109 Utah 213, 174 P.2d 148 (Utah 1946), we 
explained that Utah law assumes that at the time the prescriptive right arose, the 
parties concerned knew of the arid nature of our state and contemplated that in the 
future the water owner would need to prevent waste and accommodate a more 
efficient use of limited available water. Thus, water users must have contemplated 
that a ditch might later need to be improved to save water. We therefore held that 
further reasonable efforts to conserve water could be made by an easement owner 
so long as they did not unnecessarily burden the servient estate. To this end, an 
easement owner may install "reasonable and necessary improved structures (not 
taking more or different land) in order to conserve the water." 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 312-13 (Utah 1998). Utah law permits holders of an 
express easement pro vidingfoi replacement and i epaii to oiake such impi oven: leiits as would be 
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within the scope of the original grant. The Court holds that PacifiCorp's proposed improvements 
are within the scope of the original grant. 
Defendant, Fox Ridge, argues that the increased height of the proposed poles will require 
additional setbacks, increasing the burden on the servient land. Defendant's setback arguments 
are unpersuasive. The traditional use of the easement is relevant to prescriptive easements rather 
than express easements. In the latter, it is the words of the conveyance and not the use to which 
the land has been put that governs scope. Plaintiffs easement has no limitations as to height. 
Defendant was aware of the easement when it purchased the pi oper 1:; Defendant, ai id more 
importantly, Grantors could not reasonably expect Plaintiff and his predecessor to leave the power 
lines in their 1957 condition in perpetuity. It is the easement and not the existing poles that 
burdens the land. If Plaintiff wishes to avail itself of more of its rights than it has in the past, that 
is its prerogative. Defendant cannot by its changed use of the property limit the scope of the 
easement. 
[Although the grants of easement did not contain words such as "reconstruct" or 
"renew," they did grant "a perpetual right to construct, operate, use and maintain" 
transmission lines. (Emphasis added.) We believe logic alone would justify the 
finding by the trial court that this was an unlimited grant. Certainly the initial use 
(construction of a 220KV line) does not indicate any intention to limit the 
easement to lines of that size since there was no ambiguity in the grant itself. 
There was no limitation in the easement on the size or the number of the electric 
transmission lines to be installed which was not difficult to do if the parties had any 
such intention. 
Taltv v. Commonwealth Edison Co.. 346 N.E.2d 74, 76 (HI. App. 1976). It is the grant and not 
the historic use that determines scope. 
The accepted rule is that the language of the grant is the measure and the extent of 
the right created; and that the easement conveyed should be so construed as to 
burden the servient estate only to the degree necessary to satisfy the purpose 
described in the grant. 
Weggelandv.Uiifusa. 14 Utah 2d 364, 366; 384 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1963). Plaintiffs proposed 
use is a use described in the grant. 
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Defendant attempts to raise an issue of material fact by virtue of the overstrike of the 
word "towers." Defendant cites 3 Corbin on Contracts Section 548, page 180, note 21 for the 
proposition that stricken words may be considered in the interpretation of provisions. Defendant 
argues that the grantors of the easement thereby intended to prevent the use of power line 
"towers." Such an argument only has validity if the grantors were the ones to make the deletion. 
The Court has no admissible evidence before it to that fact. Even assuming that the grantors 
made the change, the plain language still governs. 
The plaiti meaning of the substituted word, "structures," is broader than "towers," Other 
cases have described the single steel poles as "steel structures." See Florida Power. 727 So.2d 
1149, 1151 (Fla. App. 1999). If grantors wished to limit height or prohibit single-pole structures, 
they could easily have done so. It is a strained reading of the granting language to say that double 
steel poles would be permissible "structures" and single steel poles would be impermissible 
"towers." Defendant's argument that the placement of a comma means that the right to inspect, 
alter, replace, or repair refers only to circuits and not to poles is likewise strained. 
The new steel poles are not ai I improper increase of the scope of the original easement: 
In a leading treatise on the subject, the authors state the general rule to be "when 
precise language is employed to create an easement, such terminology governs the 
extent of usage." JON. W. BRUCE AND JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF 
EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND, p 8.02[1], at 8-3 (rev. ed. 1995). 
The general rule does not preclude the scope of an easement being adjusted 
in the face of changing times to serve the original purpose, so long as the change is 
consistent with the terms of the original grant: 
It is often said that the parties are to be presumed to have 
contemplated such a scope for the created easement as would 
reasonably serve the purposes of the grant.... This presumption 
often allows an expansion of use of the easement, but does not 
permit a change in use not reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
establishment of the easement. 
RICHARD R. POWELL, 3 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.12[2] (Patrick J. Rohan 
ed., 1996). 
Preseault v.United States, 100F.3d 1525, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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No valid issue of ambiguity exists Plaintiff falls within the scope of its easement. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Bifurcation and Cross Motions for Rule 56(f) Relief 
The Rule 56(f) motions relate to Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion Re: 
Redevelopment Issues, which is not yet properly before the Court. Therefore, the Court declines 
to rule on these motions until the nil necessary parties are joined to allow adjudication of the RDA 
counterclaims. Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate has been rendered moot by this Ruling. 
Defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion is irrelevant to its Motion foi Summary Judgment Re: Scope, 
because the Court and the parties agreed the language was unambiguous and scope could be 
determined from the face of the document. Any additional discovery would have constituted 
unnecessary extraneous evidence as to the meaning of the grant. 
Plaintiffs Motions to Strike 
Plaintiff has filed tx\ o motions to strike. The first motion to strike concerns the Carlson 
Easement, statements in the Christensen and Tolbert Affidavits, and the unsigned Fox Ridge 
Easement. The Carlson Easement was granted over thirty years after the easement in question 
and on unrelated land. It is irrelevant to the interpretation of the easement at hand. 
The Christensen and Tolbert affidavits make assertions of damages that are purely 
speculative, list damages to Tractus (a nonparty to these proceedings), and speculate as to the 
fears of potential buyers and the necessary setbacks. 
The unsigned Fox Ridge Easement is properly deemed inadmissible settlement 
negotiations under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 408. Plaintiff has every right to attempt to 
specify the proposed improvements in an amended easement. Yet, if those improvements are 
within the scope of the original easement, Plaintiff is merely acting out of an abundance of caution 
in seeking an amended grant. Plaintiffs attempt to settle cannot be used against it. Plaintiffs first 
motion to strike is granted. 
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Plaintiffs second motion. 1 o strike is directed against a clear violation of the hearsay rule. 
Defendant attempts to establish the intent of the original parties to the grant by submitting the 
affidavit of the parties' son. The son makes hearsay statements concerning what his father meant 
by the overstrike. Defendant claims the statement falls under the general hearsay exceptions of 
Utah R. Evid. Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). These exceptions require "circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness/' An affidavit taken for purposes of litigation more than forty years after the 
events in question has no special indicia of trustworthiness. To the extent not rendered moot by 
the Court's ruling that the grant's plain language governs scope, Plaintiffs Motions to Strike are 
Granted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that: 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Scope is DENIED. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
3. Plaintiffs Motions to Strike ai e GRANTED to the extent they ai e tic >t moot. ' 
4. Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED as moot. 
5. Defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion is DENIED as moot. 
6 All other Motions require additional parties and are not yet properly before the Court. 
7. Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling 
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for 
signature, pursuant to Rule 4-5Q&s>f the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this f (i day of March, 2001. l / A 
n 
LYM. HARDING, 
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Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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STEPHEN J. HILL (A1493) 
STEPHEN J. HILL, LC 
Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-1308 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company; 
and DOES I through X, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company, 




PACIFICORP, an Oregon corporation, 
and THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
LEHI CITY, a government entity, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
RUSTIN J. TOLBERT 
Case No. 010400280 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Division 6 
Counterclaim defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Rustin J. Tolbert, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Vice President of D.R. Horton and have personal 
knowledge of the statements made by me in this affidavit. 
2. D.R. Horton is one of the largest home builders in the 
United States and has had considerable experience in the construc-
tion of homes within residential subdivisions. In its selection 
process, D.R. Horton conducts due diligence research before build-
ing homes for sale to the public. As a part of its decisions to 
purchase property for building homes, D.R. Horton avoids building 
and selling homes in the proximity of high voltage steel towers. 
3. Smaller wood poles are a concern, but are much less of 
a concern than steel towers, even though they may carry the same 
"voltage," because they have fewer wires and are lower profile, 
having the appearance of telephone poles and telephone lines. 
4. Based upon my experience in selling homes, the public's 
perception-and other issues related to high voltage steel towers 
are a real concern for D.R. Horton. 
5. The very minimum standard for D.R. Horton is to build 
homes within 100 feet of existing wood pole easements, and 400-600 
feet from steel tower easements. 
6. D.R. Horton will not build any home closer than 400-600 
feet from the easement line if steel towers are constructed on the 
Fox Ridge Property. 
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DATED this m day of February, 2001. 
^n^/j T^^yyA 
Rustin J. Tolbert 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ft| day of February, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
N \20755\1\PLEJUDING\TOLBERT1 AFD 
SEAL: iii iflh i t ^ A """ A " • " A * • * *~* "* ^ A A A l l l i 
CONNIE JEAN QUINTANA I 
Notary Public r 
State of Utah * 
My Commission Expires June 28,2003 ) 390 East Wyandotte Ave., Sandy, UT 840/0 I 
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KEITH A. CALL (A670 8) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Telecopy: (801) 363-0400 
STEPHEN J. HILL (A1493) 
STEPHEN J. HILL, LC 
Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-1308 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company; 
and DOES I through X, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company, 




PACIFICORP, an Oregon corporation, 
and THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
LEHI CITY, a government entity, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JAMES M. CHRISTENSEN 
Case No. 010400280 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Division 6 
Counterclaim defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. CHRISTENSEN 
Case No. 010400280 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Division 6 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
James M. Christensen, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am Manager of Fox Ridge Planned Communities, LLC 
("Fox Ridge"), have been involved in the daily business activities 
of the company, and have personal knowledge of the statements made 
by me in this affidavit. 
2. I am familiar with the proposed transmission line, con-
sisting of steel towers, which PacifiCorp plans to construct 
across Fox Ridge's Property. I am also familiar with the existing 
wooden pole structures on the Property. 
3. If PacifiCorp constructs the proposed transmission line 
within the right-of-way across approximately 2 miles of Fox 
Ridge's Property, the damage to Fox Ridge and Tractus, LLC 
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("Tractus"), will include the following: 
a. Loss of an estimated 500-800 residential lots that 
Fox Ridge otherwise would have been able to develop within the 
subdivisions on the Property. Loss of these lots would result 
from the need to provide a "safety corridor" of 400-600 feet on 
each side of the easement corridor presently located on the Fox 
Ridge Property for the 90th South-Hale Line, The damages 
resulting from such losses will be approximately $7-12 million, 
based on present estimates. Additional damage to Fox Ridge and 
Tractus would include the following: 
i. Loss of revenue that Tractus would have 
realized from the sale of voice, video, internet and other 
services to owners of those lots. Although it is presently 
impossible to determine the amount of such damage, Tractus 
would lose a presently estimated $3-5 million from such 
sales. 
ii. Fox Ridge would suffer a devaluation of resi-
dential lots proximate to the proposed transmission line due 
to the negative visual impact on lot view and the perceived 
health fears and safety perceptions among the public and home 
builders from the line. It is presently impossible to esti-
mate such losses, but based on my experience, the loss would 
be in the millions of dollars. 
iii. Fox Ridge would be required to pay increased 
expenses and carrying charges on loans for the development of 
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its Property resulting from the negative impacts on the sales 
image of the subdivision and the additional time that will be 
required to market subdivision lots. Again, these losses 
cannot be quantified with certainty, but based upon my exper-
ience, the losses will be in the millions of dollars. 
iv. Fox Ridge and Tractus will lose the right to 
obtain the quality power they need from the existing 90th 
South-Hale Line and a separate circuit on the Lehi Camp 
Williams Line with its related facilities. As a result, Fox 
Ridge and Tractus will be required to pay additional amounts 
to obtain electric power from more costly and less reliable 
sources. Fox Ridge is presently investigating the alterna-
tives that are available in this regard. Damages, based on 
present estimates, are approximately $7-10 million. 
4. In connection with the permitting process for the Fox 
Ridge Property, representatives of Lehi City informed me that Fox 
Ridge would receive electric power from the 90th South-Hale Line, 
in addition to other sources. 
DATED this /^ day of February, 2001. 
/fames M. Christensen 
2001 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /^T day of February, 
* * = * * JS»5 
t ,4y HIGH 
MHDEsE BOREN 
'TMYPUBUC'STATttfUTAH 
285 W. 11000 N. 









REX E. MADSEN (A2 052) 
KEITH A. CALL (A6708) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Telecopy: (801) 363-0400 
STEPHEN J. HILL (A1493) 
STEPHEN J. HILL, LC 
Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-1308 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company; 
and DOES I through X, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company, 




PACIFICORP, an Oregon corporation, 
and THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
LEHI CITY, a government entity, 
FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF 
STEPHEN L. CHRISTENSEN 
Case No. 010400280 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr, 
Division 6 
Counterclaim defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Stephen L. Christensen, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am the Operations Manager of Fox Ridge Planned Communi-
ties, LLC ("Fox Ridge"), am involved in the daily operations and 
business activities of Fox Ridge, and have personal knowledge of 
the statements made by me in this affidavit. 
2. Fox Ridge is a Utah limited liability company with its 
principal place of business in Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. Tractus, LLC ("Tractus"), is a Utah limited liability 
company with its principal place of business in Utah County, State 
of Utah. 
4. Fox Ridge is the owner of approximately 2,600 acres of 
real property located in Utah County, Utah, which it acquired in 
April of 2000 (the "Property") . The City of Lehi annexed the 
Property in 1997. The Property runs west to east from 1-15 to the 
Micron campus, and south to north from the Alpine Highway (SR-92) 
into Traverse Mountain. 
5. Fox Ridge is developing the Property into a premier 
master-planned community to be called Traverse Mountain, which will 
be the first development of its type in the State of Utah. It will 
implement the goals and objectives of city planners throughout the 
State of Utah--including those of the City of Lehi and also Envi-
sion Utah, a program developed under the direction of the governor 
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of the State of Utah. When completed, Traverse Mountain will 
include over 4 million square feet of office space, retail shops, 
restaurants, theaters, schools, churches, hospitals, police and 
fire departments, 3,500 residential homes, nature trails and a 
nature preserve consisting of approximately 1,200 acres. 
6. Pursuant to an agreement with Pox Ridge, Tractus will 
provide an enhanced data center to Traverse Mountain office tenants 
and homes with the fastest data connections and network capabili-
ties in the State of Utah. These services will be delivered 
through Tractus' data center, located in Triumph Technology Park 
in the southwest and northeast portions of the development. 
7. Fox Ridge purchased the Property subject to a 1956 Trans-
mission Line Easement which Fox Ridge's predecessors-in-interest 
granted to UP&L, PacifiCorp's predecessor-in-interest. This exist-
ing transmission line imposed a burden on the Property which Fox 
Ridge was aware of when it purchased the Property. Fox Ridge con-
sidered this burden acceptable for two reasons: (1) aesthetically 
it was tolerable because the transmission line was supported by 
wooden poles having the appearance of telephone poles that would 
require relatively minimal setbacks for developing subdivision 
lots; and (2) the proximity of the transmission line to the Trav-
erse Mountain planned community, particularly the data center, 
promised a convenient and reliable source of power. 
8. In 1957, UP&L constructed a transmission line, consisting 
of wooden 2- and 3-pole structures and connecting its substation on 
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90th South in Salt Lake County to the Hale Substation at the mouth 
of Provo Canyon in Utah County (then known as the "90th South-Hale 
Line"). 
9. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit ,!An is a true copy 
of an Annexation and Development Agreement obtained by me from the 
Utah County Recorder. This is a copy of the agreement I reviewed 
in connection with Fox Ridge's purchase of the Property. 
10. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "B" is a copy of 
the Electric Services Agreement, dated June 13, 1995, between Lehi 
City and Micron Technology, Inc., which is a part of the Annexation 
and Development Agreement referred to above. 
11. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "C" is a true and 
correct copy of a Joint Public Hearing Notice, dated July 12, 1995, 
which was provided to me by Lehi City. 
12. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "D" is a true and 
correct copy of Resolution No. 7-18-95D, dated July 18, 1995, which 
was provided to me by Lehi City. 
13. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "E" is a true 
and correct copy of a Joint Statement at Public Hearing held on 
August 22, 1995, which was provided to me by Lehi City. 
14. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "Ffl is a true and 
correct copy of Ordinance No. 10-10-95.23, dated August 22, 1995, 
which was provided to me by Lehi City. 
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15. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "G" is a true and 
correct copy of Resolution No. 10-10-95G, dated October 10, 1995, 
which was provided to me by Lehi City. 
16. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "H11 is a true and 
correct copy of the Alpine Highway Economic Development Plan, Final 
Plan, dated August 22, 1995, which was provided to me by Lehi City. 
17. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "Il! is a true and 
correct copy of the Report on Redevelopment Plan entitled "Alpine 
Highway Economic Development Plan," dated August 22, 1995, which 
was provided to me by Lehi City. 
18. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "J,f is a true and 
correct copy of Alpine Highway Economic Development Plan, Project 
Area Budget, and Taxing Agency Committee's Resolution 01-95, dated 
September 28, 1995, which was provided to me by Lehi City. 
19. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "K" is a true and 
correct copy of an Agreement between the Redevelopment Agency of 
Lehi City and Lehi City, dated May 13, 1997, which was provided to 
me by Lehi City. 
20. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "L" is a true and 
correct copy of Amendment One to Annexation and Development Agree-
ment, dated May 16, 1997, which was provided to me by Lehi City. 
21. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "M" is a true and 
correct copy of an Economic Development Agreement, dated May 16, 
1997, between the Redevelopment Agency of Lehi City and Micron 
Technology, Inc., which was provided to me by Lehi City. 
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22. The Fox Ridge Property fronts both sides of the existing 
2-lane Alpine Highway (SR-92), and its entire frontage would have 
to be used to widen the highway to four lanes for traffic circula-
tion when the road is widened. 
23. In April 2000, Fox Ridge purchased the Property for the 
purpose of developing the Traverse Mountain planned community. 
Before purchasing the Property, I reviewed the public record relat-
ing to the Micron project. Based on that record, I determined that 
a new Camp Williams line owned by Lehi City would be built with 
funds advanced by Micron and later repaid to Micron by the RDA out 
of tax increment revenues, that the Alpine Highway would be widened 
to four lanes, and that the existing PacifiCorp 90th South-Hale 
Line would be unaltered. 
24. I have asked PacifiCorp and Micron repeatedly for copies 
of the Power Purchase Agreement between Micron and PacifiCorp. I 
still have not received a copy of that agreement, and it is un-
certain what the parties agreed to with respect to the "path of 
delivery" for Lehi's Camp Williams line. I have been informed, 
however, that the line was to go along the Alpine Highway (SR-92) . 
25. In the summer of 2000, PacifiCorp notified Fox Ridge for 
the first time that PacifiCorp intended to remove the existing wood 
pole structures that have been a part of the 90th-South-Hale Line 
across the Fox Ridge Property for over 40 years. Representatives 
of PacifiCorp stated to me that PacifiCorp would install single 
-6-
steel towers and other improvements for the purpose of supplying 
electric power to the Micron plant. 
26. In discussions between representatives of PacifiCorp and 
me during the summer and fall of 2000, PacifiCorp never told me 
that it was bringing power from Camp Williams to Micron in a way 
that was contrary to the Alpine Highway Economic Development Plan, 
but only said it was "upgrading and modernizing" its line. When 
I resisted, representatives of PacifiCorp threatened to enter the 
Fox Ridge Property immediately and begin construction of the line 
consisting of steel towers. 
27. On one occasion, PacifiCorp's representatives threatened 
that if Fox Ridge did not acquiesce to its demands within two days, 
it would enter the Fox Ridge Property and commence construction 
and/or initiate condemnation proceedings. 
28. When I requested documents relating to the proposed line 
and the agreements between Micron and PacifiCorp, both Micron and 
PacifiCorp refused to provide any such documents. 
29. Fox Ridge emphatically denied that the 1956 Easement to 
which PacifiCorp referred permitted construction of the new line 
across the Fox Ridge Property, and I informed representatives of 
PacifiCorp that the proposed construction exceeded the express 
scope of that easement. 
30. Throughout my discussions with representatives of 
PacifiCorp, I maintained that the subject easement expressly limits 
PacifiCorp's use of the right-of-way covered by .the easement to 
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electric transmission, telephone and telegraph circuits installed 
on "one 3-pole structure" and "nine 2-pole structures." 
31. I also notified representatives of PacifiCorp that Fox 
Ridge was developing a master planned community and that construc-
tion of single steel towers for Micron and consolidation of the 
90th South-Hale Line and the Lehi Camp Williams Line would impose 
a significantly greater burden on Fox Ridge's property than that 
permitted by the 1956 Easement. It would also impair Fox Ridge's 
right to receive quality and affordable power from the 90th South-
Hale Line and would significantly devalue the Fox Ridge Property 
and cause other significant damage to Fox Ridge. 
32. Fox Ridge, through its attorney, Mark Rinehart, also 
notified PacifiCorp, Lehi City and the RDA that PacifiCorp could 
not proceed with construction of the proposed transmission line 
because construction and ownership of the line by PacifiCorp would 
violate (a) the Neighborhood Development Act and the Alpine Highway 
Economic Development Plan, (b) Fox Ridge's due process rights, and 
(c) applicable constitutional and statutory provisions requiring 
fair consideration in return for the transfer and payment of public 
funds to Micron and PacifiCorp. 
33. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "N" is a true and 
correct copy of the Micron Technology, Inc. Request for Proposal 
For Power Purchase Agreement Submitted to City of Lehi, Utah, dated 
August 23, 1995, and Lehi's response, which were provided to me by 
Lehi City. 
-8-
34. During discussions with me, PacifiCorp's representa-
tives provided me with the computer-enhanced renderings, attached 
to this affidavit as Exhibit "0, " showing the line before and after 
installation. Although not marked as such, the renderings do not 
show the true scale difference, thus minimizing the actual visual 
impact of the steel towers on Fox Ridge's Property. 
35. Despite various requests made by me to PacifiCorp, 
PacifiCorp has refused to provide complete drawings and schematics 
of the towers and line that Pacif iCorp proposes to construct on Fox 
Ridge's Property. I learned for the first time on February 10, 
2001, that some poles may be as high as 102 feet with a 6-foot base 
diameter, based on documents provided to me by PacifiCorp's 
counsel. 
36. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "P,f is a true and 
correct copy of the 90th South-Hale Tap Line Financing and Con-
struction Agreement between Pacif iCorp and Micron Technology, Inc., 
dated December 4, 1995, which was provided to me by PacifiCorp on 
February 10, 2001. 
37. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "Q" is a true and 
correct copy of a Facilities Improvements and Use Agreement between 
PacifiCorp and Micron Technology, Inc., which is undated and un-
signed, which was provided to me by Pacif iCorp on February 10, 
2001. 
38. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "R" is a true and 
correct copy of the Alpine Highway Economic Development Agency, 
-9-
those parties refuse to provide many of the requested documents 
because of confidentiality agreements with Micron. 
DATED this /£ day of February, 2001. 
stensen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \C^ 
2001 
day of February, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 




ALISON M. WOOD 
10 Exchange PI., 11 ttiFl. 
Salt Uke City, Utah 84111 
My Commission Expire* 
October 3,2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
- 1 1 -
Summary of Interest, September 28, 1995, through March 31, 2000, 
which was provided to me by Lehi City. 
39. As of the date of this affidavit, I have observed that 
PacifiCorp has constructed a portion of the transmission line from 
the Camp Williams Substation easterly toward 1-15, has joined or 
consolidated the Camp Williams Line with the 90th South-Hale Line, 
and is preparing to continue construction of its massive steel 
towers east of 1-15 and across Fox Ridge's Property. I have also 
observed that PacifiCorp has constructed wood pole structures, 
including a 4-pole structure, within the 90th South-Hale Line 
easement immediately north of the Micron plant, in preparation to 
bring the proposed transmission line to the Micron substation. 
40. On various occasions since the summer of 2000, repre-
sentatives of PacifiCorp have advised me that PacifiCorp will not 
provide electric power to Fox Ridge and that Micron will not permit 
Lehi City or the RDA to tap into the transmission line proposed to 
be constructed by PacifiCorp for purposes of supplying power to Fox 
Ridge. 
41. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit flSlf is a true and 
correct copy of a Micron Technology, Inc., Mutual Confidentiality 
Agreement, dated March 19, 1999. On numerous occasions, I have 
spoken to representatives of PacifiCorp, Lehi City, Micron, the RDA 
and others to obtain documents from them relating to the Alpine 
Economic Development Plan, the proposed line to be constructed by 
PacifiCorp, and other details relating to this case, only to have 
-10-
Tab 6 
REX E. MADSEN (A2052) 
KEITH A. CALL (A6708) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Telecopy: (801) 363-0400 
STEPHEN J. HILL (A1493) 
STEPHEN J. HILL, LC 
Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-1308 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, 
an Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company; 
and DOES I through X, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company, 




PACIFICORP, an Oregon corporation, 
and THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
LEHI CITY, a government entity, 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
STEPHEN L. CHRISTENSEN 
Case No. 010400280 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Division 6 
Counterclaim defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Stephen L. Christensen, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am the Operations Manager of Fox Ridge Planned Communi-
ties, LLC ("Fox Ridge"), am involved * in the daily operations and 
business activities of Fox Ridge, and have personal knowledge of 
the statements made by me in this affidavit. 
2. The Hansen Lime Easement, dated December 10, 1956, a 
copy of which is attached to plaintiff's Complaint in this action, 
involves property other than the property of Fox Ridge. 
3. In the summer of 2000, representatives of PacifiCorp 
notified me for the first time that PacifiCorp intended to remove 
the wood pole structures that have been a part of the 90th South-
Hale Line across the Fox Ridge Property for over 40 years, and 
install a new line using single steel towers with a significantly 
enlarged pole diameter and height. I have repeatedly requested the 
exact details of their plans for 8 months. PacifiCorp has been 
unwilling to provide the requested information. PacifiCorp also 
intends to install additional high-voltage electric transmission 
lines, and other enlargements for the purpose of supplying electric 
power to the Micron plant directly east of the Fox Ridge Property. 
The proposed new line would be a vertical double circuit that would 
carry power from the 90th South Substation, the Hale Substation, 
and another substation located at Camp Williams, as I later learned. 
-2-
4. The proposed steel towers supporting the proposed new 
line would average 92 feet in height, based on the limited and 
incomplete information provided to me by PacifiCorp on February 10, 
2001. At least one of the proposed steel towers, based on such 
information, would be 102 feet in height and have a base diameter 
of approximately 70 inches. 
5. The existing wooden poles along the 90th South-Hale Line 
across the Fox Ridge Property measure approximately 52 feet in 
height and have a base diameter of approximately 16 inches* 
6. On or about October 10, 1978, Security Title Company and 
others conveyed an Easement to Utah Power & Light Company for a 
power line on an undevelopable part of the Fox Ridge Property, near 
the top of Traverse Mountain in Utah County. A true and correct 
copy of that Easement is attached to Fox Ridge's Memorandum in 
Support of Fox Ridge's and Tractus' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment Re Easement and In Opposition to PacifiCorp's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as Exhibit "H.11 
7. In approximately June 2000, representatives of Pacifi-
Corp requested that I come to their office in Salt Lake City and 
wanted Fox Ridge to sign a new easement to relocate a portion of 
the line PacifiCorp proposes to construct across Fox Ridge's Prop-
erty. PacifiCorp's representatives presented the new right-of-way 
easement to me and asked if Fox Ridge would sign and convey that 
easement to PacifiCorp. PacifiCorp sought the new easement in 
-i -
connection with the enlarged power line with steel towers that it 
now wants to build across Fox Ridge's Property. 
8. Representatives of PacifiCorp told me that they had 
learned that Fox Ridge was the true owner of the Fox Ridge Property 
and asked Fox Ridge to sign the above easement. They explained 
that Fox Ridge would be substituted as the grantor of the easement. 
DATED this /S day of February, 2001. 
stensen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this IG*+-
2001. 
day of February, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
MWAfeV ttifeirt I SEAL: 
N:\207SS\1\PLBADING\S-CHRIS2.APD 
AUSON M. WOOD 
10 exchange Pt.. timFl. 
8 * Uk* City. Utah 84111 
MyCommiwk>n&cp*rti 
October 3,2003 
8TATE OF UTAH 
Tab A 
* f / . 
.)?• 
TRANSMISSION LINE EASEML^f 
J^YM^. . .Cl«k
 and Z?Jl*.3.:..SJ3l}?:„ 
his wife, Grantors..; of Utah. ...County, Utah, do.... hereby convey., and warrant.. 
to UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation, its successors in interest and assigns, 
Grantee, for the sum of One ($1.00) Dollar and othc: valuable consideration, a perpetual easement 
and right of way for the S^ ecTftm anclcontinued maintenance, repair, alteration, inspection, reloca-
tion a&d replacement of the electric transmission, distribution, telephone and telegraph circuits of 
-^ . structures 
the Grantee, andpn§L..three..BPl?....4M two pole baraas and 5. _ 
guy anchors with the necessary guys, stubs, cross arms, braces and other attachments affixed there-
to, for the support of said circuits, on, under, over, through, and across a tract of land fifty (50) feet 
in width, located in .V.?.?.!* County, Utah, and being twenty- f ive (25) feet on 
each side of the following described center l ine: 
Beginning at a point on the west boundary l i n e of the grantor 's land, which 
point i s 2090 f e e t north and 1320 f ee t west , more or l e s s , from the southeast 
comer of Section 24, T.4 S. , R,l W., S.L.M., thence S.55°12 fE, 1010 f e e t , more 
or l e s s , thence S.76°18 fE. 6714 f e e t , more or l e s s , to a fence on the east 
boundary l ine of said grantor's land and being in the NE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of 
said Section 24, Lots 3 and 4 , the SE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 , the S 1/2 of the SE 1/4 
of Section 19, the SW 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 20, and the NW 1/4 of the 
NW 1/4 of Section 29, T\4 S., R,l E. , S.L.M. 
Together with all rights of ingress and egress necessary or convenient for the full and com-
plete use, occupation and enjoyment of the easement hereby granted, and all rights and privileges 
incident thereto, including the right to cut and remove timber, trees, brush, overhanging branches 
and other obstructions which may injure.or interfere with the Grantee's use, occupation or enjoy-
ment of this easement. 
WITNESS the handJSL of the Grantors.., this 1 Isfday of P.ecemker _ A. IX 19.5.6 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
/•SS 
County of U t a h J 
On the . ? l s t . d a y of December
 # ^ D.I?5.,6personally appeared before 
„ ^ ' j n e , •-,„. .Syl.yan...¥.A...Clar.k a nd .Zelia„RA . . .C.lar& , his wife 
'^ V TjPpfWheVs_ of the foregoing instrument, who duIyaek^SwledgeoVtoliae that .they.--- _ 
•»
vnTtv^<fi»fe4 the same. sx ^^ y J ^' 
^ ^ ^ g b f u m i s s i o n expires: Notary Public. 
> ? ^ Residing at S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
L'^JS# i File JXo22fS£—£ ZZ 
• - '• ° < - c . /. / o « 
A O l 
TabB 
JL 0 




- TRANSMISSION MNE EASfeWfENT 
Edward ..A. Johnson
 am| ... . ^ 
his wife, Grantor..S, of...H.k§A* County, Utah, do. .hereby convey, and warrant. 
to UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation, its successors in interest and assigns, 
Grantee, for the sum of One ($1.00) Dollar and other valuable consideration, a perpetual easement 
and right of way for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, inspection, reloca-
tion and replacement of the electric transmission, distribution, telephone and telegraph circuits of 
the Grantee, and no..fftructures Owxfwtotiw^CTand n° 
guy anchors with the necessary guys, stubs, cross arms, braces and other attachments affixed there-
to, for the support of said circuit**, on, under, over, through, and across a tract of land fifty (50) feet 
in width, located in ;..JM#ft.,; .County, Utah, and being twenty-five (25) feet ori 
each side of the following described center line: 
Beginning on the south boundary line of the grantor*s land at a point 190 
feet e&st, taor6 or less, from the south one quarter corner of Section 16, T.9 S., 
R,4 E»f S.L.M/i* thence N,44°58fW. 280 feet, more or less, to the west boundary 
line of said land and being in the SW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of said Section 16. 
Together with all rights |)f ingress and egress necessary or convenient for the full and com-
plete use, occupation and enjoyment of the easement hereby granted, and all rights and privileges 
incident thereto, including the right to cut and remove timber, trees, brush, overhanging branches 
and other obstructions which may injure or interfere with the Grantee's use, occupation or enjoy-
ment of this easement. 
WIJNESS the hands of the Grantor? , this 1 7 t h
 f j a v o f October 
Cfe:.^ ..r.^  "N /JAc^rAJw-: / 
A. 1). 19 n\ 
/1 / u t <J~t-ri~ 
STATK OF UTAH. ] 
Jss. 
County of .1 UTAH. / 
f ffi% ^ ^ 7 t l x (la>' of. . . . O c t o b e r , . l ' | 56 , A. I). .. , personally i\ 
.and. Mary LaRue J o h n s o n . j , j s Wjf(l 
?. of the foregoing instrument, who duljytffcnowledged to my that t h e y . 
[esame. ( ^ y
 f J \ 
\ : / [ 
lissfon expires: Notary Public. 
November. .8.,....3.95.9. Residing at 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
, x & ^ File No. 
» cn.„„. 
O ~i CD 
TO.. 
TabC 
\ £> 0 
2717 (Utfth Imfividiinl) 
y TRANSMISSION LINE EASEMENT 
.Marj_B,_S^ ,....#?fi«xx , 
jfebKHlte, Grantor...., of .Utah. County,. Utah, does, hereby convey., and warrant.. 
to UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation, its successors in interest and assigns, 
Grantee, for the sum of One ($1.00) Dollar and other valuable consideration, a perpetual easement 
and right of way for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, inspection, reloca-
tion and replacement of the electric transmission, distribution, telephone and telegraph circuits of 
the Grantee, anci.on&..9^$&e..^ JfHMjxtetoira* and 6 
guy alienors with the necessary guys, stubs, cross arms, braces and other attachments affixed there-
to, for the support of said circuits, on, under, over, through, and across a tract of land fifty (50) feet 
in width, located in !-....Uftgh County, Utah, and being twenty-five (25) feet on 
each side of the following described center line: 
Beginning on an east boundary l ine of the grantor's land at a point 1350 
feet north, more or l e s s , from the east one quarter corner of Section 18, T.9 S., 
R.4 E . t S.L.M., thence N .SS 0 !?^ . 60 f e e t , more or l e s s , to a north boundary l ine 
of said land and being in the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of said Section 18. 
Also, beginning on an east boundary l ine of the grantor1s land at a point 
770 feet south and 1345 feet west, more or l e s s , from the northeast comer of 
Section 18, T.9 S . , R.4 E. , S.L.M., thence N.53°19fW. 1325 f ee t , more or l e s s , 
to a north boundary l ine of said land and being in the NW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 
of said Section 18. 
Together with all rights of ingress and egress necessary or convenient for the full and com-
plete use, occupation and enjoyment of the easement hereby granted, and all rights and privileges 
incident thereto, including the right to cut and remove timber, trees, brush, overhanging branches 
and other obstructions which may injure or interfere with the Grantee's use, occupation or enjoy-




WITNESS the hand.... of the Grantor...., this ..J'/ ... clay or !•;. e' '... ....... . A. I). 19. ' 
Witness: S~'/ •'£*<s.:.s yy^/yZtf/J'S't:.. 
STATE OP UTAH, 
.if ' 
County of k:;,J&.<*rf*Sire.^:.., 
• > /-&' 
On the..i??.,.£.....V....dsiy,of 
me, ..&/&.kj..^.M.0h?A. 
.., A. D./r" \' personally appe* n the...-?:.?:: .....day,of (A.s.t..:: , . T).r \ ers ll  eared before 
e, %U&&.i~d..MMylL&^.:}^. and J v C ' l t a ^ V " 
the signer... of'the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me tht\\jSjL .. ;.:;i^......*f:....^_i • 
executed the same. < :.-r}.a>\ c^ »•. 
.^Zc..u.u,, <d.lh:d^^^ 
My Commission expires: Not^iV'RiSilJo^ 
executed the same. 
My Commission expires: 
c L.C..L,:. i-
W Tin'tf 
Residing at County o f Escambia," F lo i - ida , 
Jf&> m:* File No. 
TabD 
-}3$ 
i.n 600 103156 
48. 
2721 
TRANSMISSION LINE EASEMENT 
(Utah IndivMunU 
GLADYS BECK, a widow, 
....tCEm]ETH.J...BEQl>. 
his wife, Grantors, of....... Ufcsta.. 
and..'. MH^!..!>.»...?!?C!>. , 
County, Utah, do..., hereby convey., and warrant. 
" successor^ in interest and assigns, 
tion ai 
the Grantee, t 
guy anchors \ 
to, for the suppur* ui 
in width, located ij}. ..County 
/9 Utah, and being twenty-five (25) feet on 
Beginning at a fence on the west boundary line of the grantors1 land at a 
-t. _.i £Qft poof. past^ more or less, from the northwest corner 
"i S.76°l8fE. 2717 feet, more or less 
) a fence on the east boundary line 
N 1/2 of the N 1/2 of said Section 29, 
and the N 1/2 of 
metit of this easement 
"* s^s necessary or convenient for the full and oom-
,nnt hereby granted, and alt rights and privileges 
"*ve timber, trees, brush, overhanging branches 
e with the Grantee's use, occupation or enjoy-
WITNESS the hand.s.. of the Grantor.*., this.^nd.: day of J.v.iutai , A. t). 10 
Witfiess: 
.J'J.&A,,£U.,.K- deceit. 
STATE OP UTAH, 
County of .?.?.]•.?i..L.?:Uc 
On the 2nd: day of 
GLAOTS Tjr-CKi•;,a widow, 
me, E m ] ) m i . . L : , i l ! ^ 
.., A. DA.V.57, personally appeared before 
V i g k g n e r . . . of the for |ping instrument, who duly acknowledged t o m ^ t h a t . . f ^ 
^'•'"^ •«•t*l"-C*">-.'»\ / Nota 
•"•
;







TRANSMISSION LINE EASEMENT 
(UUh Imlivldunt) 
_ .....Jay...S.A...B.i:.Qa.dbent , and... B.everLy...R.....Brtadbent , 
his wife, Grantors.., of ~?r.™ ..County, Utah, do.... hereby convey., and warrant.. 
to UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation, its successors in interest and assigns, 
Grantee, for the sum of One ($1.00) Dollar and other valuable consideration, a perpetual easement 
and right of way for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, inspection, reloca-
* intent of the electric transmission, distribution, telephone and telegraph circuits of 
. structures 
i .- two pole ttHWfc and no... 
to, for the support of said circuits, "o 
in width, located in .Ufc&h..... County, Utah, and being twenty-five (25) feet on 
each side of the following described center line: 
Ewltming at a south boundary l i n . fonce of U« ( ™ t o r < 3 land at a 
p o l„ t 505 r S " £ X . »»re or 1 . ; . . J - «» ~ corn, o J ^ . ^ . k ^ / ^ ^ " a S S£ "AfVU *. » 1/,. or S,U *»«« 
13. 
Together with all rights of ingress and egress necessary or convenient for the full and com-
plete use, occupation and enjoyment of the easement hereby granted, and all rights and privileges 
incident thereto, including the right to cut and remove timber, trees, brush, overhanging branches 
and other obstructions which may injure or interfere with the Grantee's use, occupation or enjoy-
ment of this easement. 
WITNESS the hand.§. of the Grantor.?.., this 2 3 r ^ a y 0f November. , A. D/1&6.. 
WltWss 
£.*Z.^t-i ZU,^.U. K.J:. 
STATE OF UTAH, "1 
}ss. 
County of ........Utah J 
On the ?3?.l...day of.... November. 
m„ Jay..S.....Broadbent: 
• : C 0 lMM|§AM|sio)i expires: 
y adtrrow 
...., A. D,1?5.^personally appeared before 
Bever ly H.. .Brq^dhent ^ his wife 




S a l t Lake City.,.„"tah.. 
File No.. 
* 3 £ -3i He?g ££ 
o <•> r n 
^Er*09 l & V
... ., ~.J 
TabF 
T3? 29 
2-40 noo 103156 
50, TRANSMISSION LINE EASEMENT 
„ ..MiP...C,..JURGESS .^Aj:adpweT! and £• P^E BURGESS
 f 
yklaxirijfe, Grantor.?.., of -Utah County, Utah, do.... hereby convey., and warrant. 
to UTAH POWEtt & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation, its successors in interest and assigns, 
Grantee, for the sum of One ($1.00) Dollar and other valuable consideration, a perpetual casement 
and right of way for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, inspection, reloca-
tion and replacement of the electric transmission, distribution, telephone and telegraph circuits of 
the Grantee, and OP.. two pole towers and n.?. 
guy anchors with the necessary guys, stubs, cross arms, braces and other attachments affixed there-
to, for the-support of said circuits, on, under, over, through, and across a tract of land fifty (50) feet 
in width, located In.. ......Utah 
each side of the following described center line: 
.County, Utah, and being twenty-five (25) feet on 
Beginning at a fence on the west boundary l ine of the grantors' land at a 
point 480 feet douth and 1307 feet east , more or l es9 , from the northwest comer 
of Section 27, T.4 S*, R.l E. , S*L.M«, thence N.87°44fE. 20 feet , more or l e s s , 
to the east boundary l ine of said grantors' land and being in the NW 1/4 of the 
NW 1/4 of said Section 27. 
Together with all rights of ingress and egress necessary or convenient for the full and com-
plete use, occupation and enjoyment of the easement hereby granted, and all rights and privileges 
incident thereto, including the right to cut and remove timber, trees, brush, overhanging branches 
and other obstructions which may injure or interfere with the Grantee's use, occupation or enjoy-
ment of this easement. 
WITNESS the hatuLa. of the Grantors.., this 12th day of February ,
 A . p. i9;,7 
^ ^ J) . t±? 
2^t^^/i^ n O ii :> v 
STATIC OP UTAH, 
County of Salt Lake 
On the !•.?.th day of... 
mf, REID Ctii BURGESS. 
February , A.;|p9?7, personally appeared before 
..and (V fALfe.BURC.K5JS 
..xhtaexsifo: 
,, . \ tjiu-signer.3.. of the foregoing instrument, who dtih>m1<tw\vledge|fto hi<\ that t l ie>' 
> v:'\exek!uted the same. ( e / ' • | | — ^
 f>.-
;: p U 3 -Myi ^ Ofatalsalon expires: | Notai I Not ry f*nl>fit*. 
• • \ . > + y . A ^ : N p y , . 8 , . l ? 5 S . Residing at 
Satt^ake City,.. Utah 
File No. 
TabG 
46 . TRANSMISSION LINE EASEMENT 
Hansen L^ JJje & Stucco Compjanx. a eornorarinn 
doing business in the State of Utah, Grantor, hereby conveys, and warrants to UTAH POWER fir 
LIGHT COMPANY/a corporation, its successors in interest and assigns, Grantee, for the sum of 
One ($1.00) Dollar and other valuable consideration, a perpetual easement and right of way for 
the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, inspection, relocation and replacement 
of the electric transmission, distribution, telephone and telegraph circuits of the Grantee, and 
onAJtlxr^^^ and <? guy 
anchors with the necessary guys, stubs, cross arms, braces and other attachments affixed thereto, for 
the support of said circuits, on, under, over, through and across a tract of land fifty (50) feet in 
width, located in. .Utah County, Utah, and being twenty-five (25) feet on 
each side of the following described center line: 
Beginning at a point on the east boundary line of the grantor's land, which 
point is 2090 feet north and 1320 feet west, more or less, from the southeast 
corner of Section 24, T*4 S*, R.l W., S.L.M., thence N*55°12,W. 2595 feet, more 
or less, to the Utah County boundary line and being in the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4, 
the SW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 and the SE 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of said Section 24. 
Together with all the rights of ingress and egress necessary or convenient for the full and com-
plete use, occupation and enjoyment of the .easement hereby granted, and all rights and privileges 
incident thereto, including the right to cut and remove timber, trees, brush, overhanging branches 
and other obstructions which may injure or interfere with the Grantee's use, occupation or enjoy-
ment of this easement 






County of UAah ) 
Ss. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
On the„.I.QiJl—day of—DsssanhST. 
J2*JLJHans.en.. 
., A. D. 19.-5A., personally appeared before 
, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he 
>Y-\Ct^h^txS^l President of..HaJias&.Lio^ a corporation, and that said instru-
(•• P U B i M t J ^ s l g n e d in behalf of said corporation by authority of A X ^ s g ^ u M p n ^ 
^„s&ttf4i'> *
 w TT ^ .„,^^„acknowledgOT to me that said corporation 
Notary Public. 
^£.. | . . .Q..X.JIaJX^n... . 
/\<? ^}xG£hltdr\Ee same, 
\.).\ YMJ» Commission expires: 
J.9v§afeS!-..?j.JE25S. Residing at 
n;: .aalt..Lak5...aiiy.,...Ui^Ja.. 6 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
! THE UNDERSIGNED PECORDER OF UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
DO hER~B\ CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS A 
P i l e 10PY OF THE ORIGINAL RECORDED DOCUMENT IN THE 
OrPiCE RECORD IN MY OFFICE AS THE SAME APPEARS IN 
ENTRY 4 5 4 ( 0 ^ PAGES 
BOOK_JJEL3^ AT PAGE " l ^ S ^ T S C * 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL OF SAID OFFICE THIS F&ZL 
DAY OF " F ^ W , _ 2 0 O L L 







UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
gASEflBflf 
SECURITY TITLE COHPAHTY, a corporation, UTAH IAH& VJ&W£ 
COMPLY, a limited partnership, and ALP IKE HILLS G©HP&#Yt a 8#»S#$* partnership, Utah County, State of O a^h, Grsnfcoxe, do herehy ^ i | p % 
AN© CONVEY to UTAH POWER & LIGHT C0KPAS*Y, a corptfStttliai*, fee mmfr&V& 
in interest and assigns, Grantee, for the sum of Cfcia ($i>-0# l ^ P K 
and other valuable consideration, a perpetual e&eafiMUftfe m& %$J0$'.'m 
way for the erection, operation and continued maintenance, r4$$$$, 
alteration, inspection, relocation and replacement of the electric 
transmission and distribution circuitB of the Grantee, with fche-
necessary poles, towers, guys, stubs, crossartss, brasas nn4 Ot&er 
attachments affixed thereto, for the support of sHA eirctftt*» on, 
over and across a tract of land located in UTAH ©BKfY, U$AH: 
Beginning on the West boundary line of the 
Grantor's land at a point 900 feet South and 
1320 feet West, more or less , from the Kortheast 
comer of Section 24. X. 4 S., R, 1 W. , S.t.H* , 
thence N 50c 13* E. 1064 feet, more or Ifees, to 
the West boundary line of microwave stat'on s i te 
and being in the MB 1/4 of che KB 1/4 of said 
Section 24, Utah County, Utah, comprising of 
4 poles and one guy anchor. 
Together with all rights of ingress and egress nj»<$igft$$3r 
or convenient for the full ai»d complete use, occupation $&&'4t^tf$M$& 
of the easement hereby grantm , and all rights and priv£^$$g ium^M-
thereto, including the right to cut and remove timber, *ttfepji> hlfltim* 
overhanging b rail che s and other obstructions which may ift$Q&| #£ 
interfere with thr Grantee's as«, occupation or enjoyrnettt m t&t* 
easement. 
Hon Feb 05 2001 08:42 UTAH COUNTY RECORDERS OFFICE 
ER 14-1513 
STATE OF UTAH )ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Oil the 
appeared b&$mB 8J£ _ 
did f4y that h©> the 
of sierra:?* trms mimx smRrmfmm 
wa-9 i t e # 4 - * t o beheif of sa id corr*o*Jiti£n 
° % P ^ B f ^ H K l l directors and said jL.'„ 
a
^^^^^%&^^km& t ? i a t 8** id corporixi©! -ex 
tH'e3%W'i#liii^l&' i s rt*e s e a i °f s a i c i corpor. 
STATE OF tifkli 
... ... *&?$ {mtNttoany 
M ^ and i o ^ S W t e 
) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE' ) 
On the 
ha is"oni of the 'AeVtft*?* of UTAft hmU WBm£ ' ,^&& appeared before roe j \ i •l-X,^\}-K^^ X,^. -V..- *
 WPO
 ®m -v -- -
sworn did say that ha i s on'6 of the $«rtm*r* of T ft lm& ..,„.. 
C0M2AHY, a l imited partnership, that "executed the witfr&t S»fef 
and acknowledged to me that such partnership executed the $& 
My CoTraciftsion Expirea: 
v*" o *•» • 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of A^^dk*.. * 
e:ppe»red before T ^ . , # f c 
sworn did My that he i f 6m o f Iftft pagfrfeneirs of ^ y g | p l p p ^ 
a general partnership, that executed the within | iraSM^J# 1 
*«1cn«wle4g*d to me that such partnership executes * ^ ****1*--> 
My Cotmnieaion Expires: 
*3fl , / • • £ / ; , 3 / , 
•sps* *- •*• *^te ^ . "jr-r-v^ V¥ saws? 
l ess- *" ' ••••'• - C - : • f-'<;*.;-.r ;.^«*'?? 
**wt*'!: "" ' 
805 
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EASEMENT 
3R. 
^ Michael M. Carlson and , 
2 Jo""-- hritoowdaEs, Grantor , does hereby convey and warrant to 
EC 3£!•?;£ PacifiCorp, an Oregon Corporation, dba Utah Power & Light 
x §5^.2 Company, its successors in interest and assigns, Grantee, for 
S ^ " ? ^ the sum of Ten ($10.00) Dollars and other valuable 
.rc^J^ consideration, a perpetual easement and right of way for the 
^J^iiscS^ erection. operation, maintenance, repair, alteration, 
§:i£-pc: enlargement, inspection, relocation and replacement of electric 
ccS<"^^ transmission and distribution lines, communications circuits, 
:=>.£?5Ho? fiber optic cables and associated facilities, one steel pole and 
00
 ^  3 one guy anchor, with the necessary guys, stubs, crossarms, 
~ braces and other attachments affixed thereto, for the support of 
said lines and circuits, on, over, under and across real 
property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, described as 
follows: 
Along a centerline described as follows: 
Beginning in an existing power!ine on the Grantor's 
land at a point 46 feet north and 94 feet east, more 
or less, from the south one quarter corner of Section 
5, T.3 S., R.l E., S.L.M., thence S.88°15'E. -3** feet, 
more or less, thence N.86°21,E. 43 feet, more or less, 
Aoprovedas to the easterly boundary line of said land and being 
rocccnptr- in the SW1/4 of the SE1/4 of said Section 5. 
Sfa One guy anchor described as follows: 
One guy anchor located on the Grantor's land at a 
point 71 feet north and 190 feet east, more or less, 
from the south one quarter corner of Section 5. T.3 
S., R.l E., S.L.M. , and being in the SW1/4 of the S 
SE1/4 of said Section 5. ^ 
Together with all rights of ingress *nd egress oo 
necessary or convenient for the full and complete use, "^ 
occupation and enjoyment of the easement hereby granted, and all £ 







Page 2 of 2 
cut and remove timber, trees, biush, overhanging branches and 
other obstructions which may injure or interfere uith the 
Grantee's use, occupatior, or enjoyment of this easement. 
June 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF 
WITNESS the hand 
, 1989 . " 
of t h e G • ,
 y t h i s 2 9 t h day of 
) 
On t h e 2 ^ t h day of June 19 Q9 
p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d b e f o r e me, Michael ^. Carlson 
,___ , SSS^TS^", tKe signer 
"iroregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
executed the same. 
My Commission expires: 
9-20-92 
Description Approved ZA/^J) 
Form & Execution Approved 
Cj>ctxrC5C-
R e s i d i n g a t SaJtJrLpJ^ 
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UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
1 9 % JUH 4 1£:E2 W FEE 1 6 . 0 0 BY BT 
RECORDED FOR UTAH POWER t LIGHT 
EASEMENT 
I'd" r''t-zietftu iB;kV-~3Jj 
lrb. Micron Technology, Incorporated, a Delaware corporation, doing 
cusiness in the State of Utah, Grantor, hereby conveys and 
warrants to PacifiCorp, an Oregon corporation, dba Utah Power & 
Light Company, whose principal place of business is located at 
1407 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, its successors in 
interest and assigns, Grantee, for the sum of Ten Dollars 
($10.00) and other valuable consideration, a perpetual easement 
and right of way for the erection, operation, maintenance, 
repair, alteration, enlargement, inspection, relocation and 
replacement of electric transmission and distribution lines, 
communications circuits, fiber optic cables and associated 
facilities, and four - three pole structures, six - two pole 
structures, one - four pole switch structure and fourteen guy 
anchors, with the necessary stubs, crossarms, braces and other 
attachments affixed thereto, for the support of said lines and 
circuits, (collectively the "Facilities") on, over, under and 
across real property located in Utah County, Utah, described as 
follows: 
A right of way 50 feet in width, being 25 
feet on each side of the following described survey 
line: 
Beginning at a new pole in an existing power 
line on the Grantor's land at a point 517 feet south 
and 824 feet west, more or less, from the northeast 
1 corner of Section 28, T. 4 S., R. 1 E., S.L.M., thence 
S.3°49'E. 1807 feet, thence S.8°14'E, 400 feet on said 
land and being in El/2 of the NE1/4 and the NE1/4 of 
the SE1/4 of said Section 28, containing 2*53 acres, 
more or less. 
Beginning at a new pole in an existing power 
line on the Grantor's land at a point 514 feet south 
and 724 feet west, more or less, from the northeast 
corner of Section 28, T. 4 S., R. 1 E., S.L.M., thence 
S.2°13'E. 1800 feet, thence S.8°14'E. 400 feet on said 
land and being in the El/2 of the NE1/4 and the NE1/4 









May 20, 1996 
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more or less. 
One four pole structure described as follows: 
One four pole switch structure located in an 
existing powerline on the Grantor's land at a point 516 
feet south and 774 feet west, more or less, from the 
northeast corner of Section 28, T. 4 S., R. 1 E., 
S.L.M., and being in the NE1/4 of the NE1/4 of said 
Section 28. 
This easement for the above mentioned new 
four pole switch structure is granted in accord with 
and supplements a prior easement dated February 21, 
1957 and recorded in the 21st day of February, 1957, in 
the office of the County Recorder of Utah County, Utah 
in book 738 at page 20. 
A right of way 35 feet in width, being 17.5 
feet on each side of the following described 
centerline: 
Beginning at a point in a new three pole 
structure on the Grantor's land at a point 508 f-eet 
south and 72 9 feet west, more or less, from the 
northeast corner of Section 28, T. 4 S., R. 1 E., 
S.L.M., thence N.2°13'W. 70 feet on said land and being 
in the NE1/4 of the NE1/4 of said Section 28, 
. containing 0.06 of an acre, more or less. 
Beginning at a point in a new three pole 
structure on the Grantor's land at a point 511 feet 
south and 819 feet west, more or less, from the 
northeast corner of Section 28, T. 4 S., R. 1 E., 
S.L.M., thence N.3°49'W. 70 feet on said land and being 
in the NE1/4 of the NE1/4 of said Section 28, 
containing 0.06 of an acre, more or less. 
Total area 5.18 acres, more or less. 
Together with all rights of ingress and egress 
necessary or convenient for the full and complete use, occupation 
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immediately prior to said installation, construction, 
maintenance, repair, removal, or replacement. 
WITNESS the hand(s) of the Grantor(s) this 29th day of 
May
 t 19 96 . 





STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF Utah 
On the 29th day of 
personally appeared before me, 
being by me duly sworn did say that he is the yp Lehi Operations 
RKOSXOtaCK of Micron Technology. Inc. , a corporation, and 
that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of Barney Jurica and said Barney Jurica 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
Ibz Commission expi 
Description Approved 
P O T 
Iplglill 
Mon Feb 05 2001 08:57 UTAH COUNTY RECORDERS OFFICE 
TabK 
Return To. 
Lome J. Hoggan 
PtcifiCorp / Utah Power 
1407 West North Temple. Suite #110 
Salt Lake City, UT MHO 
WO PN 201928 
ROW File No.. 19990214 
RIGHT OF WAY EASEMENT 
For value received, Utah Valley Land Company, ("Grantor"), hereby grants to 
PacifiCorp, an Oregon corporation, its successors and assigns, ("Grantee"), an easement for a 
right of way 50 feet in width, more or less, for the construction, reconstruction, operation, 
maintenance, repair, replacement, enlargement, and removal of electric power transmission, 
distribution and communication lines and all necessary or desirable accessories and 
appurtenances thereto, including without limitation: supporting towers, poles, props, guys and 
anchors, including guys and anchors; wires, fibers, cables and other conductors and conduits 
therefor; and pads, transformers, switches, vaults and cabinets, along the general course now 
located by Grantee on, over or under the surface of the real property of Grantor in Utah County, 
State of Utah, more particularly described as follows and as more particularly described and/or 
shown on Exhibit A attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof: 
A right of way 50 feet in width, being 25 feet on each side of the following 
described survey line: 
Beginning on the west boundary line of the Grantor's land at a point 441 feet 
north and 1317 feet west, more or less, from the east one quarter corner of 
Section 24, T. 4 S., R. 1 W., S.L.M., thence S.45°45'E. 2336.2 feet, more or less, 
to a point in an existing power line on said land and being in the SEV£ of the NE!4 
and the NEtt of the SEK of said Section 24, and in Lot 3 of Section 19, T. 4 S., R. 
1 E., S.L.M., containing 2.54 acres, more or less. 
Together with the present and (without payment therefor) the future right to keep the 
right of way clear of all brush, trees, timber, structures, buildings and other hazards which might 
endanger Grantee's facilities or impede Grantee's activities. 
At no time shall Grantor place, use or permit any equipment or material of any kind that 
exceeds twelve (12) feet in height, light any fires, place or store any flammable materials (other 
than agricultural crops), on or within the boundaries of the right of way. Subject to the foregoing 
limitations, the surface of the right of way may be used for agricultural crops and other purposes 
not inconsistent, as determined by Grantee, with the purposes for which this easement has been 
granted. 
Page 1 of2 
The rights and obligations of the parties hereto shall be binding upon and shall benefit 
their respective heirs, successors and assigns. 
DATED this day of , 2000. 
Grantor(s) 
REPRESENTATIVE ACKOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF ) 
)ss. 
County of ) 
This instrument was acknowledged before me on this day of , 
2000, by , as of 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires:. 
Page 2 of 2 
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REX E. MADSEN (A2052) 
KEITH A. CALL (A6708) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Telecopy: (801)363-0400 
STEPHEN J. HILL (A1493) 
STEPHEN J. HILL, LC 
Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-1308 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PACFICORP, dba UTAH POWER, an Oregon 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
AFFIDAVIT OF S. KENLY CLARK 
vs. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company; and DOES I 
through X, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company, and TRACTUS, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
PACFICORP, an Oregon corporation, and THE 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF LEHI CITY, a 
government entity, 
Counterclaim defendants. 
Case No. 010400280 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Division 6 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
S. Kenly Clark states under oath as follows: 
1. I lived in Lehi> Utah, my entire life until I moved to Tremonton, Utah, about twenty-
oneyearsago. IwasbomMay 18,1935. I am the son of Sylvan and Zella Clark, both of whom 
have been deceased for several years. 
2. On December 21,1956, my parents granted a Transmission Line Easement to Utah 
Power & Light Company, A copy of the easement is attached. 
3. At the time my parents signed the easement, I was 21 years old. At that time I was 
personally running cattle on the property crossed by the easement, which our family called the 
Low Hills Farm. Up to that time, I had worked side by side with my father nearly every day of 
my life on that farm, and I continued to work the farm for more than 20 more years. 
4. I paid close attention to my parents' negotiations with Utah Power & Light concerning 
the easement because the power line would affect my cattle business. I discussed the easement 
many times with my parents. 
5. I remember that my parents wanted to revise the original easement form presented to 
them by Utah Power & Light. They did not want tall steel towers running across the property. 
They crossed out the word "towers5' because they did not want anything larger than the original 
wooden poles put on the property. The poles were the same size all along the line, and that's all 
that my parents agreed to. 
6. My father was at one time a Utah County Commissioner. He talked to me a lot about 
the future of the county. He believed it would grow and that eventually our farm could be 
developed. He told me many time that he thought our property had the most beautiful view in 
the state of Utah. After the power line was built he often told me that he didn't want anything 
larger than the original poles because anything other than that would wreck the view and would 
hurt the value of the property. 
7. I have been told that PacifiCorp, the successor to Utah Power & Light, is now 
involved in a lawsuit with the current owners of the property over whether it can put large steel 
towers on the property in place of the original wooden poles. I have also been told that 
PacifiCorp has told the Court that by striking out the word "towers" and replacing it with the 
word "structures" my parents actually intended to expand the permissible types of structures that 
Utah Power & Light could put on our farm. That is not true. My parents crossed out the word 
"towers" because they did not want large steel towers on the property. They didn't want anything 
on the property other than the original wooden poles. 
S.Kenly Clark 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this^T^day of February, 2001. 
)TARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
OT?AT 8 A W M ^ \ RONALD V. HANCOCK 
5fcAL: I / J / ^ K M r a 140 West Main 
Ttemonton, UT 84337 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
MAY 19,2001 
STATE OF UTAH 
-3-
Tab 8 
REXE. MADSEN (A2052) 
KEITH A. CALL (A6708) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTTNEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Telecopy: (801) 363-0400 
STEPHEN J. HILL (A1493) 
STEPHEN J. HILL, LC 
Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)328-1308 
Telecopy: (801) 322-4139 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company; and 
DOES I through X, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company, and TRACTUS, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 
Counterclaimants, Case No. 010400280 
vs. 
PACIFICORP, an Oregon corporation, and 
THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF LEffl 
CITY, a government entity, 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF JAMES M. CHRISTENSEN 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Division 6 
Counterclaim defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
'. SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
James M. Christensen, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. This Affidavit supplements my Affidavit of February 15, 2001 in the above-entitled 
action 
2. The statements made by me in my February 15, 2001 Affidavit are based upon my 
experience and personal involvement over a period over 20 years as an owner and developer of 
residential and commercial property. 
3. I have had extensive experience with the development of residential and 
commercial property involving hundreds of millions of dollars during that period of time, and I 
have worked extensively, oft times on a daily basis, with national and local home builders who 
purchase residential lots within the subdivisions in which I have been personally involved as a 
manager of construction and marketing activities. 
4. I have personally been involved in a management and supervisory capacity in the 
construction of thousands of apartments and residences, as well as over a million square feet of 
commercial space. 
5. During my years of experience, I have become well acquainted with the kinds of 
problems that exist with respect to development and construction activities within the immediate 
vicinity of electric transmission lines, and have taken active steps to avoid the development of 
properties and construction of improvements within the vicinity of such lines because of the 
problems and difficulties they create in the marketing of properties, including particularly 
residential lots. 
6. I have conducted many negotiations with national and local builders who purchase 
lots for the construction of homes, and I am very familiar with the kinds of factors considered by 
them in the purchase of such lots. 
-2-
Q r /* 
7. I have been involved in numerous dealings and negotiations with potential builders 
who have expressed interest in purchasing residential lots within Fox Ridge's property in the 
present case. 
8. In my dealings and negotiations, I have experienced considerable difficulty in 
attempting to market lots to such builders as a result of the threatened construction by PacifiCorp 
of its electric transmission line consisting of steel towers and two circuits across Fox Ridge's 
property. 
9. Specifically, those parties do not desire to purchase property within a corridor of 
approximately 400 to 600 feet on either side of PacifiCorp's line, if PacifiCorp is permitted to 
construct the line. 
DATED this ^ day of March, 2001. 





ALISON M. WOOD 
10 Exchange PI., 11th F1. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires 
October 3,2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
Tab 9 
REX E. MADSEN (A2052) 
KEITH A. CALL (A6708) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Telecopy: (801) 363-0400 
STEPHEN J. HILL (A1493) 
STEPHEN J. HILL, LC 
Attorney for Defendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)328-1308 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
a Utah limited liability company; and DOES I 
through X, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
FOX RIDGE PLANNED COMMUNITIES, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company, and TRACTUS, c a s e N 0 010400280 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 
Counterclaimants, J u d S e R ay M" H a r d i n & Jr-
vs. Division 6 
PACIFICORP, an Oregon corporation, and THE 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF LEHI CITY, a 
government entity, 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF 
STEPHEN L. CHRISTENSEN 
Counterclaim defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Stephen L. Christensen, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Operations Manager of Fox Ridge Planned Communities, LLC ("Fox 
Ridge"), am involved in the daily operations and business activities of Fox Ridge, and have personal 
knowledge of the statements made by me in this affidavit. 
2. In approximately June 2000,1 received a call from an individual who stated that he 
was with PacifiCorp and would like to meet with me at his office. During my conversation with him, 
I understood that I would be meeting with him and not several other people from PacifiCorp. 
3. Because of Fox Ridge's recent acquisition of the property that is the subject of this 
action, I went to his office. When I arrived, several of PacifiCorp representatives were present. I 
recall that one of them was Jeff Richards who is PacifiCorp's attorney in the above action. 
4. PacifiCorp's representatives explained that they wanted to relocate a portion of the 
existing power line across Fox Ridge's property and construct a new line in place of the existing 
wooden poles. 
5. They handed me computer-enhanced photographs which they said showed the 
difference between the new steel towers and wooden poles. 
6. They also handed me a three-page document. The first two pages consisted of some 
easement language they asked me to sign. The last page was a map of the power line easement, 
showing the general location of the easement corridor and the proposed relocation of a portion of the 
easement along the northwest portion of Fox Ridge's property. A copy of that document is attached 
to my affidavit dated February 15, 2001, as Exhibit "K." 
7. I informed PacifiCorp's representatives that I had to go back to my office and think 
about it. I also asked for additional information and stated that I would like to know more about 
what was going on. 
-2- 9^( 
8. During that meeting, there was no discussion of settlement, any dispute, or any need 
to resolve differences between PacifiCorp and Fox Ridge. No negotiations concerning any settlement 
or resolution of any differences occurred. 
9. PacifiCorp's representatives simply discussed with me their desire to relocate a portion 
of the power line easement and construct a new line in place of the existing wooden poles. 
10. As I was leaving, I asked PacifiCorp's representatives about their positions at 
PacifiCorp. I recall that Jeff Richards indicated, at that point, that he was an attorney. I did not 
know that until he told me at the end of the meeting. 
DATED this J ^ c l a y of March, 2001. 
Stephen L. Christensen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this (£ day of March, 2001. 
tf^/4l<tv<*A 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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I. Introduction 
THIS ARTICLE BEGINS with a general review of major scientific and appraisal writings since 1993 on tlie 
subject of electromagnetic field radiation (EMF) and tlieir effect on real property values. Further, there is a brief 
examination of current cases, statutes, and municipal regulations on tlie subject. Finally, the authors explore the 
pros and cons of conidor valuation for expansion of existing utility easements, with an emphasis on tlie 
right-of-way marketing efforts of several major utility companies and using corridor sales data as opposed to 
traditional "at the fence" methods. 
II. Review of Original Conclusions 
In 1993, one of the authors took a long look at the then-current relationship between electric transmission lines 
and surrounding real estate values. In the article, "Properties Near Power Lines and Valuation Issues: 
Condemnation or Inverse Condemnation?," [FN1] this author presented a broad oveiview of the subject including 
tlie following: 
. An examination of scientific inquiry of the day concerning the existence of actual adverse effects of EMF from 
major transmission lines on human health; 
. Public perception of those effects; 
*332 . Straw polls of real estate professionals on their views of whether these lines impact values; 
. A survey of 100 residential properties abutting a major power line corridor in Houston relative to their peer 
properties not next to the line; 
. A brief review of four important condemnation cases dealing with the potential impact of EMFs on health and 
property values, as well as the admissibility of expert appraisal evidence; and 
. A developing method for analyzing compensation to landowners for placement of a new power line which took 
into account an effective easement area, in addition to the actual easement required by the condemning entity. 
At tlie time of the original article, scientific findings on the issue of negative health effects were inconclusive, 
sending mixed signals to the public. [FN2] The author found, however, that general public perception that EMFs 
were harmful uniformly drove the values of adjacent property downwards, a finding supported both by his 
discussions with other real estate professionals and by his residential property study in Houston. [FN3] Emerging 
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case law at the time supported the admissibility of expert testimony based on "fear in the market place" diminishing 
the prices of affected properties. [FN4] In addition, some municipalities had already enacted subdivision plat 
requirements and other regulations which seemed to support the author's effective easement theory. [FN5] 
Since 1993, there have been significant developments on all fronts. Scientifically, the debate has reached the lofty 
halls of the Council of the American Physical Society and the U.S. Academy of Sciences. Real estate professionals, 
however, even those performing studies on behalf of the power line companies themselves, are continuing to 
conclude that power lines are bad for property values. On the case law front, in general, there is continuing support 
for the admissibility of expert appraisal evidence based on "fear in the market place," but there is growing criticism 
of testimony deemed to be "junk science," fueled by the Daubert and Robinson opinions [FN6] 
11II HUP nl it if Conclusions: Still Inconclusive 
Scientific investigation of the potential adverse impacts of radiated fields has widened to include not only the low 
frequency emissions of *333 transmission lines, the subject of this article, but also high frequency emanations from 
cellular phones and microwave towers. Though the data indicating that higher frequency emissions may be harmful 
seems much more settled in the literature than that concerning low frequency emissions, it is probable that public 
perception blends the two such that general fear of EMF exists in the public mmd across the board 
A. Good News 
In an attempt to quell some concerns, the Council of the American Physical Society, a body of renowned 
American physicists, issued the following statement in 1995: 
The scientific literature and the reports of reviews by other panels show no consistent, significant link between 
cancer and power line fields.... While it is impossible to prove that no deleterious health effects occur from 
exposure to any environmental factor,...the conjectures relating cancer to power line fields have not been 
scientifically substantiated. [FN7] 
One year later, the U.S. Academy of Sciences joined the physicists in their conclusions: 
|T]he current body of evidence does not show that exposure to these EMFs presents a human health hazard. 
Specifically, no conclusive and consistent evidence shows that exposure to residential electric and magnetic fields 
produces cancer, adverse neurobehavioral effects or reproductive and developmental effects [FN8] 
These statements were foreshadowed by a British group of epidemiologists known as the Advisoiy Group on 
Non-Ionizing Radiation (AGNIR) in 1994. AGNIR, however, reserved judgment on the issue with regard to 
childhood leukemia: "...[epidemiological] studies do not establish that exposure to electromagnetic fields is a cause 
of cancer but, taken together, they do provide some evidence to suggest that the possibility exists in the case of 
childhood leukaemia." [FN9] 
B Bad News 
The most recent official pronouncement on the subject reopens the debate and muddies the waters more than ever. 
In June 1998, an expert panel convened by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) at the 
behest of Congress issued an alarming press release which concluded that low frequency EMFs, *334 like those 
surrounding transmission lines, should be classified as a Group 2B human carcinogen under the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer classification scheme. [FN10] A Group 2B classification means that "the agent 
(mixture) is possibly carcinogenic to humans. The exposure circumstances entail exposures that are possibly 
carcinogenic to humans." [FN11] 
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C. Ugly News 
As both the following look at subsequent appraisal literature and common sense make clear, the continuing 
scientific uncertainty over the adverse health consequences of EMFs only serves to perpetuate the debilitating 
effect of power lines on abutting property values. 
j i iti n ill 1 ili in idm JIHI Surveys 
A. Hamilton/Schwann 
In 1995, two academics named Stanley Hamilton and Gregory Schwann published a highly empirical study of 
residential home prices in Vancouver, British Columbia. [FN12] The study contrasted sales in four separate 
Vancouver neighborhoods of residences adjacent to power lines of 60kV or greater from 1985 to 1991. The sample 
size was impressive, containing 12,907 transactions in the four study areas. The percentage of decreases in 
property values were not as great as those originally measured in the Houston area in this author's 1993 study. 
|TN13] Hamilton/Schwann nevertheless concluded to an undeniable drop in value: "We find that properties 
adjacent to a line lose 6.3 percent of their value due to proximity and the visual impact." [FN14] The 
well-supported findings presented in this article lead one to conclude that the depressing effect power lines have on 
property values is not merely an American phenomenon. 
B. Cowger/Bottemiller/Cahill 
These three real estate professionals employed by the Bonneville Power Administration in Portland, Oregon, 
published another study in Right *335 of Way magazine in 1996. [FN15] This study again concluded that overhead 
transmission lines negatively influence value: "Overhead transmission lines can reduce the value of residential and 
agricultural property. The impact is usually small (0-10 percent) for single-family residential properties. The 
greatest impacts have been measured in intensively managed agricultural property (irrigators, etc., and in rural, 
second (vacation)) home developments." [FN 16] 
C. Development Strategies Survey 
In 1995, a group of real estate consultants in Missouri conducted a survey of residential brokers and salespersons, 
some 167 professionals, all in the St. Louis area. [FN17] The results were published in a study concluding that 54 
percent of those surveyed believed high voltage overhead electric transmission lines (HVOETLs) "very negatively 
affected" residential property values; another 23.8 percent considered HVOETLs to "somewhat negatively" affect 
property values. [FN 18] 
D. Rikon Article 
In January 1996, a New York attorney named Michael Rikon published an article in the Appraisal Journal 
following up on the landmark Criscuola [FN19] decision, which had just been handed down at the time of this 
author's original paper. [FN20] Criscuola was the New York Supreme Court decision allowing appraisal evidence 
in transmission line cases to be based upon fear in the marketplace, rather than actual epidemiological evidence of 
adverse health effects from EMFs. [FN21] Rikon noted that the Criscuola court's embrace of the "fear in the 
marketplace" theory of damages had spread beyond transmission line cases to include actions against a cell phone 
provider to stop construction of a tower, against Amtrak to oppose electrification of its tracks in New York, and in 
increasing numbers of inverse condemnation cases. [FN22] Clearly, the Criscuola buzz continues to grow. 
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*336 E. Gimmy Seminar 
hi late 1994, Arthur Gimmy, MAI, presented a seminar before the EMF Regulation and Litigation Institute. 
[FN23] In pail, the seminar presented a matched-sales analysis of California residential property that indicated 
diminutions in lot values from properties abutting power line easements of 18 percent to a whopping 53.8 percent 
[FN24] While the methodology employed in this study does not seem as rigorously empirical as that used by 
Hamilton/Schwann, it may demonstrate that California landowners are more sensitive to the EMF property 
devaluation issue than those in British Columbia. 
F LCRA Commissioned Study 
More recently, in late 1997 the Lower Colorado River Authonty (LCRA) commissioned a study to quantify the 
property value impact of electric transmission lines in and around Georgetown, Texas. [FN25] The study was 
performed by a local MAI who the LCRA had also hired to do all of the appraisal work for the concuiTent 
acquisition of numerous easement parcels for a new 138kV line. Well over 100 real estate transactions were 
analyzed, including both sales from eight different residential subdivisions and vacant land sales. Even in a study 
prepared for a condemning entity in connection with a number of pending acquisitions, undeniable value damage 
was found: "From the data analyzed, it is concluded that from an overall value perspective, an electric transmission 
line easement has less than a 10 percent impact on price, and in most instances, less than a 5 percent impact on 
price." |FN26] 
It is important to note that the appraiser in this study was referring to a 10 percent overall mrpact on price, not just 
on the value of the land immediately affected by or adjacent to the easement. [FN27] For those areas, he reached a 
specific conclusion: 
...[I]t is concluded that the area located within an electric transmission line easement has a 90% diminution in 
value due to the presence of the easement...[and] it is concluded that an area 200 feet wide adjoining the proposed 
easement has some diminished value. The extent of the diminished value can be dependent on various factors 
which would include the location of the easement relative to the whole tract, and the physical characteristics of the 
remainder [FN28] 
*337 This author's original 1993 estimate as to the probable width of an effective easement was 150 feet on either 
side of the actual easement. [FN29] The fact that a study prepared on behalf of a major Texas condemnor reached 
a similar conclusion demonstrates the validity of the effective easement theory. 
V. Municipal Regulations and Statutes: More B*id News 
A. Setback Requirements 
Since the original article, this author has become aware of building setback requirements from HVOETLs 
imposed by a few Texas municipalities that convert effective easements from theory to undeniable reality in some 
jurisdictions. For instance, the Town of Flower Mound, Texas (just north of Fort Worth) mandates that no building 
be constructed within 100 feet of the edge of the right-of-way or easement of any high voltage (60kV or higher) 
electrical transmission line. [FN30] 
Although its requirements are not as concrete as those of Flower Mound, the City of Red Oak, Texas (south of 
Dallas) has enacted similar restrictions tied to height. [FN31] In Red Oak, buildings in residentially zoned areas 
adjacent to elevated power lines or towers must be set back an additional one foot for every foot by which the 
neighboring transmission line or tower exceeds fifteen feet. [FN32] For instance, if a residential property abuts a 
90-foot high transmission line or tower, an additional 75-foot building setback would be imposed. The City of 
Piano has related provisions tied to tower or line height. [FN33] Obviously, all other things being equal, a 
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purchaser comparing properties affected by these regulation-imposed effective easements would pay quite a bit less 
for them than for other competing properties unaffected by such setbacks. 
B. Potential Legal Liability 
In addition, the Texas Health and Safety Code contains at least one provision related to high voltage power lines 
(anything over 600 volts) that the authors suspect could have a chilling effect on the values of the underlying 
servient estate beneath an electric line easement. Chapter 752 of the Code sets out a host of prohibited activities in 
and around power lines, such as restrictions on operation of certain types of machinery *338 or structures near the 
line without posting a statutorily required warning. [FN34] Curiously, the Texas Legislature even saw fit to declare 
violation of this chapter a criminal offense punishable by jail time, fines, or both. [FN35] Perhaps the most 
damaging provision, however, is the one that establishes civil liability to the power line company for any contacts 
with the line caused by violations of the statute: 
If a violation of this chapter results in physical or electrical contact with a high voltage overhead line, the person, 
finn, corporation, or association that committed the violation is liable to the owner or operator of the line for all 
damages to the facilities and for all liability that the owner or operator incurs as a result of the contact. [FN36] 
While at first blush an underlying landowner's liability to a power line company for a downed transmission line or 
tower seems obvious, the effective global indemnity of the line operator contained in the last clause could 
negatively impact underlying property values. 
Consider this hypothetical example. Developer John, whose 300 acre tract is bisected by a 138kV power line 
easement, is preparing the surface of his newly subdivided tract for roadways with a bulldozer. Inadvertently, the 
operator of the bulldozer bumps one of the towers supporting the line. The tower, having been incorrectly 
engineered and installed by the power company, immediately falls over on the operator, instantly killing him and 
knocking out power to all users serviced by the line. One of the users, a major semiconductor manufacturer, sues 
the power line company for consequential damages flowing from the manufacturer's closure of two full shifts while 
the line was being repaired and re-energized. Can Developer John possibly be held liable? 
In 1984. a federal court sitting in Texas concluded that the "all liability incurred" language of the statute provided 
full indemnity to an electric utility for any claims arising out of any violation, including liability for the electric 
utility's own negligence. [FN37] Subsequently, in 1991, a Texas appeals court held the language extended even to 
the "violator" being responsible for the power line operator's attorney fees, costs, and interest. [FN38] There are 
few-if any-other types of "improvements" to real estate that require an underlying landowner to be responsible for 
someone else's negligence. 
*339 VI. A Qui* it ( -isr Knini 
A. Old Cases 
The author's first look at power lines and diminished property values in 1993 contained synopses of three cases 
from across the country standing for the proposition that fear in the minds of potential purchasers of real estate was 
an admissible element of damages in a statutory condemnation proceeding. [FN39] These cases—Criscuola [FN40] 
from New York, Ryan [FN41] from Kansas, and Daley [FN42] from California-have all survived the appellate 
process and continue to be controlling law in their respective jurisdictions. 
One important distinction has been drawn from this principle of law, however, at least m California. In San Diego 
Gas & Electric Co. v Superior Court, [FN43] a landowner tried to make out a claim for inverse condemnation 
caused by a pre-existmg power line based in part on a diminution in value of his property due to fear in the 
marketplace of EMFs. The court declined to accept that Daley controlled, but rather the court held that while fear 
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in the marketplace was an acceptable element of damages in a conventional condemnation, such fear could not 
create a new cause of action for inverse condemnation when the power line in question already exists. [FN44] 
B. Coker 
One relatively recent federal case merits discussion, though it does not directly involve power lines. In United 
States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, [FN45] the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals embraced the fear in the marketplace 
theory of damages. Coker involved a condemnation for a new levee which the landowner's appraiser testified 
would create "fear" that land on the river side of the levee would be significantly more likely to Hood, thus 
decreasing its market value fFN46] The court upheld the admissibility of this testimony in this context, relying on 
a prior power line case: 
Causes of diminution of market value, [such as] the construction of a powerline carrying high voltage electricity 
across a tract of land which create in the general *340 public fears which make the property less desirable and thus 
diminish the market value of the property are proper to be considered, though as a separate item of damage might 
be too speculative and conjectural to be submitted to the Court [FN47] 
Interestingly, the lower court in Coker had excluded entirely the testimony of Coker's appraisal expert, finding 
essentially that his opinions were "junk science" under the Supreme Court's now famous 1993 opinion in Daubert 
[FN48] In holding that Coker's expert should have been allowed to testify, the court observed: 
The value of property taken by the Government...is largely a matter of opinion. Since there are no infallible 
means of determining with absolute conviction what a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller for the 
condemnee's property at the time of taking, eminent domain proceedings commonly pit the Government's valuation 
experts against those of the landowner.... Recognizing the critical role of expert witnesses in these cases and the 
strong interest on both sides that compensation be just, trial courts should proceed cautiously before removing from 
the jury's consideration expert assessments of value which may prove helpful. [FN49] 
The Coker court thus acknowledged the obvious: "how much" in any given condemnation case, particularly one 
involving the establishment or expansion of high voltage power lines, will always be a matter of opinion for 
competing appraisal experts to set forth and for a fact finder to ultimately decide. 
VII. Newer Issues: Utility Corridors Can Be Extremely Valuable 
Within the past few years a new industry has emerged requiring the use of right-of-way corridors for 
communication lines and fiber optic cables. These communication lines are responsible for transmitting data 
involving national security, banking, world wide web, teleconferencing, and most types of data transmission. What 
better avenues to install the hardware necessary for this product than existing utility corridors, which already offer 
the physical, economic, and legal attributes for this kind of use. 
A ATF or True Market Value? A Question of Highest and Best Use 
Acquiring rights for communication lines by condemning entities has been fairly rare until recently, primarily 
because there was no need. As the need for communication lines increased, the utility companies *341 have begun 
to acquire these property rights. Naturally, the valuation issue is now becoming a factor. The position taken by 
most companies with the power of eminent domain is that the value of the property rights is simply the pro rata 
share of the easement value as determined by the "at the fence" (ATF) prices. 
From a pure appraisal perspective, this method is inappropriate and does not conform with generally accepted 
appraisal practices set forth in the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practices (USPAP). "In developing 
a real property appraisal, an appraiser must be aware of, understand, and correctly employ those recognized 
methods and techniques that are necessary to produce a credible appraisal." [FN50] The foundation of proper 
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appraisal methodology is an analysis of a property's value based on its highest and best use, defined as "[tjhe 
reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property, which is physically possible, 
appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value." [FN51] The basis for appraising 
property rights of this type is plainly set out in the Appraisal Institute's textbook, which is universally accepted as 
the best authority: "Analysis of the highest and best use of the property as though vacant and of the property as 
improved is essential in the valuation process." [FN52] 
In the evaluation of a taking of additional property rights within an existing right of way conidor, very rarely can 
the highest and best use be anything other than for those kind of uses that are already found within the corridor. 
That being the case, those property rights being acquired must be appraised based on that highest and best use. 
ATF prices rarely have anything to do with the market value of property rights within the established conidor. 
B. Corridor Property Availability 
The proper method for appraising properties within a conidor is to use market data occuning witliin a comdoi. 
There is a vast amount of existing conidor space cun-ently available, literally hundreds of thousands of miles. If 
buyers and sellers for a particular type of property exist in the marketplace, then market data will be available to 
the appraiser Consider the following examples of corridor property availability: 
*342 . Union Pacific advertised on the rear cover of Right of Way from at least 1993 through 1996. [FN53] 
With a map showing the approximate locations of their corridors, the ad states: 
20,000 Mile Right of Way Corridor and Sites Available Throughout the West 
Transmission Lines Signboard Sites 
Electrical Industrial Sites 
Pipelines Water Rights 
One major Texas power line company advertises the sale or lease of rights-of-way corridor properties located 
throughout southeast Texas for various uses, including mineralleasing, commercial leasing, drainage easements, 
roadways, pipeline easements (private), commercial large-demand pipelines, and for communication uses. 
. Another national pipeline company advertises its right-of-way corcidors for lease only, with lease rates being 
based on an annual amount per mile. 
. The Lower Colorado River Authority has made leases for communication lines based on a rate for each fiber, 
per mile, per month. Indeed, the LCRA openly solicits fiber optic easement customers over the Internet: 
LCRA has 18 dark strands from Austin to Lake Buchanan, 30 dark fiber strands from Austin to LaGrange and 24 
dark fiber from Austin to San Antonio available for license The terms of the license, price, and fiber count are 
negotiable. Typically, the primary term of the license will be 15 years...with an option to renew for 10 years. 
In order to expand the fiber routes beyond the core river system, the LCRA seeks proposals from Caniers. 
Depending upon the amount of fiber requested in a proposal, LCRA will install the fiber cable and license dark 
liber reserve capacity to a third party. The LCRA is positioned to leverage its transmission ROW and towers, 
which includes approximately 2,300 miles of transmission lines and over 200 electric substations. [FN54] 
These advertisements have all the earmarks of typical market forces at work. Without doubt, these examples are 
indicative of market data for rights-of-way throughout Texas and the United States for established easement 
corridors. 
C. What Happened to the Landowner's Rights? 
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Usually forgotten are the underlying rights of ownership of the landowner. When a utility company has obtained 
the right of way and *343 created a corridor, but has not obtained a specific property right (i.e., a fiber optic cable), 
then the value to the property owner should be assessed or appraised based on its highest and best use. This 
conclusion necessitates that market data (sale and lease) within utility corridors be used for comparison puiposes. It 
is inappropriate to use ATF prices when evaluating the rights of ownership within the corridor for a condemning 
authority and ignore the data and evaluation methods used when the same rights are sold or leased to users of 
corridor properties. 
1. EXPANDING AN EXISTING EASEMENT: THE CONDEMNOR'S VALUATION 
Consider this scenario. A major utility company owns a prior easement which grants the rights for three electric 
transmission lines across an approximate 110 acre tract of land in central Texas. A petition is tiled to obtain 
additional property rights within the easement for the right to construct, place, operate, maintain, reconstruct, 
replace, rebuild, upgrade, remove, inspect, patrol, and repair communication lines and facilities and all necessary 
and desirable appurtenances on, across, and within the property. The proposed easement is within the existing 
75-foot easement and the length is approximately 1,849 lineal feet or about 113 rods. 
Citing sales data averaging about 150 acres in size and prices averaging about $1,000 per acre, the utility 
company's appraiser concludes to a market value for the communication easement with the following: 
3.24 acres (area of the existing easement) x $1000 per acre = $3,224 Value of the property rights within the 
existing easement 95% or $3,078 Value of the Communication Easement 5% or $162 
2. THE LANDOWNER'S VALUATION 
Assume for puiposes of this hypothetical that the condemnor utility company had recently leased a fiber optic line 
to a communication company on the basis of $21,312 per year, equating to a value of $266,400 (based on a 
capitalization rate of .08) or $832 per rod. Utilizing this and other actual market data of sales and lease information 
from comparable corridor uses averaging between $300 per rod and $880 per rod, the landowner's appraiser, 
considering the property's true highest and best use, could conclude to a significantly higher value: 
113 Rods x $500 per rod = $56,000 
Given the foregoing example, it seems manifestly unreasonable for a utility company to consider only the ATF 
value when it is purchasing an easement and then turn around and sell or lease the same easement, based on its true 
highest and best use, for an exponential profit. 
*344 V III. Arguments ., igainst Corridoi \ alnation I Hieoi y 
A. Corridor Transactions Are Inadmissible Data 
The traditional rule in Texas has long been that market data involving entities with the power of eminent domain 
are legally inadmissible to determine just compensation, because such transactions are not arms-length as a matter 
of law. [FN55] There are obvious inequities raised when a utility company is allowed to take using one valuation 
method and sell based on anotlier. This fact, considered along with the rationale behind the prohibition against 
sales involving condemnors, leads the authors to believe that a good faith, argument exists for the extension of the 
existing law. 
1. DOES THE EXISTING RULE MAKE SENSE HERE? 
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The Texas prohibition against using transactions involving condemnmg entities really arose in tlie context of 
appraisers using sales to condemning entities as opposed to from them. As one court stated, "The reason for 
excluding proof of such sales is that they do not meet the willing seller- willing buyer concept; they are made under 
a direct or an implied threat of condemnation and, theoretically at least, are not free and voluntary." [FN56] 
Applied in that context, the rule makes perfect sense. But what about when a condemnor is advertising to sell 
right-of-way, or tlie riglit to use right-of- way? Potential purchasers are not compelled to buy at that condemnor's 
price; they can condemn their own right-of-way elsewhere or purchase from some other supplier. It seems logical 
that a meeting of the minds has occurred when a purchaser acquires rights for an advertised price, and that such 
sales (or leases) constitute competent market evidence, regardless of whether one or both parties to the transaction 
possess the power of eminent domain. 
2. BAUER v. LAVACA-NAVIDAD RIVER AUTHORITY 
At least one Texas case indicates that if a landowner demonstrates that the highest and best use of desired 
property is for an easement corridor, then corridor sales are appropriate data to consider in the appraisal problem. 
[FN57] In Bauer, the River Authority sought to condemn a 50-foot *345 wide water line easement across Bauer's 
property. [FN58] The location of the desired easement was in the midst of an established, 432-foot wide "easement 
corridor" containing eight other easements previously granted to various oil companies and electric utilities. [FN59] 
The court held that Bauer should have been permitted at trial to prove that the highest and best use of his property 
was for an easement corridor. [FN60] Further, the court found that sales of easement rights-of-way within such 
corridors were relevant and admissible, provided the sales did not involve entities with the power of eminent 
domain. [FN61] In the opinion, the court set out a guideline to determine when such evidence was proper: 
...[AJppellant Bauer offered testimony that the highest and best use of the land in question was the sale of 
pipeline easements in his "pipeline corridor." He showed that the corridor was well-defined, and he offered 
testimony regarding the value of the condemned land by showing what he and his neighbor received for the sale of 
other pipeline easements to prior companies.... Bauer's right to have the fact finder consider the land's highest and 
best use in determining its market value was thus denied. [FN62] 
The undisturbed holding of Bauer leaves open the right of Texas landowners to claim an easement corridor as 
highest and best use and hints that sales from condemning entities of corridor rights-of-way may become fair game 
for an appraiser to consider when determining value for this property. 
3. OTHER SUPPORT FOR USING SALES FROM CONDEMNORS 
Other limited support for the valid use of comparable market data involving public or quasi-public entities comes 
from various environmental groups and some right-of-way professionals. Their position calls "for the inclusion of a 
highest and best use for environmental preservation in a real estate appraisal based on comparable market data 
evidence. Some of the Environmental Value Proponents argue for use of public agency comparable sales data, 
some for private sales data and some for both." [FN63] 
In the State of California, where most of the debate over this issue originates, there is, in addition to prevailing 
case law, a provision in their evidence code which: "(i) allows for a merger of the appraised *346 highest and best 
use of a property and the use for which a public entity is acquiring it; and (ii) allows use of prices paid by public 
agencies for open space as comparables for valuation purposes where such purchases were voluntary and not under 
the 'threat of condemnation.'" [FN64] 
Certainly, the current argument against using market data involving a party having the power of eminent domain 
predominates. The inherent inequity of this rule m the context of corridor valuation, however, calls for 
modification of existing Texas law. Regardless, appraisers ought to acknowledge market reality. 
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B The Condemnor Created the Value 
Anothei argument commonly urged by condemnor utility companies is that they created the corridors through the 
original acquisition such that any future benefit would accrue to their rights of ownership 
Considei the following example that exposes the flaw m this logic. The State Highway Department builds a new 
freeway along the property line of Mr Jones's farm near the edge of town, creating valuable commercial frontage. 
A couple of yeais after completion, Wal-Mart comes along and wants to purchase Mr. Jones's farm which now has 
frontage along a new freeway Mr Jones contributed no land nor any monies for the construction of the roadway. 
Should the value of his property be based on who assembled the right of way or who built the roadway? Obviously, 
once the road is built, futuie appraisals of Mi Jones's pioperty would be based on its new highest and best use, 
without legard to who built the road Likewise, when appraising property rights within a corridor, no consideration 
should be given to the creator of the conidor 
C It's Not a Corridor, It's a Closet 
The thud emerging argument against corridor valuation is that usually the underlying property owner possesses 
only a small portion of the conidor and that value is only created when the whole conidor is assembled. Again, the 
value should be determined by analyzing market data such as the following (actual) transactions by a southeast 
Texas utility company. 
June 1993 to June 1998, 2-5 year options, 7 87 rods leased to a restaurant 
May 18. 1996. to May 19, 1998 (one day), 167 rods leased for parking 
*347 Septembei 1, 1990, to August 31, 1990, lease extended, 29 rods leased to a public university on the basis 
of $1,476 per rod 
January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2001, 2-5 year options, 9 rods leased foi parking 
Easement granted for 113 rods for a telecommunication cable to another utility company 
Given these actual transactions, it is plain that any one segment of the conidor, regardless of length, is much more 
valuable than traditional ATF valuations 
For now. it is true that current law (m Texas anyway) discourages using sales between condemning entities as 
maiket data The extremely active marketing efforts of power line and pipeline companies, however, coupled with 
increasing amounts of actual sales data point to conidor valuation for expansion of existing easements as the only 
logical way of conforming with the Uniform Standards of Appraisal Practice Perhaps our Native American 
foiebeais had it right all along 
Back m the days when agents representing a newly formed railroad were buying land for right of way they 
encounteied some shiewd bargainers among the Indians One Chief was asked whether he would sell a small 
eroded piece of land 
"Sure, me sell foi $50,000," said the Chief 
"$50,000' Why that land is no good for planting or pasture It is just no good for anything'" the agent exclaimed 
The Chief grunted, "It heep good for railroad " [FN65] 
[FNal] The following article is the fust in a series presented at the Southwestern Legal Foundation Symposium on 
issues of Planning, Zoning, and Eminent Domain This and additional papers also appear in an annual series 
entitled Institute on Planning. Zoning, and Eminent Domain published by Matthew Bender, Co (New York 1999). 
The Urban Lawyer welcomes the Institute's input and looks forward to bunging members of the State and Local 
Government Law Section a review of selected papeis during next year's symposium 
[FNI] David R Bolton, Pioperties Neai Power Lines and Valuation Issues Condemnation or Inverse 
Condemnation?, 1994 INST ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 13-1 
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[FN21 Id at 13-6.7 
[FN3] Id at 13-9.10 
[FN4] Id at 13-15.16 
[FN5] Id at 13-9 through 13-13 
[FN6] Daubert v Men ell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 U S 579 (1993), EI du Pont de Nemours & Co v 
Robinson, 923 S W 2d 549 (Tex 1995) 
[FN7] Council of The Ameiican Physical Society, Power Line Fields and Public Health, Public Statement issued 
Apr 22. 1995 
[FN8] NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, POSSIBLE HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO 
RESIDENTIAL ELECTRIC AND MAGNETIC FIELDS (1997) 
[FN9] NRPB, Electromagnetic Fields and the Risk of Cancer Supplementary Report by the Advisoiy Group on 
Non-Ionizing Radiation (Apr 12, 1994) <http // www nrpb oi g uk/Absd5-2 htm> 
[FN 10] Woikmg Group Report Assessment of Health Effects from Exposure to Power-Lme Fiequency Electric 
and Magnetic Fields (Christopher J Portia, PhD & Mary S Wolfe, P h D , eds, June 24, 1998) <http// 
www niehs nih gov/emfiapid/html/WGReport/Chaptei5 html> 
[FNll] Id 
[FN 12] Stanley W Hamilton & Gregory M Schwann, Do High Voltage Electric Transmission Lines Affect 
Pioperty Value?, LAND ECON , Nov 1, 1995, 436 
[FN13] See Bolton, supra note 1, at ] 3-10 
[FN14] Hamilton & Schwann, supia note 12 
[FN15] J R Cowgei et al, Ti ansmission Line Impact on Residential Pioperty, RIGHT OF WAY, Sept /Oct. 1996 
[FN16] Id 
[FN 17] Development Strategies, Inc , Value of Residential Property Proximate to High Voltage Overhead Electric 
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Transmission Lines, (1995). 
[FN18].Id. 
[FN19"]. Criscuola v. Power Auth. of State of New York, 621 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 1993). 
IPN20]. Michael Rikon, Electromagnetic Radiation Field Property Devaluation, THE APPRAISAL J., Jan. 1996, 
at 87. 
[FN21V Criscuola, 621 N.E.2d at 652. 
[FN22]. Rikon, supra note 20, at 89. 
[FN23]. Arthur Gimmy, The Potential Impact of EMF On Property Values, EMF REG. AND LITIG. INST., New 
Orleans. (1994). 
[FN24]. Id. 
[FN25]. Larry Kokel, Impact of Electric Transmission Lines on Value, Study prepared for LCRA (1997). 
[FN26].Id. at 94. 
[FN27]. Id. 
[FN28]. Id. 
07N29] Bolton, supra note 1, at 13-17. 
[FN30]. FLOWER MOUND, TEX., LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 3.05(d)(8) (1994). 
[FN31]. RED OAK, TEX., UNIFIED DEVEL. CODE § B.l.b. (1989). 
[FN321.Id. 
[FN33]. PLANO, TEX., ZONING ORDINANCE § 3.801 (1998). 
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[FN34]. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 752.004 (West 1992). 
[FN35]. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 752.007 (West 1992). 
[FN36]. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 752.008 (Vernon 1992)(emphasis added). 
[FN37] Moore v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 737 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1984), ceil denied, 105 S. Ct. 1181 
(1985) (emphasis added). 
[FN38]. Olson v. Central Power and Light Co., 803 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App. 1991). 
[FN39]. See Bolton, supra note 1, at 13-14 through 13-16. 
[FN40]. Criscuola, 621 N.E.2d 1195. 
[FN41]. Ryan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 815 P.2d 528 (Kan. 1991). 
[FN42]. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Daley, 253 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) 
[FN43]. 920 P.2d 669, 55 Cal Rptr. 2d 724 (Cal. 1996). 
[FN441. Id. at 754-55. 
[FN45]. 80 F.3d 1074 (5th Cir. 1996) (Coker). 
[FN46].Id. 
[FN47]. Id. at 1079 (quoting United States v. Robertson, 354 F.2d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
[FN48]. 509 U.S. 579(1993). 
[FN49]. Coker, 80 F.3d at 1077. 
[FN50]. APPRAISAL STANDARDS BD. OF THE APPRAISAL FOUND., UNIFORM STANDARDS OF 
PROF'L APPRAISAL PRACTICE 11 (1995). 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
rage 14 or 14 
31 URBLAW331 Page 14 
(Cite as: 31 Urb. Law. 331) 
[FN51]. APPRAISAL INST., THE DICTIONARY OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 171 (3d ed. 1993). 
[PN521. APPRAISAL INST., THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 87 (11th ed. 1996). 
[FN53] RIGHT OF WAY, various issues, 1993 through 1996. 
[FN54], LCRA Telecommunications Sendees (last modified Jan. 11, 1999) < 
http7/www. lcra.org/telecom/fiber.html>. 
[FN55]. Gomez Leon v. State, 426 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1968). 
[FN56]. Id. at 565. 
[FN57]. Bauer v. Lavaca-Navidad River Auth., 704 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App. 1985). 
[FN58]. Id. at 109 
[FN59]. Id. 
[FN60] Id. at 111-13. 
[FN61].Id. at 111. 
[FN62]. Bauer, 704 S W.2d at 113. 
[FN63] Wayne C. Lusvardi, The Flawed Logic of Sales Substitution in the Appraisal of Land Suitable for Habitat 
Preservation or Mitigation, RIGHT OF WAY, May/June 1997, at 14. 
|FN64] Wayne C. Lusvardi, A Critique of the Position Papers on the Valuation of Land Suitable for Habitat 
Preservation or Mitigation, RIGHT OF WAY, Nov./Dec. 1996, at 23 
[FN65]. John P. Dolman & Charles F. Seymour, Valuation of Transportation/Communication Corridors, 46 
APPRAISAL J. 515 (1978) (quoting American Right of Way Association, Newsletter, Apr. 1963). 
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2 SITE ANALYSIS 
2-0 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter addresses the site requirements for FHA-insured 
mortgages. Before the valuation process can begin, subject 
properties must meet specific site requirements. The appraisal 
process is the lender's tool for determining if a property meets 
the minimum requirements and eligibility standards for a FHA-
insured mortgage. In addition, these standards provide a context 
for the appraiser in performing the physical inspection of the 
property. 
2-1 SITE REQUIREMENTS 
The purpose of site analysis is to identify the various site 
characteristics that affect the marketability and the value of 
the subject property. Site analysis requires the following: 
o determining the desirability and utility of the site 
o determining the degree and extent to which the site, because 
of external influences, shares in the market for comparable 
and competitive sites in the community 
o forecasting the likely changes at the site because of 
justifiable future trends 
o appraising the current situation and knowledge of the 
various trends that could affect the valuation of the real 
property 
The principal of change is fundamental to appraising real estate 
and to properly analyzing a site. Value is created and modified 
by economic, social and governmental changes that occur outside 
the property. Evaluate the direction of these trends and 
determine their effect, if any, on the current value of the 
subject property. 
A. NEIGHBORHOOD DEFINITION 
The appraiser must clearly define the boundaries - north, 
south, east and west - of the subject neighborhood. By 
defining the neighborhood, the appraiser can extract 
pertinent information on which to base valuation 
conclusions. 
B. COMPETITIVE SITES 
Sites are competitive when they are improved with, or 
appropriate for, residential properties that are similar in 
accommodations and sales price or rental range for similar 
residents or prospective occupants. Compare features of the 
W W W .llUUL/lipD.ULg, 
subject site with the same features of competitive sites 
within the community. An acceptable site must be related to 
the needs of the prospective occupants and to the 
alternatives available to them in other competitive 
locations. 
C. DEFINITIONS - CONSTRUCTION STATUS 
Proposed - No concrete or permanent material has been 
placed. Digging of footing and placement of re-bar is not 
considered permanent. 
Under Construction - From the first placement of concrete 
(permanent material) to 100% completion. Finalized and 
ready to occupy. 
Existing - 100% complete and has occupancy permit. 
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(2-1) Existing 
less than one year - Appraisal performed less than one year 
since receipt of final occupancy permit issued. For model 
homes, age begins with issuing of permit to use as a model. 
For any home less than 2 years old, list month and year 
completed in the age box on the URAR. 
D. ECONOMIC TRENDS 
The appraiser must give consideration to, and include in the 
value analysis, the economic trends of a neighborhood and 
the general area, including: 
o price and wage levels (the purchasing power of 
community occupants) 
o employment characteristics 
o the current supply and demand for residential 
dwellings, including projects under construction 
o taxation levels 
o building costs 
o population changes 
o activity of real estate sales market and mortgage 
interest rates 
E. LAND USE RESTRICTIONS 
Site analysis determines the effects of actual and potential 
neighborhood land use on the subject site. The following 
factors form patterns for present and future land uses: 
1. Zoning 
The appraiser should consider the effect on the value 
of appropriate and well-drawn zoning ordinances. Land-
use controls that receive public approval and are 
strictly enforced protect residential sites from 
adverse influences that diminish the desirability of 
sites. This must be noted on the URAR, and its effect 
must be quantified in the valuation analysis. 
2. Protective Easement/Covenants 
Properly drawn protective covenants have proven more 
W W W . i l U U U l l J J b . U l ^ rct^ c J ui 1 J 
effective than zoning regulations in providing 
protection from adverse environmental influences. When 
combined with proper zoning ordinances, these covenants 
provide the maximum legal protection to ensure that a 
developed residential area will maintain desirable 
characteristics or that a proposed or partially built-
up neighborhood will develop in a desirable manner. 
Protective easements and covenants should be superior 
to any mortgage and should be binding to all parties 
and all persons claiming under them. These must be 
noted on the URAR and its effect must be quantified in 
the Valuation Analysis. 
3. Inharmonious Land Uses 
The appraiser must identify all inharmonious land uses 
in a neighborhood that affect value. Clearly define 
the current and long-term effect that inharmonious uses 
will have on the market value and the economic life of 
the subject property. If inharmonious land use 
represents a serious detriment to either the health or 
safety of the occupants or to the economic security of 
the property, clearly note safety of the occupants or 
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to the economic security of the property, clearly note 
this on the VC and URAR. Recommend that the property be 
rejected by the Lender. 
4. Natural Physical Features 
(2-1) The appraiser must consider favorable and underlying 
topography and site features, including pleasing views, 
wood lots, broad vistas and climatic advantages. 
Streets that are laid out with proper regard to 
drainage, land contours and traffic flow show good 
design and increase the desirability of the 
neighborhood. This must be noted on the URAR and its 
effect must be quantified in the valuation analysis. 
5. Attractiveness of Neighborhood Buildings 
The overall appeal of a neighborhood is strengthened if 
the buildings in a neighborhood harmonize with each 
other and their physical surroundings. A pleasing 
variety that results in harmoniously blended properties 
is desirable but not mandatory. The age of the 
structure is not in itself an important consideration; 
however, the maintenance of the structure over time has 
an important impact. Consider the amount of 
rehabilitation that has taken place or is taking place 
in a neighborhood. This must be noted on the URAR and 
its effect must be quantified in the valuation 
analysis. 
6. Neighborhood Character 
Mobility and economic growth can alter neighborhood 
patterns. Shopping, recreation, places of worship, 
schools and places of employment should be easily 
accessible. This must be noted on the URAR and its 
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effect must be quantified in the valuation analysis. 
7. Character of Neighborhood Structures 
The appraiser must carefully analyze the age, quality, 
obsolescence and appropriateness of typical properties 
in a neighborhood. Take into account the attitude of 
the user group as well as the alternative choices 
available to the specific market under consideration. 
This must be noted on the URAR and its effect must be 
quantified in the valuation analysis. 
F. COMMUNITY SERVICES 
Community services include commercial, civic and social 
centers. For a neighborhood to remain stable and retain a 
high degree of desirability, it should be adequately served 
by elementary and secondary schools, neighborhood shopping 
centers, churches, playgrounds, parks, community halls, 
libraries, hospitals and theaters. A lack of services in 
the community should be noted and quantified in the 
valuation analysis. The appraiser must note a change in 
these services and quantify the effect on value. 
G. TRANSPORTATION 
Ready access to places of employment, shopping, civic 
centers, social centers and adjacent neighborhoods is a 
requisite of neighborhood stability. The appraiser must 
take into consideration the transportation requirements of 
the typical family and quantify the effect on value. 
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H. UTILITIES AND SERVICES 
(2-1) 
The appraiser must consider these utilities and neighborhood 
services: police and fire protection, telephone services, 
electricity, natural gas, garbage disposal, street lighting, 
water supply, sewage disposal, drainage, street improvements 
and maintenance. Public services and utilities can affect 
value and must be quantified. A lack of these services 
should be noted and quantified in the valuation analysis. 
I. NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE CONSIDERATIONS 
As time passes, desirability changes residential areas in 
any location. Therefore, give special consideration to the 
following: 
o infiltration of commercial, industrial or nonconforming 
use 
o positive and negative effect on value of gentrification 
o changes in the mobility of people (employment shifts) 
o weakly enforced zoning regulation or covenants 
J. MARKETABILITY 
The demand for home ownership in a neighborhood is directly 
related to the marketability of the homes in the 
neighborhood or in competitive neighborhoods. Home 
ownership rates, vacancies and the marketing time of 
dwellings in a neighborhood help the appraiser determine the 
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strength of market demand and the extent of supply. 
K. SMALL COMMUNITY MARKET PREFERENCES 
A small town may have its own set of standards in 
architectural design, livability, style of mechanical 
equipment, lot size, placement of structures, nature of 
street improvements and in all features of the physical 
property and environment. Judge each in light of local 
standards and preferences. 
L. OUTLYING SITES AND ISOLATED SITES 
The segment of the market interested in purchasing homes in 
these sites compares the advantages and disadvantages of 
other outlying or isolated locations. 
M. STUDY OF FUTURE UTILITY 
The study of future utility is typically covered in the 
appraiser's Highest and Best Use Analysis and includes: 
o selecting possible uses 
o rejecting uses that are obviously lower or higher than 
the most probable use 
o analyzing differing motives of those buyers 
The study of the future uses and utility of a particular 
property win lead the appraiser to the property's Highest 
and Best Use. 
N. CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL TAXES AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS 
When estimating value, account for general taxes and special 
assessments: 
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o General real estate taxes related to specific sites are 
a recurring periodic expense in the ownership of 
taxable real property and must be accounted for in the 
value estimate. 
o Special assessments of various types are frequently an 
additional expense of 
(2-1) ownership 
and must similarly be accounted for in the value estimate. 
Determine the relative effect of the real estate tax and/or 
special assessment's burden on the desirability of the site. 
Enter this information on the URAR. 
1. Assessment 
The real estate tax liability is computed by 
multiplying the assessed value by the tax/ millage 
rate, which is typically expressed in dollars per 
hundred or dollars per thousand of assessed value. In 
the addendum to the VC, state the assessment, real 
estate tax liability and tax year. State the assessed 
market value of the subject property in the addenda. 
> If there is no method to relate the assessment to 
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market value, such as new construction where 
reasonable assessment may not exist, mark the 
assessed market value response as "N/ A". 
2. Special Assessment 
A special assessment can be calculated in two ways: 
o the same way as real estate taxes, or 
o on a pro-rated basis 
Determine how the special assessment is calculated and 
report the special assessment liability on the URAR. 
> If the property does not have special assessment, 
mark the URAR "N/A". 
For example: An organization that services a community 
creates an annual operating budget. Each property 
becomes liable for its percentage of that budget based 
on the percentage of front feet their property has 
compared to the total amount of front feet as a special 
assessment in this community. 
2-2 SPECIAL NEIGHBORHOOD HAZARDS AND NUISANCES 
Physical conditions in some neighborhoods are hazardous to the 
personal health and safety of residents and may endanger physical 
improvements. These conditions include unusual topography, 
subsidence, flood zones, unstable soils, traffic hazards and 
various types of grossly offensive nuisances. 
When reporting the appraisal, consider site hazards and 
nuisances. 
> If site hazards exist and cannot be corrected but do not meet 
the level of unacceptability, the appraisal must be based upon 
the current state. 
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> If the hazard and/or nuisance endangers the health and safety 
of the occupants or the marketability of the property, mark 
"YES" in VC-1 and return the unfinished appraisal to the 
lender. 
(2-2) The lender, who is ultimately responsible for rejecting the 
site, relies on the appraiser's site analysis to make this 
determination. Guidelines for determining site acceptability 
follow. The appraiser is required to note only those readily 
observable conditions. 
A. UNACCEPTABLE SITES 
FHA guidelines require that a site be rejected if the 
property being appraised is subject to hazards, 
environmental contaminants, noxious odors, offensive sights 
or excessive noises to the point of endangering the physical 
improvements or affecting the livability of the property, 
its marketability or the health and safety of its occupants. 
Rejection may also be appropriate if the future economic 
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life of the property is shortened by obvious and compelling 
pressure to a higher use, making a long-term mortgage 
impractical. 
These considerations for rejection apply on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into account the needs and desires of the 
purchaser. For example, a site should not be considered 
unacceptable simply because it abuts a commercial use; some 
commercial uses may not appeal to a specific market segment 
while other commercial uses may. 
If the-condition is clearly a health and safety violation, 
reject the appraisal and return it to the lender. If there 
is any doubt as to the severity, report the condition and 
submit the completed report. The lender must clear the 
condition and may require an inspection or reject the 
property. For those conditions that cannot be repaired, 
such as site factors, the appraised value is based upon the 
existing conditions. 
B. TOPOGRAPHY 
There are special hazards caused by unique topography. For 
example, denuded slopes, soil erosion and landslides often 
adversely affect the marketability of hillside areas. When 
evaluating the site, consider earth and mud slides from 
adjoining properties, falling rocks and avalanches. These 
occurrences are associated with steep grades and must be 
considered in the site analysis. 
C. SUBSIDENCE 
Danger of subsidence is a special hazard that may be 
encountered under a variety of circumstances: 
o where buildings are constructed on uncontrolled fill or 
unsuitable soil containing foreign matter such as 
organic material 
o where the subsoil is unstable and subject to slippage 
or expansion 
In mining areas, consider the depth or extent of mining 
operations and the site of operating or abandoned shafts or 
tunnels to determine if the danger is imminent, probable or 
negligible. 
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The appraiser must note any readily observable conditions, 
which indicate potential problems. Signs include fissure or 
cracks in the terrain, damaged foundations, sinkholes or 
settlement problems. 
If there is a danger of subsidence, the specific site will 
be deemed ineligible unless complete and satisfactory 
evidence can be secured to establish that the probability of 
any threat is negligible. 
> If there is evidence of subsidence, the property is 
ineligible. Mark the "YES" column in VC-1 under 
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subsidence. 
D. OPERATING AND ABANDONED OIL OR GAS WELLS 
Operating and abandoned oil and gas wells pose potential 
hazards to housing, including potential fire, explosion, 
spray and other pollution. 
1. Existing Construction 
No existing dwelling may be located closer than 300 
feet from an active or planned drilling site. Note 
that this applies to the site boundary, not to the 
actual well site. 
2. New or Proposed Construction 
If an operating well is located in a single-family 
subdivision, no new or proposed construction may be 
built within 75 feet of the operating well unless 
mitigation measures are taken. This measure is 
designed to: 
o avoid nuisance during maintenance 
o diminish noise levels caused by pumping 
o reduce the likelihood of contamination by 
potential spills 
The appraiser must examine the site for the existence 
of or any readily observable evidence of a well. 
3. Abandoned Well 
A letter may be obtained from the responsible authority 
in the state government stating that the subject well 
was safely and permanently abandoned. 
o When such a letter is provided, a dwelling may be 
located no closer than 10 feet from the abandoned 
well. 
o When a letter is not provided, the dwelling must 
be located at least 300 feet from the abandoned 
well. 
The lender is responsible for obtaining the letter; the 
appraiser must note the location of the well and verify 
the existence of the letter. 
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4. Special Case - Proposed, Existing or Abandoned 
Wells 
(2-2) Hydrogen sulfide gas emitted from petroleum 
product wells is toxic and extremely hazardous. 
Minimum clearance from sour gas wells may be 
established only after a petroleum engineer has 
assessed the risk and state authorities have 
concurred on clearance recommendations for 
petroleum industry regulation and for public 
health and safety. 
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> If there is readily observable evidence that 
the conditions exist, mark the "YES" column in 
VC-1 under operating and abandoned wells. 
> If an inspection by a qualified person verifies 
that the condition exists and is acceptable 
based on the standards defined above, account 
for the presence of wells in the valuation of 
the property. 
E. SLUSH PITS 
A slush pit is a basin in which drilling "mud" is mixed and 
circulated during drilling to lubricate and cool the drill 
bit and to flush away rock cuttings. Drilling mud normally 
contains large quantities of bentonite - a very expansive 
soil material. This results in a site with the potential 
for great soil volume change and, therefore, damage to 
structures. 
To be eligible for FHA mortgage insurance, all unstable and 
toxic materials must be removed and the pit must be filled 
with compacted selected materials. 
> If a property is proposed near an active or abandoned 
well, call for a survey to locate the pits and their 
impact on the subject property. 
> If there is any readily observable evidence of slush 
pits, mark the "YES" column in VC-1. 
F. HEAVY TRAFFIC 
Close proximity to heavily traveled roadways can have a 
negative effect on the marketability and value of sites 
because of excess noise and danger. Properties backing to 
freeways or other thoroughfares that are heavily screened or 
where traffic is well below grade and at a sufficient 
distance from the property may not affect value. For 
detailed noise acceptance levels, reference 24 CFR 51.103. 
> If there is significant noise or unsafe traffic 
conditions that endanger the occupants or affect the 
marketability of the property, mark "YES" in VC-1. 
Typically, traffic hazards cannot be corrected. Therefore, 
the appraiser must quantify the effect on value if the 
property is marketable. This adjustment should be supported 
by comparable transactions. This condition could be the 
reason that a lender ultimately rejects the property. Do 
not reject existing properties only because of heavy traffic 
if there is evidence of acceptance within the market and if 
use of the dwelling is expected to continue. 
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G. AIRPORT NOISE AND HAZARDS 
(2-2) Sites near, an airport may be subjected to the noise 
and hazards of low-flying aircraft. Appraisers must 
identify affected properties, review airport contour maps 
w w w. ii u u on JJ £>. ui £, rage iuui LJ 
and condition the appraisal accordingly. 
Do not reject existing properties only because of airport 
influences if there is evidence of acceptance within the 
market and if use of the dwelling is expected to continue. 
HUD's position is that because the properties are in use and 
are expected to be in use into the near future, their 
marketability should be the strongest indicator of their 
acceptability. Marketability should account for the 
following considerations: 
o plans for future expansion of airport facilities 
o prospective increases in the number of planes or 
flights using the field or specific runways 
o the timing and frequency of the volume of flights 
o any other factors that may increase the annoyance of 
having the airport nearby excessive noise 
If changes are likely, the appraiser must anticipate any 
adverse effect that these changes are likely to have on the 
marketability of the property. The appraiser should judge 
each situation on its merits. Compare the effect of 
aircraft activity on the desirability of a particular site 
with other sites that are: 
o improved with similar structures 
o considered competitive with those located in the 
subject neighborhood 
H. SPECIAL AIRPORT HAZARDS 
HUD requires that the buyer of a property located in a 
Runway Clear Zone/Clear Zone is advised that the property is 
located in such a zone and of the implications associated 
with that site. This includes the possibility that the 
airport operator could acquire the property in the future. 
1. New and Proposed Construction 
New and proposed construction within Runway Clear Zones 
(also known as Runway Protection Zones) at civil 
airports or within Clear Zones at military airfields 
are ineligible for home mortgage insurance. 
Properties located in Accident Potential Zone I at 
military airfields may be eligible for FHA insurance 
provided that the property is compatible with 
Department of Defense guidelines. For more 
information, see 24 CFR 51.303(b). 
If new or proposed construction lies within these 
zones, mark "YES" in VC-1. 
2. Existing Construction 
Existing dwellings more than one year old are eligible 
for FHA mortgage insurance if the prospective purchaser 
acknowledges awareness that the property is located in 
a Runway Clear Zone/Clear Zone. The lender will 
furnish this disclosure form to the 
2-9 
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buyer. For a sample of the buyer's acknowledgment 
certification, see HUD Handbook 4150.1, REV-1, Chapters 
4-26 (a) and (b). 
Note whether the property is in a Clear Zone and 
condition the appraisal on the buyer's 
acknowledgment. 
I. PROXIMITY TO HIGH PRESSURE GAS 
A dwelling or related property improvement near high-
pressure gas, liquid petroleum pipelines or other volatile 
and explosive products - both above ground and subsurface 
must be located outside of the outer boundary of the 
pipeline easement. 
> If the property is less than ten feet away, mark "YES" 
in VC-1. 
J. OVERHEAD HIGH-VOLTAGE TRANSMISSION LINES 
No dwelling or related property improvement may be located 
within the engineering (designed) fall distance of any pole, 
tower or support structure of a high-voltage transmission 
line, radio/TV transmission tower, microwave relay dish or 
tower or satellite dish (radio, TV cable, etc.). For field 
analysis, the appraiser may use tower height as the fall 
distance. 
For the purpose of this Handbook, a High-Voltage Electric 
Transmission Line is a power line that carries high voltage 
between a generating plant and a substation. These lines 
are usually 60 Kilovolts (kV) and greater, and are 
considered hazardous. Lines with capacity of 12-60 kV and 
above are considered high voltage for the purpose of this 
Handbook. High voltage lines do not include local 
distribution and service lines. 
Low voltage power lines are distribution lines that commonly 
supply power to housing developments and similar facilities. 
These lines are usually 12 kV or less and are considered to 
be a minimum hazard. These lines may not pass directly over 
any structure, including pools, on the property being 
insured by HUD. 
> If the property is within the unacceptable distance, 
mark "YES" in VC-1. 
K. SMOKE, FUMES, OFFENSIVE NOISES AND ODORS 
Excessive smoke, fog, chemical fumes, noxious odors, 
stagnant ponds or marshes, poor surface drainage and 
excessive dampness are hazardous to the health of 
neighborhood occupants and adversely affect the market value 
of the subject property. 
> If these conditions threaten the health and safety of 
the occupants or the marketability of the property, mark 
"YES" in VC-1. If, however, the extent of the hazard is 
not dangerous, account for its effect in the valuation 
of the property. 
(2-2) 
> 
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> Include other factors that may affect valuation such as 
offensive odors and unsightly neighborhood features such 
as stables or kennels. 
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L. FLOOD HAZARD AREAS 
Designation of Special Flood Hazard Areas 
(2-2) The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) determines 
Special Flood Hazard Areas nationwide, (SFHA). FEMA issues 
Flood Hazard Boundary Maps to designate these areas in a 
community. A special flood hazard may be designated as Zone 
A, AO, AH, Al-30, AE, A99, VO or Vl-30, VE or V. 
o Only those properties within zones 'A' and 'V require 
flood insurance, 
o Zones !B f or f C do not require flood insurance because 
FEMA designates only zones !A' and !V as "Special Flood 
Hazard Areas." 
An appraisal report with a positive indication in a Special 
Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) activates a commitment requirement 
for flood insurance coverage. The appraiser must quantify 
the effect on value, if any, for properties within a 
designated flood map. 
A lender shall reject a property in any of these 
circumstances: 
o if the property is subject to frequently recurring 
flooding 
o if there is any potential hazard to life or safety 
o if escape to higher ground would not be feasible during 
severe flooding conditions 
FEMA Maps 
For copies of FEMA's Flood Hazard Boundary Maps and Flood 
Insurance Rate Maps, contact: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
FEMA Map Service Center 
P.O. Box 1038 
Jessup, MD 20794-1038 
Phone: 1-8 00-358-9 616 
Fax: 1-800-358-9620 
Eligibility of Properties for FHA Insurance 
The lender is responsible for determining the eligibility of 
properties in Flood Zones, and relies on the appraiser's 
notation on the URAR. 
1. New and Proposed Construction 
If any part of the property improvements essential to 
the property value and subject to flood damage are 
located within the 100-year floodplain, then the entire 
property, improved and otherwise, is ineligible for FHA 
mortgage insurance unless a Letter of Map Amendment 
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(LOMA) or a Letter of Map Revision (LOMR) is submitted 
with the case for endorsement. Proposed construction 
where improvements are located, or to be located, 
within a designated Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) is 
ineligible for FHA insurance. This is true regardless 
of whether the property is covered or will be covered 
by flood insurance unless the lender can furnish 
evidence of a LOMA, a LOMR or evidence that the 
property is not in a SFHA. 
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(2-2) For existing properties located in a SFHA, make the 
appropriate notation in the URAR. 
> If the proposed improvements are located in a SFHA 
and there is no LOMA or LOMR mark "YES" in VC-1 and 
return the unfinished appraisal to the lender until 
these documents are retrieved. 
2. Existing Construction 
Market attitude and acceptance determine the 
eligibility of existing properties located in a 
designated SFHA. Flood insurance is required for 
properties accepted for mortgage insurance in a FEMA-
designated SFHA. 
3. Condominium 
The Homeowners Association is responsible for 
maintaining flood insurance on the project as a whole, 
not each individual unit. The appraiser must verify 
the location of a condominium in the floodplain and 
make the correct notation in the URAR. 
M. STATIONARY STORAGE TANKS 
Stationary Storage tanks containing flammable or explosive 
material pose potential hazards to housing, including 
hazards from fire and explosions. 
> If the property is within 300 feet of a stationary, 
storage tank containing more than 1000 gallons of 
flammable or explosive material, the site is ineligible. 
Mark "YES" in VC-1 and return the unfinished appraisal 
to the lender. 
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PART 240. MOBILE AND LAND-BASED TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES* 
* Editor's note—Part 240, sections 32-240.01 through 32-240.19, was adopted by the board of supervisors on July 7, | 
1998, pursuant to Ordinance 98-62. 9 
Sec. 3 2 - 2 4 0 . 0 1 . Purpose and Intent . 
This article, as adopted and amended, is for the general purpose of establishing parameters for the siting of mobile and 
land-based telecommunications facilities, including monopoles, towers, antennas, and related equipment. The intent of this 
ordinance is as follows: 
(1) encourage the location of monopoles and towers in nonresidential areas; 
(2) minimize the total number of monopoles and towers throughout the county; 
(3) encourage the use of public properties for new monopole towers, antennas, and related equipment; 
(4) strongly encourage the joint use of new and existing monopole and tower sites; 
(5) encourage users of monopoles and towers to locate them, to the extent possible, in areas where the adverse impact on 
the community is minimal; 
(6) encourage users of monopoles and towers to configure them in a way that minimizes the adverse visual impacts 
through careful design and siting; 
(7) ensure public health, safety, welfare, and convenience; and 
(8) conform with federal and state laws that allow certain antennas to be exempt from local regulations. (No. 98-62, 7-7-
98 ) 
Sec. 32 -240 .02 . Applicability. 
(1) The requirements set forth in this part shall govern the location of monopoles and towers that are fifty (50) feet in 
height or greater, and performance standards for antennas and related equipment used in association with existing 
structures, roof tops, utility distribution structures, and replacement utility distribution structures that are designed to 
accommodate antennas and associated equipment. Monopoles and towers that are less than fifty (50) feet in height shall 
be permitted by right in all zoning districts, subject to the provisions of sections 32-300.02, et seq. and 32-400.02, etseq. 
(2) Antennas and related unmanned equipment buildings not located on buildings and structures shall be subject to 
sections 32-300.03 and 32-400.02. 
(3) Other than the provisions of sections 32-240.10(2) through (4) and (11), the requirements set forth in this part do not 
govern the use and location of towers used solely for amateur service that are seventy-five (75) feet or less in height. (No. 
98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
Sec. 32 -240 .03 . Removal of Telecommunications Facilities. 
All unused equipment and facilities at a telecommunications facility shall be removed within twelve (12) months of cessation 
of use, or the expiration of the land lease, whichever occurs first, and the site shall be restored as closely as possible to the 
condition before the facilities were constructed. (No. 98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
Sec. 32 -240 .10 . General Performance Standards. 
(1) Mobile and land-based telecommunications facilities shall be permitted In any zoning district, or within any public right-
of-way when such use is in accordance with the provisions of this part. In addition, such uses shall be subject to the 
requirements of § 15.2-2232, Va. Code Ann. 
(2) Signals, lights, or illumination shall be permitted as required by the Federal Communications Commission, Federal 
Aviation Administration, or other federal authorities, state authorities, or the county. If given the option by the Federal 
Communications Commission and/or Federal Aviation Administration red incandescent lights shall be used at night in lieu of 
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white lights. Nonfunctional signals, lights, or illumination shall be repaired within twenty-four (24) hours. 
(3) Telecommunications facilities used for mobile and land-based telecommunications shall not display any commercial 
advertising. 
(4) Telecommunications facilities shall not interfere with or obstruct any county two-way radio or point to point microwave 
communications system, 
(5) Monopoles and towers shall be set back as follows: 
(a) two (2) feet for every foot in height of the monopole or tower from a dwelling on another parcel; 
(b) two hundred (200) feet from a public street, except a one-to-one setback shall be allowed along Prince William Parkway 
for any monopole or tower within a lot that abuts the right-of-way; 
(c) any other yard and setback requirements of the district. 
(6) Monopoles and towers shall be installed in conformance with ANSI/EIA/TIA-222, Structural Standards for Steel Antenna 
Towers and Antenna Supporting Structures, as amended or superseded. 
(7) The base of monopoles and towers, including anchors, and any accessory facility or building shall be screened from 
public streets and from adjoining development in accordance with buffer type A of the Design and Construction Standards 
Manual. 
(8) Unmanned equipment buildings used in association with monopoles, towers, and antennas shall meet the yard and 
setback requirements of the zoning district in which they are located, unless otherwise specified herein. 
(9) Each unmanned equipment building located on the ground shall neither contain more than three hundred and sixty 
(360) square feet of gross floor area per user nor be more than twelve (12) feet in height. 
(10) Prior to issuance of building permits for a monopole or tower, the applicant shall verify that the applicable regulations 
of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have been met and a finding 
from the FAA that the proposed facility is not a hazard or obstruction to aviation. 
(11) Monopoles and towers must be designed to collapse within the lot lines of the property upon which they are 
constructed. 
(12) Yard and setback exemptions contained in section 32-201.19 shall not apply to this part. 
(13) Height and setback restrictions contained in section 32-400.03(5) shall not apply to this part. (No. 98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
Sec. 3 2 - 2 4 0 . 1 1 . Antennas Mounted on Existing Structures and Rooftops. 
(1) Antennas and related unmanned equipment are permitted in all zoning districts on buildings and structures in 
accordance with this part. 
(2) Antennas and related unmanned equipment may exceed the maximum building height limitations, provided the antenna 
and related unmanned equipment is in accordance with the performance standards of this part. 
(3) Each antenna mounted on existing structures and rooftops with any related unmanned equipment may be developed 
subject to the following performance standards: 
(a) Omnidirectional or whip antennas shall not exceed twenty (20) feet in height and not exceed seven (7) inches in 
diameter and shall be of an industry standard material and color which is identical to, or closely compatible with the color of 
the supporting structure so as to make the antenna and related equipment as visually unobtrusive as possible. 
(b) Directional or panel antennas shall not exceed ten (10) feet in height and not exceed two (2) feet in width and shall be 
of an industry standard material and color which is identical to, or closely compatible with the color of the supporting 
structure so as to make the antenna and related equipment as visually unobtrusive as possible. 
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(c) Cylinder-type antennas shall not exceed six (6) feet in height and not exceed twelve (12) inches in diameter. 
(d) Satellite and microwave dishes shall not exceed ten (10) feet in diameter and such facilities greater than three (3) feet 
in diameter shall be screened with an appropriate architectural treatment that is compatible with or integral to the 
architecture of the building to which they are attached. (No. 98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
Sec. 32-240 .12 . Antennas Mounted on Existing or Replacement Utility Distribution Structures and Other 
Structures. 
Antennas mounted on existing and replacement utility distribution structures, light poles, overhead highway signs, and 
camera standards, with related unmanned equipment buildings, shall be permitted in all zoning districts, except as 
provisioned in subsection (5) below. Such antennas may exceed building height limitations, and shall be subject to the 
following performance standards. 
(1) Omnidirectional or whip antennas shall neither exceed twenty (20) feet in height nor seven (7) inches in diameter. 
(2) Directional or panel antennas shall neither exceed ten (10) feet in height nor two (2) feet in width. 
(3) Cylinder-type antennas shall neither exceed six (6) feet in height nor twelve (12) inches in diameter. 
(4) Satellite and microwave dish antennas shall not be permitted. 
(5) Antennas in agricultural and residential districts shall be subject to the following performance standards: 
(a) Omnidirectional or whip antennas shall neither exceed twelve (12) feet in height nor two (2) inches in diameter. 
(b) Directional or panel antennas shall neither exceed nine (9) feet in height nor two (2) feet in width. 
(c) An equipment building or enclosure, when mounted on a pole or standard, shall not exceed four (4) cubic feet. 
(d) No more than nine (9) whip/omnidirectional antennas shall be mounted on a pole or standard. 
(6) Any other such antennas shall not exceed standards as set forth in subsections (1) through (5) above. 
(7) Unmanned-equipment buildings in agricultural and residential districts shall be located a minimum of fifteen (15) feet 
from all lot lines when located outside the street right-of-way. 
(8) A replacement pole or standard in an agricultural or residential district, may exceed the height and diameter of the 
existing pole or standard by not more than twenty-five (25) percent with a maximum finished height of eighty (80) feet, 
including the antennas, except that if the existing pole or standard exceeds eighty (80) feet and is located in a utility 
easement, the finished height, including antennas, of the replacement pole or standard shall be no more than fifteen (15) 
feet higher. 
(9) A replacement pole or standard in a commercial or industrial district may exceed the height or diameter of the existing 
pole or standard by not more than twenty-five (25) percent with a maximum finished height of one hundred (100) feet, 
including the antennas. If the existing pole or standard exceeds one hundred (100) feet in height, the height, including the 
antennas, of the replacement pole or standard shall be no more than fifteen (15) feet higher. 
(10) A replacement pole or standard in an interstate highway right-of-way may exceed the height or diameter of the 
existing pole or standard by twenty-five (25) percent with a maximum finished height of one hundred (100) feet. I f the 
existing pole or standard exceeds one hundred (100) feet in height, the height, including the antennas, of the replacement 
pole or standard shall be no more than fifteen (15) feet higher. 
(11) Replacement or new cross bars may be permitted on poles and standards, provided that the cross bar is the same 
color as that of the existing pole or standard, and the width of the cross bar does not exceed fifteen (15) feet. (No. 98-62, 
7-7-98 ) 
Sec. 32-240.13. Monopoles, General Performance Standards. 
Monopoles with a related unmanned equipment building shall be subject to the following general performance standards: 
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(1) The height of the monopoles, including the antennas, shall not be more than one hundred and ninety-nine (199) feet, 
as measured from the ground elevation at the base of the structure. 
(2) The monopole shall be designed to accommodate at least three (3) telecommunications providers. 
(3) Satellite and microwave dishes attached to a monopole shall not exceed six (6) feet in diameter. 
(4) Unless otherwise required by the Federal Communications Commission or the Federal Aviation Administration, 
monopoles shall have a galvanized silver or gray finish. (No. 98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
Sec. 32-240 .14 . Monopoles, Permitted by Right. 
(1) Monopoles not exceeding one hundred and ninety-nine (199) feet in height, including the antennas and related 
unmanned equipment buildings shall be permitted by right, subject to a public facilities determination by the planning 
director, in nonresidential districts in accordance with the general performance standards of sections 32-240.10 and 32-
240.13. 
(2) Monopoles shall be permitted within utility easements, subject to the following: 
(a) A public facility determination shall be required. 
(b) The utility easement shall be a minimum of one hundred (100) feet in width. 
(c) The easement shall contain overhead utility distribution structures that are eighty (80) feet and greater in height. 
(d) The easement shall be located within property owned, controlled, or leased by a governmental agency. 
(e) The height of the monopole located within a utility easement containing overhead utility distribution structures, as 
approved by the State Corporation Commission pursuant to § 56-46.1 of the Code of Virginia, as amended, may exceed one 
hundred and ninety-nine (199) feet provided the height of the monopole does not exceed the height of the utility 
distribution structures by more than thirty (30) feet in any circumstance. Monopoles and equipment buildings located within 
a utility easement shall be set back a minimum of thirty-five (35) feet from all utility easement lines. 
(f) The performance standards of sections 32-240.10 and 32-240.13(2), (3) and (4) shall be met. (No. 98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
Sec. 32 -240 .15 . Monopoles, Permitted With a Special Use Permit. 
Monopoles that are fifty (50) feet or greater in height, including the antennas, and not meeting one or more of the 
performance standards of sections 32-240.10, 32-240.13 and 32-240.14 shall be permitted with a special use permit. 
Minimum lot size in A and R districts shall be one (1) acre. (No. 98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
Sec. 32-240 .16 . Telecommunications Facilities, Towers, General Performance Standards. 
Towers with a related unmanned equipment building, where permitted by right or with a special use permit, shall be subject 
to the following general performance standards: 
(1) The tower shall be designed to accommodate at least four (4) telecommunications providers. 
(2) Satellite and microwave dishes attached to a tower shall not exceed ten (10) feet in diameter. 
(3) Unless otherwise required by the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Aviation Administration, towers 
shall have a galvanized silver or gray finish. (No. 98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
Sec. 32-240 .17 . Telecommunications Facilities, Towers, Permitted by Right. 
Towers not exceeding one hundred and ninety-nine (199) feet in height, including the antennas, shall be permitted in all 
nonresidential districts, subject to a public facility determination by the director of planning, in accordance with the general 
performance standards of sections 32-240.10 and sections 32-240.16. (No. 98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
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Sec. 32 -240 .18 . Telecommunications Facilities, Towers, Permitted With a Special Use Permit. 
Towers that are fifty (50) feet or greater in height, including the antennas, and not meeting one or more of the performance 
standards of sections 32-240.10, 32-240.16 and 32-240.17 shall be permitted with a special use permit. 
Minimum lot size in A and R districts shall be one (1) acre. (No. 98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
Sec. 32 -240 .19 . Application and Submission Requirements for Telecommunications Monopoles, Towers and 
Ancillary Buildings and Facilities. 
All monopole and tower applications shall include the following requirements. Applications for special use permits shall also 
conform to the general application and submission requirements contained in sections 32-700.50, etseq, 
(a) Address, site geographic parcel identification number (GPIN), geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude), datum 
reference, and site ground elevation above mean sea level. 
(b) Written description and scaled drawings of the proposed antenna support structure, including structure height, ground 
and structure design, and proposed materials. 
(c) Number and type of antennas and their height above ground level, including the proposed placement of antennas on 
the support structure. 
(d) A statement that there will be no conflict with other licensed telecommunications facilities. 
(e) Details of the facility design capacity for additional antennas and other associated equipment. 
(f) An inventory of other telecommunications facilities in the county owned by the applicant. 
(g) Propagation maps and a statement of the technical and operational requirements for the proposed facility, the service 
area to be covered, evaluation of the existing telecommunications facilities, water tanks, utility distribution structures, and 
tall buildings within one (1) mile of the proposed facility in the urban employment, and suburban areas identified in the 
comprehensive plan and within two (2) miles of the proposed facility in the rural areas, 
(h) When locating within a residential area, a written technical and operational analysis of why a monopole or similar 
structure at a height less than one hundred (100) feet cannot be used. 
(i) Line-of-sight diagram or photo montage, showing the proposed monopole or tower set against the skyline and viewed in 
at least four (4) directions within the surrounding areas. 
(j) A statement clearly justifying why collocation of proposed facilities with existing facilities or other structures is not 
feasible. 
(k) A statement that the proposed monopole will be able to accommodate at least three (3) providers of 
telecommunications services and the proposed tower will be able to accommodate at least four (4) providers of 
telecommunications services. 
(I) A statement that other providers will be allowed to use the monopole or tower at fair market value such that all of the 
excess capacity of the facility is used. 
(m) A color-drawing or sample of the materials to be used on the monopole, towers, antennas, and unmanned equipment 
buildings. 
(n) If the telecommunications facility is to be located in an area which is not designated as the highest priority/order of 
preference, pursuant to Tele-Policy 2 of the Telecommunications Chapter of the comprehensive plan, the applicant shall 
provide a justification statement supporting their choice of location. (No. 98-62, 7-7-98 ) 
Tab 13 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be 
filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential 
to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to 
be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any 
time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them 
to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the 
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending 
party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise. 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or 
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting 
to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of 
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This 
rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely 
because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not 
require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias 
or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to 
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available 
as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition 
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
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(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's 
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, 
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates 
to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or 
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause 
or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a 
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to 
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the 
matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If 
admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be 
received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or 
near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in 
the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of 
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as 
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification 
that complies with Rule 902(11), Rules 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, 
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate 
lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, 
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not 
conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6). 
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data 
compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to 
prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of 
which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and 
preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any 
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, 
or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a 
duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers 
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against 
the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made 
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal 
deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to 
requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, 
statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a 
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matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, was 
regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a 
certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to 
disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, 
legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal 
or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a 
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a 
sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules 
or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and 
purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time 
thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained 
in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family 
portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a document 
purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the 
original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it 
purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an 
applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement contained in a 
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was 
relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the 
document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport 
of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty 
years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, 
directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public 
or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon 
cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements 
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, 
medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or 
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, 
the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of a 
person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the 
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, 
relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community 
arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the 
community, and reputation as to events of general history important to the community or 
State or nation in which located. 
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(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among associates or in 
the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial 
or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person 
guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any 
fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution 
in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against 
persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not 
affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments as 
proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the 
judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of reputation. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court 
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose 
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement 
into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or 
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name 
and address of the declarant. 
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in 
which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying 
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement 
despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing 
physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has been 
unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of lack of 
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent 
of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or 
testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a 
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the 
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same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, 
in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar 
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action or proceeding, 
a statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, 
if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far 
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the 
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against 
another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the 
statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to 
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless 
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the declarant's 
own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption or 
marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history, even though the 
declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a 
statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of another person, if the 
declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately 
associated with the other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning 
the matter declared. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court 
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes 
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement 
into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or 
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name 
and address of the declarant. 
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